Pan American World Airways - PAA

Boeing 747-100

Flight PA103 departed London-Heathrow runway 27R for New York at 18:25. The aircraft levelled off at FL310, 31 minutes later. At 19:03 Shanwick Oceanic Control transmitted an oceanic clearance. At that time an explosion occurred in the aircraft's forward cargo hold at position 4L. The explosive forces produced a large hole in the fuselage structure and disrupted the main cabin floor. Major cracks continued to propagate from the large hole while containers and items of cargo ejected through the hole, striking the empennage, left- and right tail plane. The forward fuselage and flight deck area separated when the aircraft was in a nose down and left roll attitude, peeling away to the right at Station 800. The nose section then knocked the no. 3 engine off its pylon. The remaining aircraft disintegrated while it was descending nearly vertically from 19000 feet to 9000 feet. A section of cabin floor and baggage hold (from approx. Station 1241-1920) fell onto housing at Rosebank Terrace, Lockerbie. The main wing structure struck the ground with a high yaw angle at Sherwood Crescent, Lockerbie causing a massive fire. The Semtex bomb which caused the explosion had probably been hidden in a radio cassette player and was transferred to PA103 from a Pan Am Boeing 727 flight, arriving from Frankfurt. After a three-year joint investigation by the Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation indictments for murder were issued on November 13, 1991, against Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi, a Libyan intelligence officer and the head of security for Libyan Arab Airlines (LAA), and Lamin Khalifah Fhimah, the LAA station manager in Luqa Airport, Malta. United Nations sanctions against Libya and protracted negotiations with the Libyan leader Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi secured the handover of the accused on April 5, 1999. On January 31, 2001, Megrahi was convicted of murder by a panel of three Scottish judges, and sentenced to 27 years in prison. Fhimah was acquitted.

Boeing 747-100

Flight PA073 was cleared to land on runway 25R of Karachi International Airport (KHI), Pakistan. The approach speed just prior to touchdown was 152 knots. After touchdown reverse thrust was applied on engines n°1, 2 and 3. Engine No.4 which had an unserviceable reverser was left in forward idle. Seventy knots was called and some three seconds later reverse power was decreased. At this stage EPR on n°4 engine increased rapidly. The aircraft veered to the left of the centerline at about 7400 feet from the approach end of runway 25R and departed the runway edge at 8000 feet from the approach end of runway 25R with 2,500 feet of runway remaining. Shortly before the aircraft departed the runway, the pilot flying (copilot) reported that he had no brakes and no nose wheel steering. The captain stated that he got on the brakes and tiller at this time to assist. After departing the runway surface the aircraft travelled 380 feet through soft mud before it came to rest at a point about 2100 feet from the end of runway 25R, heading about 160 degrees on the Southern side of the runway with the tail of the aircraft 120 feet from the runway edge. Shortly after the aircraft departed the runway, the nose gear struck a VASI light installation and its concrete base causing the nose gear to collapse backwards and to the left, resulting in total destruction of the VASI light installation and damage to the forward cargo hold, floor of the first class section and the stairway leading to the upper deck. Damage to the aircraft was substantial and it was not repaired. All 243 occupants evacuated safely. Source: ASN

Boeing 727-200

Pan Am Flight 759 was a scheduled flight from Miami (MIA) to Las Vegas (LAS), with an en route stop at New Or1eans (MSY). At 15:58:48 Boeing 727 "Clipper Defiance" taxied from its gate at the New Orleans International Airport. Before leaving the gate, the flightcrew had received ATIS message Foxtrot which read in part "....time one eight five five Zulu, weather, two thousand five hundred scattered, two five thousand thin broken, visibility six miles in haze, temperature niner zero, wind two four zero at two, winds are calm altimeter three zero zero one...". The flightcrew requested runway 10 for the takeoff and ground control cleared the flight to taxi to runway 10. At 15:59:03, the first officer requested a wind check. Winds were 040 degrees at 8 knots. At 16:02:34, while Flight 759 was taxiing to runway 10, the crew heard a transmission from ground control, advising another airplane of low level wind shear alerts in the northeast quadrants of the airport. At 16:03:33, the first officer requested another wind check. Ground control replied, "Wind now zero seven zero degrees at one seven... peak gusts two three, and we have low level wind shear alerts all quadrants, appears to be a frontal passing overhead right now, we're right in the middle of everything." The captain then advised the first officer to "...let your airspeed build up on takeoff..." and said that they would turn off the air conditioning packs for the takeoff, which would enable them to increase the EPR's on engines Nos. 1 and 3 to 1.92. The flightcrew completed the takeoff and departure briefings and turned onto the active runway for takeoff. At l6:06:22, Flight 759 informed the tower that it was ready for takeoff. The local controller cleared the flight for takeoff, and the first officer acknowledged the clearance. About 16:07:57, the Boeing 727 began its takeoff. According to witnesses, the airplane lifted off about 7,000 feet down runway 10, climbed in a wings-level attitude, reached an altitude of about 100 feet to 150 feet above the ground (AGL), and then began to descend towards trees. The airplane crashed into a residential area and was destroyed during the impact, explosion, and subsequent ground fire. Eight persons on the ground were killed.

Boeing 727-100

On final approach to San José-Juan Santamaría Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions. In limited visibility due to rain falls, the airplane descended below the glide until the right main gear struck the ground 15 meters short of runway 07 threshold. On impact, the landing gear was torn off. Out of control, the airplane struck the ground, lost its undercarriage then slid on several dozen meters before coming to rest. All 73 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft christened 'Clipper Meteor' was damaged beyond repair.

Boeing 747-100

The KLM Boeing 747, registration PH-BUF, took off from Schipol Airport (Amsterdam) at 0900 hours on 27 March 1977, en route to Las Palmas de Gran Canaria. This flight was part of the Charter Series KL4805/4806 Amsterdam-Las Palmas (Canary Islands) - Amsterdam operated by KLM on behalf of the Holland International Travel Group (H.I.N.T.), Rijswijk-Z.H. The Boeing 747 registration N736PA, flight number 1736, left Los Angeles International Airport, California, United States, on 26 March 1977, local date, at 0129Z hours, arriving at John F. Kennedy International Airport at 0617Z hours. After the aeroplane was refuelled and a crew change effected, it took off for Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (Spain) at 0742Z. While the aeroplanes were en route to Las Palmas, a bomb exploded in the airport passenger terminal. On account of this incident and of a warning regarding a possible second bomb, the airport was closed. Therefore, KLM 4805 was diverted to Los Rodeos (Tenerife) Airport, arriving at 1338Z on 27 March 1977. For the same reason, PAA1736 proceeded to the same airport, which was its alternate, landing at 1415. At first the KLM passengers were not allowed to leave the aeroplane, but after about twenty minutes they were all transported to the terminal building by bus. On alighting from the bus, they received cards identifying them as passengers in transit on Flight KL 4805. Later, all the passengers boarded KLM 4805 expect the H.I.N.T. Company guide, who remained in Tenerife. When Las Palmas Airport was opened to traffic once more, the PAA 1736 crew prepared to proceed to Las Palmas, which was the flight's planned destination. When they attempted to taxi on the taxiway leading to runway 12, where they had been parked with four other aeroplanes on account of the congestion caused by the number of flights diverted to Tenerife, they discovered that it was blocked by KLM Boeing 747, Flight 4805, which was located between PAA 1736 and the entrance to the active runway. The first officer and the flight engineer left the aeroplane and measured the clearance left by the KLM aircraft, reaching the conclusion that it was insufficient to allow PAA 1736 to pass by, obliging them to writ until the former had started to taxi. The passengers of PAA 1736 did not leave the aeroplane during the whole time that it remained in the airport. KLM 4805 called the tower at 1656 requesting permission to taxi. It was authorized to do so and at 1658 requested to backtrack on runway 12 for take-off on runway 30. The tower controller first cleared the KLM flight to taxi to the holding position for runway 30 by taxiing down the main runway and leaving it by the (third) taxiway to its left. KLM 4805 acknowledged receipt of this message from the tower, stating that it was at that moment taxiing on the runway, which it would leave by the first taxiway in order to proceed to the approach end of runway 30. The tower controller immediately issued an amended clearance, instructing it to continue to taxi to the end of the runway, where it should proceed to backtrack. The KLM flight confirmed that it had received the message, that it would backtrack, and that it was taxiing down tile main runway. The tower signalled its approval, whereupon KLM 4805 immediately asked the tower again if what they had asked it to do was to turn left on taxiway one. The tower replied in the negative and repeated that it should continue on to the end of the runway and there backtrack. Finally, at 1659, KLM 4805 replied, "O.K., sir." At 1702, the PAA aeroplane called the tower to request confirmation that it should taxi down the runway. The tower controller confirmed this, also adding that they should leave the runway by the third taxiway to their left. At 1703:00, in reply to the tower controller's query to KLM 4805 as to how many runway exits they had passed, the latter confirmed that at that moment they were passing by taxiway C4. The tower controller told KLM 4805, "O.K., at the end of the runway make one eighty and report ready for ATC clearance ." In response to a query from KLM 4805, the tower controller advised both aeroplanes - KLM 4805 and PAA 1736 - that the runway centre line lights were out of service. The controller also reiterated to PAA 1736 that they were to leave the main runway via the third taxiway to their left and that they should report leaving the runway. At the times indicated, the following conversations took place between the tower and the KLM 4805 and PAA 1736 aeroplanes. Times taken from KLM CVR. 1705:44.6 KLM 4805: The KLM four eight zero five is now ready for take-off and we are waiting for our ATC clearance. (1705:50.77). 1705:53.41 Tower: KLM eight seven zero five you are cleared to the Papa Beacon, climb to and maintain flight level nine zero, right turn after take-off, proceed with heading four zero until intercepting the three two five radial from Las Palmas VOR. (1706 :08.09). 1706:09.61 KLM 4805: Ah - Roger, sir, we are cleared to the Papa Beacon, flight level nine zero until intercepting the three two five. We are now (at take-off). (1706:17.79). 1706:18.19 Tower : O.K..... Stand by for take-off, I will call you. (1706: 21.79). Note: A squeal starts at: 1706:19.39 The squeal ends at: 1706:22.06 1706:21.92 PAA 1736: Clipper one seven three six. (1706 : 23.39). 1706:25.47 Tower: Ah - Papa Alpha one seven three six report the runway clear. (1706: 28.89). 1706:29.59 PAA 1736: O.K., will report when we're clear. (1706:30.69). 1706:31.69 Tower: Thank you. Subsequently, KLM 4805, which had released its brakes to start take-off run 20 seconds before this communication took place, collided with the PAA aeroplane. The control tower received no further communications from PAA 1736, nor from KLM 4805. There were no eyewitnesses to the collision. All 248 occupants on board the KLM 747 were killed. Among the 396 people on board the Pan Am 747, 335 were killed (among them nine crew members) and 61 others were injured.

