United Parcel Service - UPS

McDonnell Douglas MD-11(F)

On November 4, 2025, about 1714 eastern standard time (EST),United Parcel Service (UPS) flight 2976, a Boeing (McDonnell-Douglas) MD-11F airplane, N259UP, was destroyed after it impacted the ground shortly after takeoff from runway 17R at Louisville Muhammad Ali International Airport (SDF), Louisville, Kentucky. The 3 crewmembers aboard the airplane and 12 people on the ground were fatally injured. There were 22 others on the ground who were injured. Flight 2976 was a domestic cargo flight operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 from SDF to Daniel K. Inouye International Airport (HNL), Honolulu, Hawaii. In response to the accident, the NTSB traveled to SDF on November 5, 2025, and started the process of documenting the accident site, and collecting the perishable data necessary for the investigation. As part of the investigative process, the NTSB invited qualified parties to participate in the investigation. These included the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), UPS, The Boeing Company, Independent Pilots Association (IPA), General Electric (GE) Aerospace, and Teamsters Airline Division. The parties were formed into specialized investigative groups led by NTSB group chairmen in the areas of Structures, Systems, Powerplants, Maintenance, Air Carrier Operations and Human Performance, Hazardous Materials, Aircraft Performance, Materials, Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR), and Flight Data Recorder (FDR). A NTSB Air Traffic Controller (ATC) specialist was on site to collect ATC information, but an ATC group was not formed. NTSB Board Member Inman was the Board Member on scene. History of Flight UPS flight 2976 received their takeoff clearance from SDF ATC tower about 1711 and the flight crew acknowledged the takeoff clearance. The taxi and takeoff roll were uneventful until the airplane rotated for takeoff. Airport surveillance video of the airplane showed the left (No. 1) engine and pylon separating from the wing shortly after airplane rotation, with a fire igniting on the left engine while it traversed above the fuselage and subsequently impacted the ground (see figure 1). A fire ignited near the area of the left pylon attachment to the wing, which continued until ground impact. The airplane initially climbed but did not get higher than about 30 ft above ground level (agl) according to radio altitude data from the FDR. (Based on FAA-provided ADS-B data, the last data point showed 481 ft mean sea level [msl] and 100 ft agl.) The airplane cleared the blast fence beyond the end of runway 17R, but the left main landing gear impacted the roof of a UPS Supply Chain Solutions warehouse at the southern edge of the airport. The airplane then impacted a storage yard and two additional buildings, including a petroleum recycling facility, and was mostly consumed by fire. The wreckage area continued from the UPS warehouse to about 3,000 ft south-southeast of it. The accident site debris was centered about 38° 8' 49.85" north by 85° 44' 3.86" west. A witness in the SDF ATC tower reported that the takeoff speed appeared normal for that type of aircraft; however, the climb rate was not normal, as the airplane did not climb above the tower's height of approximately 200 feet agl. Another witness reported that the airplane stopped climbing and began to lose altitude before rolling slightly to the left. Crew Experience The captain, who was the pilot monitoring, held an airline transport pilot certificate with a type rating for the MD-11. The captain had accumulated about 8,613 total hours of flight experience as reported to the FAA, of which 4,918 hours were in the accident airplane make and model. The first officer (FO), who was the pilot flying, held an airline transport pilot certificate with a type rating for the MD-11. The FO had accumulated about 9,200 total hours of flight experience as reported to the FAA, of which about 994 hours were in the accident airplane make and model. The relief officer (RO) held an airline transport pilot certificate with a type rating for the MD-11. The RO had accumulated about 15,250 total hours of flight experience as reported to the FAA, of which 8,775 hours were in the accident airplane make and model. Recorders The airplane was equipped with a FDR and a CVR, which were both recovered from the accident scene and transported to the NTSB Vehicle Recorders Laboratory in Washington, DC. Data from both the CVR and FDR were downloaded successfully. The CVR contained about 2 hours and 4 minutes of recorded data, including the entirety of the accident flight. The FDR contained about 63 hours of data that spanned 24 flights, including the accident flight. The FDR recorded about 450 parameters of flight data. The flight data for the accident flight started about 1707 EST, with the takeoff roll starting about 1712 EST. The flight data ended about 1713:30 EST. The NTSB convened separate CVR and FDR Groups, composed of qualified party members, for transcribing the accident flight recording from the CVR and validating the flight data from the FDR, respectively. Airplane and Operator Information The MD-11 is a three-engine widebody passenger airplane originally manufactured by McDonnell-Douglas, which subsequently merged with The Boeing Company. The MD-11Fis the freighter version of the MD-11. The MD-11 can be equipped with either GE CF-6 series or Pratt and Whitney PW4000 series engines. The accident airplane was equipped with GE CF-6 engines. The MD-11 was developed from the McDonnell-Douglas DC-10 series airplane. UPS is a cargo airline and is based in Louisville, Kentucky. The company operates a variety of aircraft including Boeing 757-200F, 767-300F, A300-600F, MD-11 F, 747-400F, and 747-BF airplanes. As part of FAA requirements, the accident airplane was equipped with ADS-B Out. MD-11 Engine Pylon-to-Wing Connection The left (No. 1) and right (No. 3) engines of the MD-11 airplane are attached to the underside of pylons that are in turn attached to the underside of each wing. The center (No. 2) engine is attached to the base of the vertical stabilizer. The left and right pylon attaches to their respective wing via a forward mount bulkhead, a thrust link assembly, and an aft mount bulkhead. (For simplification, this report will refer to these bulkheads