Boeing 707

Following an uneventful flight from Hong Kong-Kai Tak, the crew started the descent to Denpasa-Ngurah Rai Airport by night and limited visibility. While descending to runway 09 at an altitude of 4,000 feet, the airplane initiated a turn to 263° when it struck the slope of Mt Masehe located about 68 km from the airport. The wreckage was found few hours later. The aircraft was totally destroyed upon impact and all 107 occupants have been killed.

Boeing 707

On January 30, 1974, Pan Am Flight 806, Boeing 707-321B 'Clipper Radiant' operated as a scheduled flight from Auckland, New Zealand, to Los Angeles, California. En route stops included Pago Pago, American Samoa, and Honolulu, Hawaii. Flight 806 departed Auckland at 2014. It was cleared to Pago Pago on an IFR flight plan. At 2311, Flight 806 contacted Pago Pago Approach Control and reported its position 160 miles south of the Pago Pago airport. Approach control responded, "Clipper eight zero six, roger, and Pago weather, estimated ceiling one thousand six hundred broken, four thousand broken, the visibility - correction, one thousand overcast. The visibility one zero, light rain shower, temperature seven eight, wind three five zero degrees, one five, and altimeter's two nine eight five." At 2313, Pago Pago Approach Control cleared the flight to the Pago Pago VORTAC. Flight 806 reported leaving FL330 three minutes later and leaving FL200 at 2324. Pago Pago Approach Control cleared the flight at 2324: "Clipper eight zero six, you're cleared-for the ILS DME runway five approach - via the two zero mile arc south-southwest. Report the arc, and leaving five thousand." At 2333, the flight requested the direction and velocity of the Pago Pago winds and was told that they were 360 degrees variable from 020 degrees at 10 to 15 knots. At 2334, the flight reported out of 5,500 feet and that they had intercepted the 226 degree radial of the Pago Pago VOR. The approach controller responded, "Eight oh six, right. Understand inbound on the localizer. Report about three out. No other reported traffic. Winds zero one zero degrees at one five gusting two zero." At 2338, approach control said, "Clipper eight oh six, appears that we've had power failure at the airport. " The first officer replied, "Eight oh six, we're still getting your VOR, the ILS and the lights are showing." Approach control then asked, "See the runway lights?" The flight responded, "That's Charlie." The approach controller then said, " ...we have a bad rain shower here. I can't see them from my position here." "We're five DME now and they still look bright," the first officer responded. Approach Control replied, "´kay, no other reported traffic. The wind is zero three zero degrees at two zero, gusting two five. Advise clear of the runway." At 23:39:41, the flight replied, "Eight zero six, wilco." This was the last radio transmission from the flight. On the flight deck the windshield wipers were turned on and the flaps were set at the 50° position, which completed the checklists for landing. At 23:40:22, the first officer stated, "You're a little high." The radio altimeter warning tone then sounded twice and the first officer said "You're at minimums." He reported the field in sight and said that they were at 140 kts. At 23:40:42, the aircraft crashed into trees at an elevation of 113 feet, and about 3,865 feet short of the runway threshold. The first impact with the ground was about 236 feet farther along the crash path. The aircraft continued through the jungle vegetation, struck a 3-foot-high lava rock wall, and stopped about 3,090 feet from the runway threshold. Of the 101 occupants of the aircraft, 9 passengers and 1 crew member survived the crash and fire. One passenger died the next day; the crew member and three passengers died 3 days after the accident. One passenger died of his injuries 9 days after the accident. Thus only four passengers survived the crash.

Boeing 707

While parked at Rome-Fiumicino-Leonardo da Vinci Airport and ready for departure, the aircraft was attacked by six members from a Palestinian terrorist group. Shots burst with police forces and several grenades detonated, causing the aircraft to catch fire. 15 occupants were seriously injured while 129 others were unhurt. Unfortunately, 33 passengers were killed during this terrorist attack.

Boeing 707

Pan American World Airways Clipper Flight 160 was a scheduled cargo flight from New York-JFK to Frankfurt (FRA), Germany, with a scheduled stop at Prestwick (PIK), Scotland. At 08:25 the flight departed JFK. The aircraft was carrying 52912 lb (24000 kg) of cargo, 15,360 lb (6967 kg) of which were chemicals. After departure, Clipper 160 was vectored on course while climbing to FL330. At 08:44, Clipper 160's clearance was amended, and it was instructed to maintain FL310 as a final cruising altitude. Clipper 160 reported level at FL310 at 08:50. As the flight approached Sherbrooke VORTAC 100 miles east of Montreal, Canada, at about 09:04, it advised Pan American Operations (PANOP) in New York that smoke had accumulated in the "lower 41" electrical compartment, and that the flight was diverting to Boston. At 09:08, Clipper 160 advised Montreal Center that they were level at FL310 and wanted to return to JFK. Montreal Center cleared Clipper 160 for a right turn to a heading of 180 degrees. At 09:10, Clipper 160 advised PANOP that it was returning to New York and that the smoke seemed to be "getting a little thicker in here." At 09:11, the crew advised PANOP that they were now going to Boston and that "this smoke is getting too thick." They also requested that emergency equipment be available when they arrived at Boston. During this conversation, the comment was made that the "cockpit's full back there." During its return to Boston, the flight was given preferential air traffic control treatment, although it had not declared an emergency. After issuing appropriate descent clearances en route so that fuel could be burned off more rapidly at lower altitudes, at 09:26:30 Boston Center advised Boston Arrival Radar that the flight was at 2,000 feet. At 09:29, Clipper 160 asked Boston Center for the flight's distance from Boston, and added, "The DME's don't seem to be working." The Center answered, "You're passing abeam, Pease Air Force Base, right now, sir, and you're about 40 to 45 miles to the northwest of Boston." The first communication between Clipper 160 and the arrival radar controller was at 09:31:21. The flight was cleared "direct Boston, maintain 2,000." The controller asked if the flight was declaring an emergency; the reply was "negative on the emergency, and may we have runway 33 left?" The controller approved the request, and the flight proceeded to Boston as cleared. At approximately the same time, the captain instructed the crew to "shut down everything you don't need." At 09:34:20, the controller asked, "Clipper 160, what do you show for a compass heading right now?" Clipper 160 answered, "Compass heading at this time is 205." The controller then asked, "will you accept a vector for a visual approach to a 5-mile final for runway 33 left, or do you want to be extended out further?" The crew replied, "Negative, we want to get it on the ground as soon as possible." At 09:35:46, the controller stated, "Clipper 160, advise anytime you have the airport in sight." Clipper 160 did not reply. At 09:37:04, the arrival controller made the following transmission: "Clipper 160, this is Boston approach control. If you read, squawk ident on any transponder. I see your transponder just became inoperative. Continue inbound now for runway 33 left, you're No. 1. There is a Lufthansa 747 on a 3-mile final for runway 27, the spacing is good. Remain on this frequency, Clipper 160." There was no reply from the flight. With flaps and spoilers had been extended for speed reduction, the airplane approached runway 33L. The yaw damper was rendered inoperative by the uncoordinated execution of emergency procedures earlier. This made the 707 extremely difficult to control at low speeds. Control was lost and the airplane struck the ground nose down about 262 feet from the right edge of the approach end of runway 33.Pan American World Airways Clipper Flight 160 was a scheduled cargo flight from New York-JFK to Frankfurt (FRA), Germany, with a scheduled stop at Prestwick (PIK), Scotland. At 08:25 the flight departed JFK. The aircraft was carrying 52912 lb (24000 kg) of cargo, 15,360 lb (6967 kg) of which were chemicals. After departure, Clipper 160 was vectored on course while climbing to FL330. At 08:44, Clipper 160's clearance was amended, and it was instructed to maintain FL310 as a final cruising altitude. Clipper 160 reported level at FL310 at 08:50. As the flight approached Sherbrooke VORTAC 100 miles east of Montreal, Canada, at about 09:04, it advised Pan American Operations (PANOP) in New York that smoke had accumulated in the "lower 41" electrical compartment, and that the flight was diverting to Boston. At 09:08, Clipper 160 advised Montreal Center that they were level at FL310 and wanted to return to JFK. Montreal Center cleared Clipper 160 for a right turn to a heading of 180 degrees. At 09:10, Clipper 160 advised PANOP that it was returning to New York and that the smoke seemed to be "getting a little thicker in here." At 09:11, the crew advised PANOP that they were now going to Boston and that "this smoke is getting too thick." They also requested that emergency equipment be available when they arrived at Boston. During this conversation, the comment was made that the "cockpit's full back there." During its return to Boston, the flight was given preferential air traffic control treatment, although it had not declared an emergency. After issuing appropriate descent clearances en route so that fuel could be burned off more rapidly at lower altitudes, at 09:26:30 Boston Center advised Boston Arrival Radar that the flight was at 2,000 feet. At 09:29, Clipper 160 asked Boston Center for the flight's distance from Boston, and added, "The DME's don't seem to be working." The Center answered, "You're passing abeam, Pease Air Force Base, right now, sir, and you're about 40 to 45 miles to the northwest of Boston." The first communication between Clipper 160 and the arrival radar controller was at 09:31:21. The flight was cleared "direct Boston, maintain 2,000." The controller asked if the flight was declaring an emergency; the reply was "negative on the emergency, and may we have runway 33 left?" The controller approved the request, and the flight proceeded to Boston as cleared. At approximately the same time, the captain instructed the crew to "shut down everything you don't need." At 09:34:20, the controller asked, "Clipper 160, what do you show for a compass heading right now?" Clipper 160 answered, "Compass heading at this time is 205." The controller then asked, "will you accept a vector for a visual approach to a 5-mile final for runway 33 left, or do you want to be extended out further?" The crew replied, "Negative, we want to get it on the ground as soon as possible." At 09:35:46, the controller stated, "Clipper 160, advise anytime you have the airport in sight." Clipper 160 did not reply. At 09:37:04, the arrival controller made the following transmission: "Clipper 160, this is Boston approach control. If you read, squawk ident on any transponder. I see your transponder just became inoperative. Continue inbound now for runway 33 left, you're No. 1. There is a Lufthansa 747 on a 3-mile final for runway 27, the spacing is good. Remain on this frequency, Clipper 160." There was no reply from the flight. With flaps and spoilers had been extended for speed reduction, the airplane approached runway 33L. The yaw damper was rendered inoperative by the uncoordinated execution of emergency procedures earlier. This made the 707 extremely difficult to control at low speeds. Control was lost and the airplane struck the ground nose down about 262 feet from the right edge of the approach end of runway 33. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all three crew members were killed.

Boeing 707

The airplane was completing a internationaal service from Auckland to Los Angeles with an intermediate stop in Papeete, Tahiti. After a night takeoff from Papeete-Faaa Airport runway 04, while climbing to a height of 300 feet, the pilot-in-command initiated a turn to the left according to departure procedures. Then the aircraft entered a left banked, lost altitude and crashed into the sea about 3 km offshore. Few debris were found floating on water and one passenger was evacuated while all 78 other occupants were killed. The aircraft sank by a depth of about 700 meters and both CVR and FDR were not found.

Boeing 707

Flight 6005 was a scheduled international cargo flight from San Francisco to Saigon with intermediate stops at Honolulu, Guam and Manila. The flight from San Francisco to Honolulu and Guam was uneventful. At 2125 hours GMT on 24 July 1971, the flight took off from Guam for Manila. Initial contact with the flight was established by Manila Control at 2400 hours and the controller provided the flight with the latest weather information for Manila. At 0013 hours the flight reported having passed Jamalig one minute before, being at 67 DME and out of FL 200. It was then handed over by Manila Control to Manila approach control. The approach controller cleared the flight to BA and provided the crew with the following weather information: wind 280°/20 kts, visibility 7 kms, light rain, cloud 3/8 at 4 000 ft and 8/8 at 9 000 ft. At 0018 hours the flight was cleared for a VOR/DME approach to Runway 24 from the Bangbang Intersection and one minute later the flight reported commencing the approach. At 0021 hours the flight reported 22 DME out of 5 000 ft for 4 000 ft and 20 seconds later reaching 4 200 ft. This was acknowledged by the controller who, thereafter was unable to establish contact with the flight. It was subsequently found that at approximately 0023 hours the aircraft collided with Mt Kamunay some 20 miles ENE of the Manila VOR, at an altitude of 2 525 ft. Witnesses residing near the scene of the accident testified that they had heard the sound of an aircraft which ceased in an explosion, followed by two other explosions, one immediately thereafter and the second one a little later. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all four crew members were killed.

Boeing 707

The aircraft christened 'Clipper Racer' departed San Francisco on a cargo flight to Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam with en route stops at Elmendorf AFB, Tokyo and Ðà N<U+1EB5>ng. Because of below minima weather at Anchorage International Airport, the aircraft landed at Elmendorf AFB. Several delays were experienced before the flight taxied out at 06:02. Flight 799 was given a void time of 06:15 by Oceanic Control to avoid traffic conflict. If the crew failed to make that time, it would result in a 45 min delay. When the checklist item "wing flaps" was called, the 'follow me' truck arrived to guide them to runway 23. From then on the crew were busy steering the plane on the slippery taxiways and talking to Oceanic Control resp. The aircraft was cleared for takeoff at 06:14. The stick shaker sounded shortly after VR (154 kts). The aircraft rotated climbed slowly. The right wing contacted the snow covered ground 94 feet left of the extended centerline at a distance of 2760 feet from the runway. The aircraft rolled inverted and broke up.

Boeing 707

Following an uneventful flight from New York-JFK, the crew started a night approach to Maiquetía-Simon Bolivar Airport in Caracas. On final, the airplane struck the water surface and crashed into the sea 18,4 km north offshore. Few debris were found floating on water and all 51 occupants were killed.

Boeing 727-100

Pan Am's scheduled cargo flight 708 from Frankfurt to Berlin usually lands at Tempelhof Airport. However because of resurfacing of the runways at Tempelhof, Pan Am operated in and out of Tegel Airport since the evening of November 13th. Flight 708 departed Frankfurt at 02:04 and climbed to the cruising altitude of FL90. At 02:35 the flight reported leaving this altitude for FL30. Three minutes later Berlin Control cleared the flight to "turn left heading zero three zero, descend and maintain two thousand". When 6,5 miles from the Outer Marker, the controller cleared the flight to "turn right heading zero six zero cleared ILS runway eight right approach". Immediately after the acknowledgment from the flight crew, the aircraft struck the ground and crashed about 10 miles from the airport in the Soviet occupation zone. Weather was poor with 2,6 km visibility in snow; cloud coverage 3/8 at 500 feet and overcast a 600 feet with a temperature of -1deg C. The Soviet authorities returned about 50 percent of the wreckage. Some major components were not returned which included the flight data and cockpit voice recorders, flight control systems, navigation and communication equipment.

Boeing 707

PanAm Flight PA292 was a scheduled service from Fort-de-France, Martinique to New York with en route stops at Saint John's, Antigua, Christiansted, St Croix, and San Juan, Puerto Rico. An IFR flight plan had been filed for the 30-minute leg to Antigua. Cruising altitude would be FL165. The airplane christened 'Clipper Constitution' departed Fort-de-France's runway 27 at 0704LT. Cruising altitude was reached at 0709. The crew established radio contact with the Antigua controller at 0715. The controller cleared the flight to the Coolidge NDB beacon at 2 500 feet and told the crew to report at the beacon outbound leaving 2 500 feet or field in sight. At approximately 0725 the flight reported through FL40 with the field not yet in sight. At the same time the airplane was observed flying along the coast of the island of Montserrat in rain and below the clouds with landing gear down and flaps partially extended. Shortly afterwards the airplane struck a mountain at an elevation of 2 760 feet asl and 242 feet below the summit. The airplane was totally destroyed and all 30 occupants have been killed. Weather was poor at the time of the accident with thunderstorms activity, towering cumulus and heavy rain falls.

Boeing 707

PAA 212 departed Dulles Airport at 2221 with the same crew of 9 and 136 passengers. The flight was conducted under instrument conditions and was routine until arrival in the New York area. At 2239 the New York Center controller transmitted the JFK weather to PAA 212. The runway visual range (RVR) on runway 4R at JFK was reported to be 1,600 feet. At 2250 JFK Approach Control established radar and radio contact with PAA 212 and advised: "Depart Colts Neck heading zero nine zero for vectors to the final approach course, Kennedy weather is three hundred thin broken, measured ceiling one thousand five hundred overcast, visibility one and one-half miles fog, and the runway visual range runway four right more than one thousand feet, standby." FAA 212 acknowledged the transmission. N779PA was restricted to landing Minimums of 300-foot ceiling and 3/4 mile visibility. The flight reported over the Colts Neck VOR at 2253 35 and was cleared to descend from 6,000 to 1,500 feet. Several vectors were given to position FAA 212 on the inbound heading to the Outer Marker (OM). At 2256.15 while on a heading of 040 degree, the crew reported reaching 1,500 feet, airspeed 180. Several delaying vectors were given to position the aircraft three and one-half miles behind a DC-8 which was landing ahead. At 2259.45 the JFK local controller transmitted to FAA 212: "Clipper two one two this is Kennedy Tower, report passing outer marker, straight in four right, wind calm, runway visual range, all aircraft copy, four right is more than six thousand." Prevailing visibility at the JFK Airport was less than three miles, therefore the Precision Approach Radar (PAR) Controller was monitoring all ILS approaches to runway 4R as prescribed by procedures. At 2301.10 the PAR controller advised, "Clipper two twelve, Kennedy radar on localizer one mile from outer marker course and glidepath OK." At 2301:40, PAA 212 reported passing the outer marker and the PAR controller advised, "Clipper two twelve two miles from touchdown." The local controller transmitted at 2301 45 "Clipper two one two, Kennedy Tower cleared to land four right, traffic will be clear in five seconds." PAR at 2302-10 advised "Clipper two twelve, Kennedy radar, execute a missed approach if you do not have the runway in sight." Immediately following this transmission, PAA 212 acknowledged "Uh. . . Roger two one two." The next radio transmission was at 2303:10 when the local controller called the flight but was unable to establish radio contact. After touchdown the aircraft continued down and off the runway across the asphalt overrun and through a sandy area before coming to rest in the shallow water of Thurston Basin approximately 800 feet from the far end of runway 4R. When the aircraft came to rest the crew proceeded aft to assist the passengers. The main forward (left) cabin door was opened and the passengers in this section of the aircraft left through this door. The passengers in the aft section left through the overwing exits onto the wings; and others left through the two rear doors and got into two life rafts that had been launched. Evacuation of the aft section of the aircraft was completed in approximately five minutes. After seats and debris had been removed from the first-class compartment aisle, some of the persons who had been in the aft section of the aircraft reentered the aircraft and left through the main forward cabin door. The aircraft broke in two and was written off. Among the 145 occupants, 40 were injured, seven of them seriously, and 105 other occupants were unhurt.