as the "forward mount" and the "aft mount".) The forward mount contains two spherical bearings that are vertically aligned (upper and lower) that attach to the wing. The thrust link assembly, located immediately behind the forward mount's lower spherical bearing, primarily transmits thrust loads. The pylon aft mount is an assembly composed of two independent fittings bolted together, with lugs (forward lug and aft lug) that house a single spherical bearing. For this report, references to the pylon aft mount spherical bearing includes both the bearing's ball element (sphere) and its outer race. A clevis on the underside of each wing ("wing clevis") connects to the pylon aft mount via attachment hardware. Recovery Operations and Wreckage Examination The airplane wreckage was spread over a wide area and significantly fragmented and burned. The left engine, left pylon, including its forward and aft mounts, fragments of engine fan blades, and separated pieces from the left engine were found on and adjacent to runway 17R. Recovered portions were transferred to a secure hangar on the airport property for further examination by investigators. The left pylon aft mount's forward and aft lugs were both found fractured near their 2 o'clock (inboard fracture) and 9 o'clock (outboard fracture) positions when in the aft-looking-forward frame of reference. The fractured and separated upper portions of the forward and aft lugs were found adjacent to runway 17R. The left wing clevis, aft mount spherical bearing, and aft mount attachment hardware were found with a portion of the left wing at the accident site. The bolt, spherical bearing, and associated hardware remained attached to the wing clevis. The spherical bearing outer race had fractured circumferentially, exposing the ball element. The right engine remained attached to the right wing pylon, both found at the accident site. The right wing pylon-to-wing forward and aft mounts had separated from the right wing pylon but were found about 87 ft from the right engine. The right pylon aft mount remained attached to the right wing clevis. NTSB Materials Laboratory Examination The left pylon aft mount, fractured lugs from the left pylon aft mount, and the left wing clevis (containing the aft mount spherical bearing and attachment hardware) were retained for further examination at the NTSB Materials Laboratory. The right pylon aft mount and wing clevis assembly as well as two engine fan blade fragments found on runway 17R were also retained for further examination at the NTSB Materials Laboratory. After initial cleaning of the fracture surfaces, examination of the left pylon aft mount lug fractures found evidence of fatigue cracks in addition to areas of overstress failure. On the aft lug, on both the inboard and outboard fracture surfaces, a fatigue crack was observed where the aft lug bore met the aft lug forward face. For the forward lug's inboard fracture surface, fatigue cracks were observed along the lug bore. For the forward lug's outboard fracture surface, the fracture consisted entirely of overstress with no indications of fatigue cracking. The forward top flange of the aft mount assembly was examined for indications of deformation or pre-existing fractures, but no indications were found. The spherical bearing was removed from the wing clevis for further evaluation. Maintenance and Inspections At the time of the accident, N259UP had accumulated a total time of about 92,992 hours and 21,043 cycles. The accident airplane was maintained under a continuous airworthiness maintenance program (CAMP). A review of the inspection tasks for the left pylon aft mount found both a general visual inspection (GVI) and a detailed visual inspection of the left pylon aft mount, required by UPS's maintenance program at a 72-month interval, was last accomplished on October 28, 2021. A 24-month/4,800 hour lubrication task of the pylon thrust links and pylon spherical bearings was last accomplished on October 18, 2025. A special detailed inspection (SDI) of the left pylon aft mount lugs would have been due at 29,200 cycles and of the left wing clevis support would have been due at 28,000 cycles. The accident airplane records showed these two SDI tasks had not been accomplished (the airplane had 21,043 cycles) Safety Actions UPS grounded their MD-11 fleet on November 7, 2025, as a precautionary measure and at the recommendation of Boeing. The FAA issued Emergency Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2025-23-51 on November 8, 2025, that prohibited further flight of MD-11 and MD-11F airplanes until they were inspected and all applicable corrective actions were performed using a method approved by the FAA Continued Operational Safety Branch (AIR-520). The FAA subsequently issued Emergency AD 2025-23-53 on November 14, 2025, which superseded Emergency AD 2025-23-51 and included both MD-11 and DC-10 series airplanes, the latter based on their similar design to the MD-11. Similar Events On May 25, 1979, about 1504 central daylight time, American Airlines flight 191, a McDonnell-Douglas DC-10-10 aircraft, crashed into an open field just short of a trailer park about 4,600 ft northwest of the departure end of runway 32R at Chicago-O'Hare International Airport, Chicago, Illinois. Flight 191 was taking off from runway 32R. The weather was clear and the visibility was 15 miles. During the takeoff rotation, the left engine and pylon assembly and about 3 ft of the leading edge of the left wing separated from the airplane and fell to the runway. Flight 191 continued to climb to about 325 ft agl and then began to roll to the left. The airplane continued to roll to the left until the wings were past the vertical position, and during the roll, the airplane's nose pitched down below the horizon. Flight 191 crashed into the open field and the wreckage scattered into an adjacent trailer park. The airplane was destroyed in the crash and subsequent fire. Two hundred and seventy-one persons on board Flight 191 were killed; two persons on the ground were killed, and two others were seriously injured. An old aircraft hangar, several automobiles, and a mobile home were destroyed. The NTSB investigated American Airlines flight 191 accident, see NTSB No. DCA79AA017 and aircraft accident report AAR-79-17. The NTSB's investigation of UPS flight 2976 is ongoing.