Boeing 707

Pan American Flight 214, a Boeing 707-121, N709PA, departed Friendship International Airport, Baltimore, Maryland, for Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, at 2024 1 December 8, 1963. The aircraft, with 73 passengers and a crew of eight, was on an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) clearance. Flight 214 reported over the New Castle, Delaware VOR at 2042 and was instructed to hold at 5,000 feet, west of the VOR. At 2058 a "MAYDAY" 2 transmission was heard from the flight. Shortly thereafter, the pilot of another aircraft broadcasted that "Clipper 214 is going down in flames". Flight 214 crashed two miles east of Elkton, Maryland, at 2059. All persons aboard the aircraft were killed instantly. The aircraft was destroyed by explosion, impact, and fire.

Douglas DC-7

The crew was completing a cargo flight from Frankfurt to Stuttgart-Echterdingen Airport. On final, weather conditions were marginal with low clouds down to 200 meters and a visibility limited to a half mile. As the copilot was unable to locate the runway, he decided to make a go around when the right main gear and the engine number three struck an earth mound located 20 meters short of runway threshold. Upon impact, the engine number three and the right main gear were sheared off. The captain regained control, continued the climb and informed ground he was diverting to Nuremberg Airport for a safe landing. Authorities were informed of the situation and the runway was recovered with foam. After a belly landing, the airplane slid for several yards and came to rest. All three crew members were uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Douglas DC-4

Christened 'Clipper Fearless', the airplane departed San Salvador-Ilopango Airport with a delay of five hours due to loading issues. While cruising by night on a cargo flight to Miami, the crew failed to realize his altitude was insufficient and that he was not following the assigned route when the airplane struck trees and crashed in a wooded area located near Mercedes. The aircraft was destroyed and all three crew members were killed.

Boeing 377 Stratocruiser

The airplane christened 'Clipper Australia' was approaching Tokyo-Haneda following an uneventful transpacific flight. While completing the approach check-list, after the gear were extended, three greens lights appears on the panel. When power was reduced prior to touchdown, the gear unsafe warning horn sounded and a red gear unsafe warning light illuminated. The captain first called for a go-around but noticed that the airspeed was too low. The gear was retracted quickly and a belly landing was carried out. While all 59 occupants were evacuated safely, the aircraft was considered as damaged beyond repair.

Douglas DC-6

Immediately after applying takeoff power, the crew of the DC-6 heard a loud noise and the takeoff was abandoned. A visual check before the plane stopped revealed that the no. 4 engine had separated from the wing. A fire erupted and spread after evacuation, destroying the aircraft. It appeared that the no. 4 propeller had failed and that the unbalanced loads on the engine mounts caused separation of the entire engine. All crew and passengers survived but six dogs the cargo hold died in the accident.

Boeing 377 Stratocruiser

On final approach to Juneau Airport, the four engine aircraft was too low and struck an embankment. On impact, the undercarriage were sheared off and the airplane belly landed, slid for several yards and came to rest in flames. All ten occupants were evacuated safely while the aircraft was written off. For unknown reason, the pilot-in-command completed a too-low approach.

Douglas DC-7

The crew was completing a local training at San Francisco Airport, part of a transition program. The approach was completed with a high rate of descent and when the pilot-in-command elected to complete the flare, the four engine aircraft descended until it impacted the runway surface. The undercarriage was sheared off on impact and the airplane skidded for several yards before coming to rest in flames. All three crew members were evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Boeing 377 Stratocruiser

The aircraft was on a scheduled flight from San Francisco, California to Singapore with numerous intermediate stops including Manila, The Philippines. It carried a crew of 8 and 49 passengers including one infant. At 21 23 hours (1 June) GMT the aircraft landed on Runway 06 at Manila. During the landing roll, the main landing gears of the aircraft collapsed. The aircraft skidded and swerved to the right until it finally settled on the right shoulder of the runway approximately 2 850 ft from the west end and 27 ft from the edge of the runway. One of the blades of No. 3 propeller flew off and penetrated the cabin area causing the death of one passenger and seriously injuring another. The aircraft was seriously damaged.

Boeing 377 Stratocruiser

Clipper 944, 1 a regularly scheduled around-the-world flight, originated at San Francisco with its first stop scheduled at Honolulu. It departed San Francisco at 1951 2 on November 8 estimating arrival at Honolulu at 0550, November 9. There were 36 passengers and a crew consisting of Captain Gordon H. Brown, First Officer William P. Wygant, Second Officer William H. Fortenberry, Flight Engineer Albert F. Pinataro, Purser Oliver E. Crosthwaite, Stewardesses Yvonne L. Alexander and Marie L. McGrath, and Flight Service Supervisor John E. King. The flight plan specified a cruising altitude of 10,000 feet and an airspeed of 226 knots. Gross weight at departure was 147,000 pounds, the maximum allowable, and the weight included fuel for approximately 13 hours. Good weather was forecast for the duration of the flight. All required position reports were made and Clipper 944 reported to Ocean Station vessel "November" at 0030; its position was fixed by radar as 10 miles east of the vessel. The last position report, at 0104, was routine with no indication of anything unusual. The next scheduled position report, due at 0204, was not received and 30 minutes thereafter the flight was designated unreported. Five days later, nine bodies and some debris were find about 147 miles northeast of the estimated point of impact. There were no survivors among the 44 occupants.

Douglas DC-3

Parked at Idlewild Airport, the aircraft was stolen by a technician who was able to takeoff. During initial climb, at an altitude of 150 feet, the airplane stalled and crashed near the runway. The aircraft was destroyed and the 'pilot' was killed.

Boeing 377 Stratocruiser

Trip 6 of October 13 was a regularly scheduled “around-the-world” flight eastbound from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. to San Francisco, California. with en route stops in Europe, Asia. and various Pacific Islands. All prior segments had been routine and the flight departed Honolulu on the last leg of the -trip on October 15. It was cleared to San Francisco Airport via Green Airway 9, then track to position 30 degrees N. 140 degrees W. at 13,000 feet. the 21,000 feet to San Francisco. There were 24 passengers aboard., including 3 infants, and a crew consisting of Richard N. Ogg, Captain; George L. Haaker. First Officer; Frank Garcia. Jr., Flight Engineer; Richard L. Brown, Navigator; Patricia Reynolds, Purser Mary Ellen Daniel and Katherine S. Araki, Stewardesses. The 8-hour, 54-minute flight was planned IFR and the aircraft carried sufficient fuel for 12 hours. 18 minutes. The gross takeoff weight of the aircraft was 138,903 pounds (maximum allowable 144,000) and the center of gravity was located within limits. N 90943 departed Honolulu at 2026. The climb to initial altitude was normal and the flight proceeded in a routine manner. At OLO2, the approximate midpoint of the flight, a request for VFR climb to its secondary altitude of 21,000 feet was approved by ATC. After reaching 21,000 feet and simultaneously with the reduction of power, the No. 1 engine oversped. Airspeed was immediately reduced by the use of flaps and reduction of power. Attempts were also made to feather the No. 1 propeller. It was impossible to control the engine or to feather the propeller and the captain decided to freeze the engine by cutting off the oil supply. Shortly after this was done there was a momentary decrease in the r. p. m., followed by a heavy thud. The propeller continued to windmill. At this time airspeed had slowed to 150 knots and the aircraft was losing altitude at a rate of approximately 1.000 feet per minute. The captain contacted the U. S. Coast Guard weather station “November” at 0122., alerted it to a possible ditching. and asked assistance. He also alerted the pas angers to the emergency and told them to prepare for a possible water landing. The flight course was altered to "home in” on station “November” and climb power applied to engines Nos. 2, 3, and 4 to cheek the rate of descent. At this time it was noticed that No. 4 engine was only developing partial power at full throttle. At 0125 the flight notified “November” that ditching was imminent and received a ditching heading from the cutter. During the descent the crew found they could maintain altitude at an airspeed of 135 knots with rated power on engines Nos. 2 and 3 and the partial power on No. 4. About 0137 the flight overheated the cutter. Prior to overheating the cutter the maximum range with the fuel remaining had been computed and it was determined to be insufficient either to complete the flight to San Francisco or return to Honolulu. Mortar flares had been fired by the cutter and electric water lights laid to illuminate a ditching track for the aircraft. However, it was decided to postpone the ditching until daylight, if possible. meanwhile remaining close to the cutter. About 0245 the No. 4 engine backfired and power dropped off. Its propeller was feathered normally. The flight was still able to maintain altitude and continued to orbit “November” to burn the fuel aboard down to a minimum while awaiting daylight. At 0540 Captain Ogg notified the U. S. S. Pontchartrain he was preparing to ditch the aircraft. A foam path was laid along the ditching heading of 3150 by the cutter and the aircraft was ditched at 0615. Passengers and crew safely evacuated the aircraft, boarded liferafts, and were completely clear of the aircraft at 0632. The aircraft sank at 0635 at position 30 degrees 01.5’ N. 140 degrees 09’ W.

Boeing 377 Stratocruiser

Trip 845/26, a scheduled flight from Seattle-Tacoma, Washington, to Sydney, Australia, departed Seattle-Tacoma Airport at 0815LT for Portland, Oregon, the first intermediate stop. There were 13 passengers and a crew of 8 consisting of Captain H. S. Joslyn, First Officer A. G. Kendrick, a Navigator N. F. Kerwick, Flight Engineer D. R. Fowler, Assistant Flight Engineer S. Bachman, Purser Natalie B. Parker, Stewardess Elizabeth M. Thompson, and Steward J. D. Peppin. The flight to Portland was normal in all respects with arrival at 0910. There the aircraft was serviced and two additional passengers boarded. Only inspections and service were accomplished. The flight left the ramp at 1010 and took off for Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii, at 1021 on an IFR clearance. Weather conditions at time of takeoff were VFR. There were 15 passengers and the saw crew of 8. Takeoff gross weight was 139,494 (maximum allowable was 145,800 pounds) and the center of gravity was located within limits. The flight plan was via Newberg and Newport, Oregon, and thence to Honolulu to Cruise at 10,000 feet. Estimated flight time was 11 hours and 3 minutes. The flight reported over Newberg at 1031 at 7,000 feet climbing., reached 10,000 feet at approximately 1039, and reported over Newport at 1048 at cruising altitude. The aircraft was then headed to make good the initial track or 221 degrees . Forty-two minutes after takeoff, severe vibration occurred while cruising era at 10,000 feet under VIM conditions. This lasted for five to eight seconds following which No. 3 engine and propeller tore free and fell from the aircraft. The captain immediately disconnected the autopilot. Severe buffeting ensued, the nose want down and the aircraft swung to the right sharply. At this point, the emergency "Mayday" signal was broadcast on both VHF and HF. Direct return to Portland was authorized by Seattle Air Route Traffic Control. The captain, in the left seat, tried to get the airplane under control. Airspeed was about 220 knots and going higher, so he closed the throttles to keep the airspeed down. He still could not get the nose up; it felt to him as though the elevators were still on automatic pilot. He tried the elevator trim tab and could not turn it. After rapid loss of altitude to about 5,000 feet, the captain directed the first officer to assist him with the controls. Their combined efforts finally brought the nose up very rapidly but the aircraft then went into a steep climb. It turned sharply to the right about 180 degrees and, according to the captain, appeared to be on "the verge of a spin." Level attitude was regained by pushing the yoke forward, and by use of the rudder and aileron trim the turn was stopped. At an airspeed of 150 knots, flaps extended 25 degrees, buffeting decreased immediately, however., the aircraft continued to descend rapidly. Attempts to get rated power were futile and a message was broadcast that ditching was imminent. This message was sent at approximately 1106. The aircraft was then at an altitude of 500-1,000 feet. Ditching was imminent. Cabin attendants, realizing the emergency, assumed their respective stations for ditching. All passengers had been seated in the upper desk of the cabin with seat belts fastened and life jackets donned. The aircraft touched down under near ideal sea conditions with little swall. Contact with the water we severe and the impact dislodged life rafts from their storage bins and some seats were torn loose. The aft portion of the fuselage and empennage broke off at impact. Evacuation was orderly and the three rafts, although dislodged from their stowage receptacles, were launched without undue delay. The lanyards of all three life rafts were temporarily held at the cabin door by crow members. However, when one of the rafts was endangered by sharp metal of the broken fuselage its lanyard was released. Another was released by a crew member who then swam to that raft to right it. The lanyard of the third raft was released for unknown reasons. Consequently the rafts were carried away by the light surface wind. Passengers and crew left by both the main cabin door and escape hatches on both sides of the fuselage over each wing. Some crew members and passengers ware able to swim to and board the rafts. Three of the four fatalities, including the copilot and first engineer, were unable to do so and were lost. Members of the crew and passengers tried in vain to paddle to these persons. One other passenger later died in a raft from awe and shock. The purser, a woman, although suffering from shock swam and towed the only seriously injured passenger to the nearest raft, some 200 feet distant. The time of ditching was determined as 1112 and the position at lat. 43 degrees 48'15" N., long. 125 degrees 12'40" W., approximately 35 miles off the Oregon coast. The U.S.S. Bayfield, en route to Seattle, changed course toward the site and by add of search aircraft reached the life rafts some two hours later.

Boeing 377 Stratocruiser

The four engine aircraft christened 'Clipper Good Hope' left Rio de Janeiro at 0243LT bound for Port of Spain, completing an international schedule flight from Buenos Aires to New York. While cruising by night and good weather under VFR conditions at an altitude of 14,500 feet, the airplane suffered severe vibrations, went out of control and crashed in an uninhabited and isolated area located about 120 km southeast of Porto Nacional. The wreckage was found two days later and all 50 occupants have been killed.

Douglas DC-4

Pan American World Airways’ Flight 526A originated at San Juan and departed there at 1211, April 11, 1952, for New York, New York. The crew consisted of Captain J. C. Burn, First Officer W. T. Hutchins, Second Officer J. R. Laubach, Purser A. Perez, and Steward R. Torres. According to company records, the air-craft at the time of takeoff weighed 31,868 kilograms (70,256 pounds), which was within the allowable gross takeoff weight of 33,113 kilograms (73,000 pounds). The load was properly distributed with respect to the approved center of gravity limits of the aircraft. Prior to departure, the captain filed with Air Route Traffic Control an IFR (Instrument Flight Rules) flight plan to New York International Airport, New York, to cruise at an altitude of 8,000 feet, estimating the flight time as eight hours and three minutes. This flight plan was approved. The crew testified that the aircraft was taxied to the end of Runway No. 9, the pre-takeoff check made, and the takeoff run started. During the takeoff and the initial climb, the aircraft appeared to be sluggish but not to an extent to cause concern. At an altitude of approximately 250 feet with the gear up, the flaps were raised and power was reduced to climb power. Climbing at an indicated air speed of 155 miles per hour, the first officer noticed that the oil pressure of No. 3 engine was falling and the oil temperature increasing. This condition was immediately pointed out to the captain, who requested that the San Juan tower be advised that they were returning to the airport. Accordingly, at 1213 the flight advised the tower of its intentions, and the tower replied, “Roger 526A, cleared to land, Runway 9, wind east one eight, altimeter two nine nine five. I’ll notify your company.” The company was notified and upon request, emergency field equipment was alerted. Because the oil pressure of No. 3 engine continued to drop rapidly and the oil temperature correspondingly increased, the propeller of this engine was feathered and power was increased to rated power on the remaining three engines. By this time the aircraft’s altitude was approximately 350 feet. When power was increased, the No. 4 engine backfired several times; however, immediately following these backfires, the engine continued to run in a normal manner. A climbing turn was initiated to a westerly heading, and the captain said that for best climbing conditions he reduced the aircraft’s air speed during the turn to 145 miles per hour. This reduction in air speed was accomplished by using up elevator. Upon reaching an altitude of about 550 feet, No. 4 engine again backfired and ran rough. Manifold pressure was reduced on this engine to approximately 32-35 inches, and again the engine ran smoothly. Subsequent attempts to operate No. 4 engine at increased power were unsuccessful due to recurrent roughness. At 1217 the tower asked the flight to report its position and received this reply: “We are still quite a way out.” And at 1218, the tower advised the U. S. Coast Guard Rescue Coordination Center at San Juan that the flight was in trouble and gave its position as seven miles, 300 degrees from the tower. The captain gradually reduced the air speed to 135 miles per hour, and at this time the heading of the aircraft was changed slightly to the right to maintain a course approximately parallel to the coast line. Because the aircraft was losing altitude, engines No. 1 and No. 2 were increased to takeoff power. The second officer was sent to the passenger compartment to advise the purser and steward that fuel was to be dumped, and all fuel dump valves were then opened. After the second officer returned to the cockpit, the flight advised the tower, at 1219, that it might have to ditch, and the captain instructed the second officer to alert the passengers. The second officer re-turned to the cabin, indicated that a ditching was imminent, took a forward seat in the cabin and fastened his safety belt. At 1220, an Air Force C-47 flying in the vicinity notified the San Juan tower that a DC-4 seemed to be ditching and accordingly was advised to circle the area. Flight 526A continued to settle, and the throttles of engines Nos. 1 and 2 were advanced to their stops. With the air speed near 120 miles per hour, the flaps were lowered to five degrees. Shortly after this, a landing on the water was made. The landing gear and flaps were lowered, and the fuel dump valves closed. The second officer obtained a life raft, which he carried to the main cabin and launched through a forward emergency exit on the right side. The first officer, after an unsuccessful attempt to loosen another life raft, abandoned the aircraft through a cockpit window. The captain entered the cabin and assisted passengers in evacuating the aircraft through the main cabin door until he was swept overboard by the action of the sea against the door. The aircraft sank approximately three minutes after landing on the water. At the time of the accident the weather was: high broken clouds at 35,000 feet with lower scattered clouds at 3,000 feet, visibility 20 miles and wind from east-southeast, 16 miles per hour.

Convair CV-240

Flight 507 departed Miami, Florida, at 0700, September 2, 1951, and made a routine scheduled stop at Camagüey, Cuba. No irregularities were reported by the flight crew upon arrival at Camagüey, and the flight departed there on schedule at 0900, cleared under visual flight rules direct to Kingston, Jamaica, with Montego Bay, Jamaica, as an alternate. The gross weight of the aircraft and distribution of the disposable load were within allowable limits upon departure from Camagüey. The flight was uneventful between Camagüey and Kingston, and routine radio contacts were made en route At 1003 Flight 507 reported its position to Palisadoes Airport Tower, Kingston, as 20 miles north and a little later was cleared into the traffic pattern for Runway 14. The flight acknowledged this clearance and shortly thereafter reported that the field was in sight Palisadoes Tower then advised Flight 507 of the presence of a local squall between Kingston and the approach end of Runway 14, with heavy rain at the airport, and suggested a low approach. When the aircraft first came into view of the air traffic controller, it was just emerging from the heavy part of the squall, which was then over the approach end of Run-way 14 and moving northwesterly. At this time the flight requested and received permission to circle the airport to the right Witnesses located near the approach end of Runway 14 observed the aircraft flying in a southeasterly direction, paralleling the runway. At approximately the runway intersection, 2 the aircraft turned right and continued around the airport to a point northwest of the approach end of Runway 14 and over Kingston Harbor, here it was observed to descend into the water about 800 feet short of the runway. No one was seriously injured. A motor launch from a nearby salvage vessel arrived alongside the wrecked aircraft in a matter of minutes and took the survivors ashore. The wreckage floated for a short time, then sank, leaving only a part of the tail group and one wing visible above the surface of the water.