McDonnell Douglas MD-11

The crew started the takeoff procedure from runway 33L at Seoul-Incheon Airport and reached V1 speed after a course of 6,413 feet. At a speed of 182 knots, the crew heard a noise corresponding to the failure of both tires n°9 and 10 located on the central landing gear. The captain decided to abandon the takeoff procedure and initiated an emergency braking maneuver. Unable to stop within the remaining distance of 4,635 feet (in relation with the total weight of 629,600 lbs), the airplane overran. While contacting a grassy area, the nose gear collapsed then the airplane struck various equipment of the localizer antenna and came to rest 485 meters past the runway end. All four crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Airbus A300-600

On August 14, 2013, about 0447 central daylight time (CDT), UPS flight 1354, an Airbus A300-600, N155UP, crashed short of runway 18 during a localizer non precision approach to runway 18 at Birmingham-Shuttlesworth International Airport (BHM), Birmingham, Alabama. The captain and first officer were fatally injured, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and postcrash fire. The scheduled cargo flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan, and dark night visual flight rules conditions prevailed at the airport; variable instrument meteorological conditions with a variable ceiling were present north of the airport on the approach course at the time of the accident. The flight originated from Louisville International Airport-Standiford Field, Louisville, Kentucky, about 0503 eastern daylight time. A notice to airmen in effect at the time of the accident indicated that runway 06/24, the longest runway available at the airport and the one with a precision approach, would be closed from 0400 to 0500 CDT. Because the flight's scheduled arrival time was 0451, only the shorter runway 18 with a non precision approach was available to the crew. Forecasted weather at BHM indicated that the low ceilings upon arrival required an alternate airport, but the dispatcher did not discuss the low ceilings, the single-approach option to the airport, or the reopening of runway 06/24 about 0500 with the flight crew. Further, during the flight, information about variable ceilings at the airport was not provided to the flight crew.

Boeing 747-400

The four engine aircraft was completing a cargo flight from Hong Kong to Cologne with an intermediate stop in Dubai with two pilots on board. One minute after passing the BALUS waypoint, approaching the top of climb, as the aircraft was climbing to the selected cruise altitude of 32,000 feet, the Fire Warning Master Warning Light illuminated and the Audible Alarm [Fire Bell] sounded, warning the crew of a fire indication on the Main Deck Fire - Forward. The captain advised BAE-C that there was a fire indication on the main deck of the aircraft, informing Bahrain ATC that they needed to land as soon as possible. BAE-C advised that Doha International Airport (DOH) was at the aircraft’s 10 o’clock position 100 nm DME from the current location. The Captain elected to return to the point of departure, DXB. The crew changed the selected altitude from 32,000 feet to 28,000 feet as the aircraft changed heading back to DXB, the Auto Throttle [AT] began decreasing thrust to start the decent. The AP was manually disconnected, then reconnected , followed by the AP manually disconnecting for a short duration, the captain as handling pilot was manually flying the aircraft. Following the turn back and the activation of the fire suppression, for unknown reasons, the PACK 1 status indicated off line [PACKS 2 and 3 were off], in accordance with the fire arm switch activation. There was no corresponding discussion recorded on the CVR that the crew elected to switch off the remaining active PACK 1. As the crew followed the NNC Fire/Smoke/Fumes checklist and donned their supplemental oxygen masks, there is some cockpit confusion regarding the microphones and the intra-cockpit communication as the crew cannot hear the microphone transmissions in their respective headsets. The crew configured the aircraft for the return to DXB, the flight was in a descending turn to starboard onto the 095° reciprocal heading for DXB when the Captain requested an immediate descent to 10,000 ft. The reason for the immediate descent was never clarified in the available data. The AP was disengaged, the Captain then informed the FO that there was limited pitch control of the aircraft when flying manually. The Captain was manually making inputs to the elevators through the control column, with limited response from the aircraft. The flight was approximately 4 minutes into the emergency. The aircraft was turning and descending, the fire suppression has been initiated and there was a pitch control problem. The cockpit was filling with persistent continuous smoke and fumes and the crew had put the oxygen masks on. The penetration by smoke and fumes into the cockpit area occurred early into the emergency. The cockpit environment was overwhelmed by the volume of smoke. There are several mentions of the cockpit either filling with smoke or being continuously ‘full of smoke’, to the extent that the ability of the crew to safely operate the aircraft was impaired by the inability to view their surroundings. Due to smoke in the cockpit, from a continuous source near and contiguous with the cockpit area [probably through the supernumerary area and the ECS flight deck ducting], the crew could neither view the primary flight displays, essential communications panels or the view from the cockpit windows. The crew rest smoke detector activated at 15:15:15 and remained active for the duration of the flight. There is emergency oxygen located at the rear of the cockpit, in the supernumerary area and in the crew rest area. Due to the persistent smoke the Captain called for the opening of the smoke shutter, which stayed open for the duration of the flight. The smoke remained in the cockpit area. There was a discussion between the crew concerning inputting the DXB runway 12 Left [RWY12L] Instrument Landing System [ILS] data into the FMC. With this data in the FMC the crew can acquire the ILS for DXB RWY12L and configure the aircraft for an auto flight/auto land approach. The F.O. mentions on several occasions difficulty inputting the data based on the reduced visibility. However, the ILS was tuned to a frequency of 110.1 (The ILS frequency for DXB Runway 12L is 110.126), the Digital Flight Data Recorder [DFDR] data indicates that this was entered at 15:19:20 which correlates which the CVR discussion and timing. At approximately 15:20, during the emergency descent at around 21,000ft cabin pressure altitude, the Captain made a comment concerning the high temperature in the cockpit. This was followed almost immediately by the rapid onset of the failure of the Captain’s oxygen supply. Following the oxygen supply difficulties there was confusion regarding the location of the alternative supplementary oxygen supply location. The F.O either was not able to assist or did not know where the oxygen bottle was located; the Captain then gets out of the LH seat. This CVR excerpt indicates the following exchange between the Captain and F.O concerning the mask operation and the alternative oxygen supply bottle location. The exchange begins when the Captain’s oxygen supply stops abruptly with no other indications that the oxygen supply is low or failing. Based on the pathological information, the Captain lost consciousness due to toxic poisoning. After the Captain left the LH cockpit seat, the F.O. assumed the PF role. The F.O. remained in