Curtiss C-46 Commando

After landing at São Paulo-Congonhas Airport, the aircraft failed to stop withing the remaining distance, overran and came to rest down an embankment. All three crew members were unhurt while the airplane was damaged beyond repair. It is reported that the crew landed long.

Lockheed L-049 Constellation

Pan American's Flight 151 departed Johannesburg at 0812, June 21, and after a routine flight and scheduled stop at Léopoldville, Belgian Congo, arrived at Accra, Gold Coast, at 2125. Following a mechanical delay which required the changing of several spark plugs and a set of magneto points, the flight was dispatched and cleared to Roberts Field, Monrovia, on an instrument flight plan at 16,500 feet with Dakar, French West Africa, and Accra as alternates Take-off from Accra was at 2352Z. The gross weight at departure was 89,255 pounds, including cargo, mail, 3,340 gallons of fuel, 31 passengers, and a crew of nine. The gross weight of the aircraft and distribution of the disposable load were within the allowable limits. The en route communication system of the flight sector between Accra and Roberts Field is high frequency radio-telephone utilizing ground stations at Accra and Roberts Field as primary guarding stations Normal communication with these two stations was maintained as Flight 151 progressed westward after departing Accra. The flight proceeded in a routine manner, climbing to 16,500 feet MSL in accordance with the flight plan. At 0057 a position report was given over Abidjan, 258 miles west of Accra, and arrival over Cape Palmas, Liberia, 265 miles farther to the west, was estimated as 0156. At 0156 Flight 151 reported over Cape Palmas at 16,500 feet MSL, on instruments, and estimated arrival at Roberts Field as 0246. (A plantation employee in the Cape Palmas area stated that he beard an airplane inland and very high at approximately 0220, that the moon was bright and the sky was clear at the time. Since no other aircraft was known to have been in the area, this is presumed to have been Flight 151). At 0220 Flight 151 requested clearance to descend. Roberts Field radio cleared the flight to descend to 3,000 feet and advised that at 0225 the Roberts Field tower would establish contact on VHF A clear two-way contact was made at 0225 on 118.1 mcs, at which time the tower gave the flight the local weather and altimeter set-ting, cleared it to descend IFR over Roberts Range Station, and indicated that Runway 05 was in use. At 0237 Flight 151 was again given local weather for Roberts Field cloud base estimated 1,000 feet, broken, light drizzle and haze, visibility 3 miles. At 0241 the local wind was given as W-WNW variable 7 miles per hour All of these messages were acknowledged. At 0255, nine minutes after its ETA at Roberts, Flight 151 was heard calling Roberts Field on VHF 118.1 mcs. The tower responded, repeating the call three times. There was no indication that the aircraft heard the tower, whereupon the tower switched to 3270 kcs and requested the flight to give its current position. There was no reply to this call. Immediately following failure of the aircraft to respond to Roberts tower on 3270 kcs, the Roberts Field high frequency radio-telephone facility established contact advising the flight that they were unable to read it on 118.1 mcs and that the flight should reply to the tower's call on 3270 kcs. This message was acknowledged at 0301. At 0305 the flight again contacted Roberts tower on 3270 kcs advising that the Dakar radio beacon was interfering with the Roberts Field radio beacon and that they would "be back in 15 minutes" Roberts tower advised Flight 151 that Dakar would be requested to turn off the beacon and this message was acknowledged (Because of incoming traffic to Dakar, the beacon there was not turned off until 0410) At 0315 Flight 151 again called Roberts tower on 3270 kcs and the latter transmitted the latest weather. The flight did not acknowledge this transmission on 3270 kcs but called Roberts tower on 118.1 mcs Roberts tower then replied on 118 1 mcs but received no acknowledgement. Thereafter, the tower repeatedly called Flight 151 on both 118.1 mcs and 3270 kcs, requesting the aircraft's position and broadcasting the weather However, the incomplete contact at 0315 was the last transmission received from the flight. The wreckage was found a day later near the village of Sanoyie, about 91 km northeast of Monrovia-Roberts Airport. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all 40 occupants have been killed.

Curtiss C-46 Commando

The crew was performing a cargo flight to Mexico when the propeller on the right engine separated in flight. Some of the blades went through the fuselage and contacted the left engine. In such conditions, the crew was forced to attempt an emergency landing. The aircraft belly landed near Mérida and came to rest. Both crew members were unhurt while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Curtiss C-46 Commando

Shortly after takeoff, while in initial climb, the crew raised the landing gear when the right engine suffered a loss of power. The captain decided to return to Asmara for a safe landing but the aircraft stalled and crashed into a ditch near the airport. All four crew members were injured and the aircraft leased by the USAF was damaged beyond repair.

Lockheed L-049 Constellation

Pan American's Flight 1-10, originating in San Francisco, California, April 10, 1948, was scheduled to fly around the world to New York, New York. In accordance with company practice the flight changed to a different aircraft, NC-88858, at the Pan American Airways' base in Calcutta, India. The flight took off from Calcutta, April 13, 1948, and continued without incident via Damascus, Syria, and Istanbul, Turkey, to Brussels, Belgium. During a night landing approach at Brussels the fluorescent lighting on the left or pilot side of the cockpit went out. Since the only other lighting immediately available was a chart light which was focused on the automatic direction finder indicator, the flight instruments could not be read, and the remainder of the landing approach was accomplished without visual reference to the flight instruments. An examination was made of the fluorescent lights after the landing. They appeared to operate normally, so the flight departed from Brussels, continuing without difficulty until on the final landing approach into London. When the power was reduced the same pilot's fluorescent lights again went out. This time the chart light was focused on the airspeed indicator. The approach was continued, and the landing was accomplished without incident. A faulty rheostat switch was found to be the cause of the fluorescent light failure, but since a spare switch could not be located, it was not changed at London. An entry describing the defect was placed in the aircraft's Form C, the airplane flight log, and the captain and the flight engineer of the new crew were informed by the company's maintenance supervisor of the condition. Though no actual maintenance was accomplished, the lights again appeared to be operating normally, so the captain, F. C. Jakel, decided to take-off, departing from London at 0035, April 15, 1948, for Shannon. At this time available weather forecasts indicated that at the estimated time of the flight's arrival at Shannon the ceiling there would be 700 feet with a higher cloud layer at 1,000 feet, and visibility 4 miles. At 0159, April 15, 1948, the flight reported being at an altitude of 4,500 feet, contact, over the Limerick Junction fan marker, located 25 statute miles southeast from the Shannon Airport, and requested permission to make a practice approach to the field with the use of the instrument landing system. Shannon Tower cleared the flight for this approach. The tower advised that 3 hours previously the instrument landing system equipment on the airport had been reported faulty, but that it had since been serviced and was operating normally according to its monitoring board, though not flight-checked. At 0210, the flight reported that it was proceeding to the outer marker, 5.2 statute miles northeast of the Shannon Airport, and also made a report, routine for Pan American flights, "mechanical condition okay." In response Shannon Tower advised the flight that the weather over the field was "fog patches, 3 miles visibility, cloud base 400 feet, sky 6/10 covered, wind from 325 degrees at 4 miles per hour." The flight was instructed to land on runway 23, the runway for which the instrument landing system was projected. It was also requested to report when making the 180 degree procedure turn for the inbound instrument approach to the field, and when over the outer marker. The requested position reports were not received by the tower, but at 0220 the flight did report a "missed approach," 2 and advised that it was going around for a second approach. At this time the flight was observed through a break in the clouds by the Shannon Tower, which was the first time that the aircraft had been seen in the vicinity of the Shannon Airport. The aircraft was reported as 500 feet above the ground, over, and in line with runway 23. Power was heard being increased, and the aircraft was observed turning left. On the second approach, at 0227, the flight reported making its 180 degree procedure turn and was cleared for landing by the tower. One minute later, weather conditions at the field were transmitted to the flight as "fog patches, visibility 2 1/2 miles, 6/10 cloud base 400 feet, 4/10 cloud base 300 feet, wind 325 degrees, 3 miles per hour, altimeter 30.29." The flight reported approaching the outer marker at 0231 at which time the tower advised that another flight which had just taken off had reported a ceiling of 500 feet when northwest of the field. Flight 1-10 acknowledged this information, which was the last communication received The aircraft was not observed at any time during the second approach until after it struck the ground. The aircraft struck the ground 2,380 feet northeast of the approach end of runway 23, and directly in line with that runway. Flames followed immediately after impact, and consumed a great portion of the wreckage. A passenger survived while 30 other occupants were killed.

Douglas DC-4

Flight 923 departed at 1030 October 26, 1947, from Seattle, Washington, for Juneau, Alaska, with an intermediate stop scheduled at Annette Island Captain Alf N. Monsen flew as pilot and First Officer Laurence A Foster as copilot. The airplane carried 13 passengers including an infant, a crew of five, 2,500 gallons of fuel, and 822 pounds of cargo. This load was within the allowable airplane weight and was properly distributed in respect to the center of gravity. Company weather information given to Captain Monsen before departure was to the effect that there would be unlimited ceiling from Seattle to Comox, British Columbia. Then at the cruising altitude of 9,000 feet, instrument conditions, light icing, and light to moderate turbulence was expected over the route. Winds were forecasted to be from 200 to 230 degrees at 30 to 40 knots. It was also forecasted that at the time of the flight's arrival over Annette there would be an 800-foot overcast, lower broken clouds, visibility of 2 miles, light rain, and a surface wind from the south-southeast at 18 knots. A cold type occlusion or front which was moving toward Annette Island from a point about 375 miles west of there was expected to pass Annette Island before the flight arrived. Proceeding en route in accordance with an instrument clearance to fly at 9,000 feet, the flight arrived over Annette Island at 1338 after a routine trip. Earlier, at 1326, the company radio at Annette Island had transmitted a weather observation which reported an indefinite 1,400-foot ceiling, overcast, lower broken clouds, visibility of 3 miles, rain, wind southeast at 28 miles per hour, with gusts to 40 miles per hour. The flight acknowledged receipt of this information. Airway Traffic Control cleared the flight to pass over the radio range station located 1 5 mile northwest of the airport at 7,000 feet and then to proceed with a normal instrument letdown and approach to the field. The flight acknowledged this clearance, and reported its position over the radio range station at 7,000 feet at 1338. The normal instrument procedure for Annette Island was established with regard to the mountainous terrain east and northeast of the airport, which rises to an elevation of 3,596 feet on Tamgas Mountain. This procedure required the flight, after approaching from the south at 7,000 feet and reporting over the radio station, to remain west of the south course of the range while on instruments. Five minutes after the flight reported over the range station, at 1343 it advised Annette Radio that it was proceeding to Juneau, approximately 250 miles north-northwest of Annette Island, because of extreme turbulence. This was the first indication that the flight was encountering any difficulty in accomplishing a normal letdown and approach to the airport. In response, Annette Radio asked the flight to report its altitude, but there was no reply. After repeated calls to the flight Annette Radio issued an alert at 1401. It was estimated that the flight at the time of its last radio contact had aboard 9 hours and 16 minutes of fuel. At approximately 1430 the Civil Aeronautics Board was notified, and a search by air, land, and sea was immediately begun. However, adverse weather conditions retarded the search to such a degree that the wreckage was not located until 5 days after the accident October 31, 1947. It was found that the airplane had crashed on the north slope of Tamgas Mountain, approximately 8 miles east of Annette Island Airport and 8 miles east of the south course of the Annette radio range.