position as P.F. for the duration of the flight. There was no further interaction from the Captain or enquiry by the F.O as to the location of the Captain or the ability of the Captain to respond. The PF informed the BAE-C controllers that due to the limited visibility in the cockpit that it was not possible to change the radio frequency on the Audio Control Panel [ACP]. This visibility comment recurs frequently during the flight. The Bahrain East controller was communicating with the emergency aircraft via relays. Several were employed during the transition back to DXB. The aircraft was now out of effective VHF radio range with BAE-C. In order for the crew to communicate with BAE-C, BAE-C advised transiting aircraft that they would act as a communication relay between BAE-C and the emergency aircraft. BAE-C would then communicate to the UAE controllers managing the traffic in the Emirates FIR via a landline, who would then contact the destination aerodrome at Dubai, also by landline. The crew advised relay aircraft that they would stay on the Bahrain frequency as they could not see the ACP to change frequency. All of the 121.5 MHz transmissions by the PF were keyed via the VHF-R, all other radio communication with BAE-C and the relay aircraft are keyed from the VHF-L audio panel. There are several attempts by the UAE’s Area Control [EACC] to contact the flight on the guard frequency in conjunction with aircraft relaying information transmitting on the guard frequency to the accident flight. The PF of the accident flight does not appear to hear any of the transmissions from the air traffic control units or the relay aircraft on the guard frequency. Around this time, given the proximity of the aircraft to the RWY12L intermediate approach fix, Dubai ATC transmits several advisory messages to the flight on the Dubai frequencies, for example DXB ARR on 124.9 MHz advise that ‘Any runway is available’. The Runway lights for RWY30L were turned on to assist the return to DXB. The Aircraft condition inbound as the flight approached DXB for RWY12L. The computed airspeed was 350 knots, at an altitude of 9,000 feet and descending on a heading of 105° which was an interception heading for the ILS at RWY12L. The FMC was tuned for RWY12L, the PF selected the ‘Approach’ push button on the Mode Control Panel [MCP] the aircraft captures the Glide Slope (G/S). The AP did not transition into the Localizer Mode while the Localizer was armed. ATC, through the relay aircraft advised the PF, ‘you're too fast and too high can you make a 360? Further requesting the PF to perform a ‘360° turn if able’. The PF responded ‘Negative, negative, negative’ to the request. The landing gear lever was selected down at 15:38:00, followed approximately 20 seconds later by an the aural warning alarm indicating a new EICAS caution message, which based on the data is a Landing Gear Disagree Caution. At 15:38:20 the PF says: ‘I have no, uh gear’. Following the over flight of DXB, on passing north of the aerodrome abeam RWY12L. The last Radar contact before the flight passed into the zone of silence was at 15:39:03. The flight was on a heading of 89° at a speed of 320 knots , altitude 4200 feet and descending. The flight was cleared direct to Sharjah Airport (SHJ), SHJ was to the aircraft’s left at 10 nm, the SHJ runway is a parallel vector to RWY12L at DXB. The relay pilot asked the PF if it was possible to perform a left hand turn. This turn, if completed would have established the flight onto an approximate 10 mile final approach for SHJ RWY30. The flight was offered vectors to SHJ (left turn required) and accepts. The relay aircraft advised that SHJ was at 095° from the current position at 10 nm. The PF acknowledged the heading change to 095° for SHJ. For reasons undetermined the PF selected 195° degrees on the Mode Control Panel [MCP], the AP was manually disconnected at 15:40:05, the aircraft then banked to the right as the FMC captured the heading change, rolled wings level on the new heading, the throttles were then retarded, the aircraft entered a descending right hand turn at an altitude of 4000 feet, the speed gradually reduced to 240 kts. The PF made a series of pitch inputs which had a limited effect on the descent profile; the descent is arrested temporarily. There then followed a series of rapid pitch oscillations. These were not phugoid oscillations, these were commanded responses where the elevator effectiveness decreased rapidly as the airspeed decayed and the elevators could not compensate for the reduced thrust moment from the engines to maintain level flight in a steady state. This was due to the desynchronization of the control column inputs and the elevators. At this point had the aircraft remained on the current heading and descent profile it would have intercepted the terrain at or near a large urban conurbation, Dubai Silicone Oasis. The PF was in VHF communication with the relay aircraft requesting positional, speed and altitude information. From this point onwards, approximately 50 seconds elapse prior to the data ending. The effectiveness of the pitch control immediately prior to the end of the data was negligible. The control column was fully aft when the data ended, there was no corresponding elevator movement. The aircraft lost control in flight and made an uncontrolled descent into terrain.