Douglas DC-4

Pan American's Flight 131 departed from Bermuda at 1358, September 20, 1947, with 36 passengers and a crew of 5. The take-off and climb to the cruising altitude of 8,000 feet were normal, and the flight proceeded on course to La Guardia Field, New York, for a period of 3 hours without incident Between 1650 and 1655, about 225 statute miles from destination, Warren Robinson, the first officer, noticed a fluctuation in fuel pressure for engines 1 and 2 Seconds later, the left auxiliary fuel tank quantity gauge dropped to zero, the fuel pressure warning light flashed on, and the No 1 engine faltered To insure a positive fuel supply for all engines Mr Robinson immediately turned the fuel selector valves for all engines to their respective main tanks, 2 following which all engines operated normally. Mr Robinson then transferred fuel from the right auxiliary tank to the left auxiliary tank so that they would contain equal amounts, which was 40 gallons each according to the fuel quantity gauges after completion of the operation A few minutes later Mr Robinson noticed that the right auxiliary fuel gauge indicated not 40 gallons, but 100, and that it was visibly increasing even though no fuel was at that time being transferred The No. 3 main fuel tank gauge then dropped to zero, and the fuel pressure for the No 4 engine started to fluctuate. Alarmed by what now appeared to be a serious malfunction in the right side of the fuel system, Mr Robinson operated all engines from the left main tanks (1 and 2), turning on all the cross feed valves, and the booster pumps for main tanks 1 and 2. The flight had by this time reached position "Baker," a point on course and a distance of 212 statue miles from La Guardia This check point was regularly used by Pan American on the route from Bermuda to La Guardia, and was established by reference to precomputed radio bearings Flight Radio Officer Rea was instructed to call Captain Carl Gregg, who was eating lunch in the passengers cabin, to the cockpit. The captain, unable to account for what appeared to be a total loss of fuel in the right main tanks, tried to operate engines 3 and 4 from their respective mains. Shortly after, the fuel pressure for both these engines dropped, the fuel pressure warning lights came on, and engines 3 and 4 lost power. Other combinations of fuel valve settings were tried during the next few minutes, but power could not be restored to engines 3 and 4 The "fasten seat belt" sign was turned on, rated power was applied to engines 1 and 2, and a descent of 200 to 300 feet per minute started. Two minutes later the fire warning light flashed on for engine 4 The flight radio officer was sent to the passengers cabin to see if any signs of fire from this engine were visible He saw none from engine 4, but he did see smoke trailing from engine 3. By the time Mr Rea returned to the cockpit, Captain Gregg noticed the smell of burning rubber, and furthermore, that the fire warning light for engine 3 was also on. No flames from either engine, however, were visible. Standard fire fighting methods were followed to control the fire in the No. 3 nacelle. The propeller was feathered, all fluids into the engine were closed at the emergency shutoff valves, and the C02 gas bottle was discharged. The fire warning light then went out. Since there was no visible indication of fire in engine 4, the C02 gas bottle was not discharged. As a precautionary measure, however, the shutoff valves for all fluids into the engine were closed, and an attempt made to feather the propeller But, the propeller would not feather, and continued to windmill. At 1712, shortly after Mr. Rea transmitted to the company the flight's position as "Baker", a loud noise from the right side of the airplane was heard, and simultaneously the green right landing gear light came on. Through the drift sight the crew could see the right outboard tire burning, and a landing gear bungee cable hanging slack. All attempts to raise the right gear were unsuccessful, and it was found that with the right gear down, and with both right engines "out" that an air speed of 125 miles per hour was required to maintain directional control. At 1730, engine 4 stopped windmilling, having seized from lack of lubrication By 1745, altitude had been lost to about 1,000 feet, and over 100 statute miles remained to destination. Full take-off power was applied to engines 1 and 2 in an attempt to hold the remaining altitude. A report had been transmitted to the company at 1729 that the fires in engines 3 and 4 were believed to be out, and at 1740, the company had been advised that the flight was at 2,000 feet still descending All radio contacts with Pan American at La Guardia throughout the course of this emergency were accomplished through Eastern Air Lines' radio on the frequency 8565 kcs. Mr. Rea attempted to secure a fix on "CW" 3 from the U. S. Coast Guard, using the distress frequency of 8280 kcs. Because of an extreme amount of "CW" interference on this frequency only one station was actually contacted. This was NMR, the Coast Guard station in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Even this contact was not entirely satisfactory, and no radio bearing from it was ever received. The radio equipment was accordingly returned to the frequency of 8565 kcs, the established channel of communication, for further radiophone contact with New York. No call was ever made on the international distress frequency of 500 kcs., or over any of the "VHF" equipment on board. By 1800, altitude had been lost to 800 feet, and still over 50 statute miles remained to destination. Preparations were made for "ditching". The passengers were instructed in the use of life jackets, and in emergency water landing procedures. The life rafts were moved so as to be easily accessible from the main cabin door. Celluloid protective coverings were removed from all the emergency exit handles Clothing was loosened, and seat belts tightened. Flight Radio Officer Rea broadcasted "blind" on the frequency 8280 kcs., reporting the position of the flight to be 40-00 degrees north and 73-10 degrees west. From this point on only a small gradual loss of altitude was experienced. Captain Gregg decided to attempt to reach and land at Floyd Bennett Field, and was advised through Eastern Air Lines' radio that runway one would be available. New York Air Traffic Control had been alerted through Eastern Air Lines' radio of the emergency, and they in turn had called Coast Guard search and rescue. Coast Guard, Army, and Navy rescue equipment was dispatched, and as Flight 131 approached the coast, the crew observed other aircraft and surface vessels proceeding out to meet them. At 1815, approximately 15 statute miles from Floyd Bennett Field, the flight had descended to an altitude of 400 feet. Full available power was now applied to engines 1 and 2, and the flight was able to not only hold, but even gain a slight amount of altitude, Four to five minutes later, 1820, throttles were retarded to take-off power and the aircraft maneuvered into a position for a straight-in landing approach on runway one. The aircraft was set down 775 feet from the south end of runway one, wheels up. During the course of the crash landing the No. 1 propeller was torn from the engine, the propeller dome becoming embedded in the No. 2 main fuel tank. The spilled gasoline was ignited by sparks generated as the aircraft skidded 2,167 feet on the concrete runway to a stop U. S. Navy fire and crash equipment had been previously deployed along runway one which allowed the Navy's crash personnel to bring the fire quickly under control, and to assist the passengers and crew to deplane without injury.

Lockheed L-049 Constellation

Flight 121 departed from Karachi at 1537 June 18, 1947, for a return trip to the United States. The climb to the cruising altitude of' 18,500 feet was routine, and the flight was proceeding “direct” to Istanbul, the first intended point of landing, estimating its arrival there to be 0208 the next day. Five hours after take-off trouble developed in the No. 1 engine, and the No. 1 propeller was feathered. The captain, J H. Hart, decided to continue to Istanbul with the use of three engines, however, it soon became evident that at an altitude of 18,500 feet the airspeed obtainable was not sufficient to provide adequate cooling for the engines. even though climb power was applied. Power was accordingly reduced and altitude was gradually lost. At 17,500 feet the engines still overheated and the descent was continued to 10,000 feet. At 2140, approximately one hour after the failure of engine No 1, the flight advised its company radio in Karachi of the engine trouble, following which it reported its 2200 position. This report placed the aircraft at 14,000 feet, 50 miles east of Baghdad, Iraq, and 90 miles east of the Royal Air Force Field at Habbaniya, Iraq Shortly after this report Habbaniya Tower was advised by the flight that its approximate position was over Baghdad. at an altitude of 10,000 feet, and the flight requested Habbaniya Tower to inform the civilian airfields in their area that the aircraft was proceeding with the use of only three engines to Istanbul Habbaniya Tower replied, stating that no airfields would be open until dawn, and suggested that an emergency landing be made at Habbaniya Flight 121, however, affirmed Its intention to continue, and added that if it were impossible to reach Istanbul, a landing would be made at Damascus, Syria Habbaniya Tower answered, at 2225, that all airfields in the Damascus area were closed until 0400 and again suggested that the flight land at Habbaniya. The flight again stated that It would continue to Istanbul, but that it would turn back to Habbaniya if it experienced any more trouble. Contemporaneous with this communication to Habbaniya Tower the flight sent a message, received in Karachi, and relayed to Damascus, requesting that Damascus Radio be alerted to stand by, and that the airport be opened. At 2308, June 18, Damascus Radio was on the air, and the field was opened as had been re quested. At approximately 2300 the flight reported its position to be 75 miles north west of Habbaniya at 10,000 feet Fifteen to thirty minutes later the purser seated in the passenger cabin noticed that the "fasten seat belt-no smoking” sign had come on, and he Immediately started to awaken the passengers so that they might fasten themselves in their seats. Suddenly. the entire cabin became illuminated from a fire which had started in Zone 1 of the No 2 engine nacelle. A report of this fire was received at 2330. by the Habbaniya direction finding station. at which time the flight was reporting a position of 34 38 degrees north and 41 05 degrees east, a point 170 statute miles northwest of Habbaniya, and 290 miles northeast of Damascus Immediately after the fire started in engine No. 2 a rapid descent was made for the purpose of crash landing the aircraft, and six to seven minutes later on the landing approach the No. 2 engine fell from the aircraft The wing in the area of the No 2 engine, however, continued to burn intensely. Less than a minute after the No 2 engine fell from the aircraft a wheels-up landing was made on relatively smooth, hard-packed desert sand. The left wing tip made the first contact with the ground, then the No 1 propeller and then the left wing at the No 2 engine position. The impact tore the left wing from the fuselage near its root, and caused the aircraft to ground loop violently to the left. During the course of the ground loop the aircraft turned around its longitudinal axis 180 degrees, skidded backwards for a distance of 210 feet, then came to rest in flames 400 feet from the first point of impact, and headed opposite to its course of landing.