Douglas DC-8

On February 7, 2006, about 2359 eastern standard time, United Parcel Service Company flight 1307, a McDonnell Douglas DC-8-71F, N748UP, landed at its destination airport, Philadelphia International Airport, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, after a cargo smoke indication in the cockpit. The captain, first officer, and flight engineer evacuated the airplane after landing. The flight crewmembers sustained minor injuries, and the airplane and most of the cargo were destroyed by fire after landing. The scheduled cargo flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Night visual conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

Swearingen SA227 Metro III

During arrival, at 0540:31, the captain was cleared for an rnav runway 05 approach and was told to contact London FSS on 121.6 mhz, 'now.' However, he did not make the radio call until approximately 3 minutes later. The aircraft broke out of the weather at about 1,000 feet and 1 mile from the airport (before the radio call). At that time, the runway lights were not on. The captain then advised the FSS to turn on the runway lights and he made a left pattern to circle back and land. During the next approach, the aircraft was high and fast on final approach and touched down long. The 1st officer recommended that the captain make a go-around, but the captain elected to continue the landing. When the captain realized that he would not be able to stop on the remaining runway, he retracted the gear. The aircraft then slid off the end of the runway, went over an embankment, became airborne for about 140 feet, then impacted in a large ravine area. The weight manifest was found to be in error. After allowing for a 500 lb fuel burnoff, the landing weight was estimated to be 14,668 lbs. The max gross weight limit was 14,500 lbs. All three occupants were injured.