Lockheed L-049 Constellation

Following an uneventful flight from New York-La Guardia, the crew completed the approach and landed properly. After touchdown, the captain requested the copilot for flaps up when the aircraft sank on its belly, skidded for several yards and came to rest, broken in two. All 36 occupants were evacuated safely while the aircraft was written off.

Boeing 314 Clipper

Enroute, two engines lost power and the captain decided to make an emergency landing about 625 miles northeast of Honolulu. All 23 occupants were quickly rescued by the crew of a US Navy ship while the aircraft christened 'Honolulu Clipper' was deliberately sunk by gunfire.

Sikorsky S-43

Flight 216 continued at 6,000 feet until radio bearings indicated its position to be opposite the Fort de France radio beacon at which point it turned to the west, away from the island, preparatory to making a let-down. About 10 miles west of Martinique the plane entered an area clear of clouds and descent was started in wide spiral over the open sea. The co-pilot then established radio communications with the company's base station and at 0955 was advised that landing conditions at Fort do France were: wind ESE 20 knots, visibility 2 miles, ceiling 2,000 feet, barometer 1012.2, sea moderate with ground swells. Landing minimums for Pan American at Fort-de-France, approved by the Civil Aeronautics Administration, are: ceiling 1,000 feet, visibility 2 miles. During the let-down to Fort do France the pilot observed that the clouds extended upwards from 800 feet and that very heavy rain underneath the overcast made it impossible to determine accurately the condition of the water surface. Captain Shaw stated that during the let-down the left engine cut out momentarily and then resumed normal operation with indication of the proper manifold pressure. Instead of encountering the weather conditions reported at 0955, the pilot found that low ceiling and heavy rain squalls prevailed with visibility reduced to about 1/2 mile. Proceeding to Fort-de-France under the overcast, Captain Shaw circled the company station at an altitude of 500 feet and rioted that the wind-sock indicated a southwest surface wind instead of the previously reported east-southeast wind. Remarking to the co-pilot that he was afraid they would "lose" the left engine and, being apprehensive of single-engine performance of the Sikorsky S-43, the pilot elected to risk a landing under his emergency authority. At this moment the company radio advised that the weather was closing in rapidly and a landing should be made as soon as possible. Heading into the southwest wind an approach with full flaps was made toward a portion of Fort-de-France harbor seldom used for landing. Captain Shaw stated that during the latter part of his approach intense rain precluded forward vision through the windshield and only by opening a side window in the cockpit was he able to see the surface of the water just before the plane landed on the crest of a 4 to 6-foot swell. On contact with the water and alarmed by the size of the surface swells, the pilot attempted to take off, using full throttles, but he stated that the left engine failed to respond. The bow submerged and the plane yawed to the right, shearing off the left wing float and permitting that wing to submerge. As the left wing went down the aircraft rolled over on its back, rapidly filling with water. Quick action on the part of the crew resulted in the saving of all but four of the ten passengers, several of whom had to be taken from the plane through the submerged hatch. Survivors were picked up by the company service launch and a private fishing boat. The crash occurred at about 1011 and the plane sank within 10 minutes.

Douglas DC-3

Crashed on takeoff at Port of Spain-Piarco Airport for unknown reason. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair while all 12 occupants were uninjured.

Martin M.130

On final approach to Port of Spain, the seaplane hit the water surface some 1,5 mile short of the touchdown zone, overturned and sank. 23 occupants were killed while seven others were injured.

Sikorsky S-42

At about 1318LT, the pilot taxied to the take-off position. The weather was clear and the ceiling unlimited with a wind estimated to be 20 knots from approximately 100 degree. The water was choppy with no ground swells. With a gradual opening of the throttles to 33 1/2 inches of manifold pressure, the plane appeared to go on the step normally and was making approximately 75 knots. The captain then requested an increase in manifold pressure from 33 1/2 inches to 35 inches and upon attaining a speed estimated as between 78 and 80 knots, the plane left the surface of the water. Captain Williams stated that as the plane rose into the air to a height of 10 or 12 feet, he relaxed back pressure slightly, in order to gain speed, whereupon the plane seemed to want to go back on the water so he pulled back on the yoke. When it became obvious to him that the plane was going to go back on the water anyway, he dropped the nose quickly to "flatten out." After striking, bow first, the plane left the water in a slightly nose-high attitude, rose higher than previously, then returned to the water at a much steeper angle. The third time, the plane rose out of control to a height of approximately 25 feet, and in a steeper angle of climb than previously. It then nosed down at a sharp angle and struck the water violently. The nose of the plane struck the water with such force as to cause the hull to fracture and completely separate at a point just aft of the pilot's compartment. The after portion of the plane, which included passenger compartments A, B, C, and D, pitched forward and came to rest in a nearly inverted position with the forward portion fully submerged. Seventeen passengers were killed while all 14 other occupants were rescued.

Fairchild Pilgrim 100A

Shortly after take off from Nome Airport in poor weather conditions (snow falls), the single engine aircraft hit trees and crashed on a mountain slope. All six occupants were killed, among them a crew of three. Crew: Robert Leslie Bullis, Fred Moller, Mr. Theodore.

Consolidated 16 Commodore

The crew was engaged in a test flight when the seaplane crashed in unknown circumstances off Miami. A crewmen was killed.

Sikorsky S-42

The seaplane christened 'Bermuda Clipper' was fully loaded with passengers and crew, ready for departure from Manaus. A fire developed in the carburetor of the No. 1 engine. The pilot directed the flight mechanic to pull the fire extinguisher handle. The mechanic pulled the fuel dump handle by mistake. Flaming gas fell from the carburetor onto the gas on the water, igniting it, and causing the loss of the plane. Source: http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19430727-0

Boeing 314 Clipper

The flight maintained in altitude of approximately 7000 feet until it approached the mouth of the Tagus River, approximately 11 miles from Lisbon, when a gradual let-down was made to about 600 feet. The Portuguese authorities require that this altitude be maintained from the mouth of the river to the landing area. The flight arrived over the area at about 1835 GMT (6:35 p.m. Lisbon time) 3 hours and 52 minutes after take-off from Horta and 15 minutes ahead of its estimated arrival time. Since official sunset was at 6:20 p.m., PanAm's ground crew at Lisbon had set out as usual a string of landing lights, indicating that the landing was to be made from south to north. On this particular occasion the light arrangement was slightly different from normal, since the extreme downwind (south) light, which was usually green in color, had been replaced with a white light. The only reason for this change was that the green bulb had burned out and the PanAm station substituted the white bulb. Captain Sullivan indicated in his testimony that the substitution of lights was not confusing and had no bearing on the accident. This string of five landing lights extended over a distance of approximately 4500 feet. At the time the flight arrived an the area it was still light enough for the aircraft to be observed plainly by personnel in the PanAm launch and on the shore. The PanAm launch had patrolled the landing area east of the string of landing lights and had taken its station near the red light which was the extreme upwind (north) light of the landing strip. The landing conditions and barometric pressure were given to the flight by radio at 6:35 p.m. and were acknowledged with a statement from the flight that they would want flares when both landing lights were blinked. While proceeding in a northeasterly direction, at an estimated speed of 135 knots and at an altitude of between 500 and 600 feet over the area, about 1 1/2 miles east and abeam of the center light in the string of landing lights, the aircraft made a descending, turn to the left which continued until it was headed in a westerly direction when the left wing tip skimmed along the surface of the water, dug in and the plane crashed into the river. It remained partially submerged for approximately 10 minutes, then disappeared below the surface of the river. The PanAm launch, which had been standing by for the landing, proceeded to the scene of the accident, arriving about 10 minutes later, and began rescue operations. The PanAm launch was joined by a BOAC launch (British) and another PanAm launch approximately 10 minutes later. The American actress Tamara Drasin and the American novelist Ben Robertson were killed in the crash while the actress Jane Froman was seriously injured.

Martin M.130

At the end of the night, while overflying the Pacific ocean off the Californian coast, the radio navigator contacted San Francisco ATC to inform about an estimated time of arrival at 0710LT, nearly three hours ahead the schedule. While approaching San Francisco from the north, by night and in poor weather conditions, at an altitude of 2,500 feet, the seaplane christened 'Philippine Clipper' hit the slope of a mountain located 7 miles southwest of Ukiah. Extensive emergency resources were dispatched to the scene where no survivors were found among the 19 occupants. Crew: Robert M. Elzcy, pilot, G. F. Acbel, pilot, Orven K. Judd, copilot, L. A. Mackota, flight engineer, J. J. Egan, flight engineer, John Maynard, navigator, C. P. Thompson, radio operator, G. W. Angus, radio operator, John Hill, steward.