ACE Air Cargo

Beechcraft 1900C

Aircraft was destroyed when it impacted rising terrain about 10 miles east of Aleknagik, Alaska. The airplane was operated as Flight 51, by Alaska Central Express, Inc., Anchorage, Alaska, as an on demand cargo flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135. The airline transport certificated captain and the commercial certificated first officer sustained fatal injuries. Instrument meteorological conditions were reported in the area at the time of the accident, and the airplane was operating on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The flight had originally departed Anchorage about 0544, and made a scheduled stop at King Salmon, Alaska, before continuing on to the next scheduled stop, Dillingham, Alaska. According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) personnel, as the airplane approached Dillingham, the flight crew requested the RNAV GPS 19 instrument approach to the Dillingham Airport about 0757 from controllers at the Anchorage Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC). The ARTCC specialist on duty subsequently granted the request by issuing the clearance, with instructions to proceed direct to the Initial Approach Fix (IAF) to begin the approach, and to maintain an altitude of 2,000 feet or above. A short time later the flight crew requested to enter a holding pattern at the IAF so that they could contact the Flight Service Station (FSS) for a runway conditions report, and the ARTCC specialist granted that request. The ARTCC specialist then made several attempts to contact the aircraft, but was unsuccessful and subsequently lost radar track on the aircraft. When the airplane failed to arrive at the Dillingham Airport, ARTCC personnel initiated a radio search to see if the airplane had diverted to another airport. Unable to locate the airplane, the FAA issued an alert notice (ALNOT) at 0835. Search personnel from the Alaska State Troopers, Alaska Air National Guard, and the U.S. Coast Guard, along with several volunteer pilots, were dispatched to conduct an extensive search effort. Rescue personnel aboard an Air National Guard C-130 airplane tracked 406 MHz emergency locater transmitter (ELT) signal to an area of mountainous terrain about 20 miles north of Dillingham, but poor weather prohibited searchers from reaching the site until the next morning. Once the crew of a HH-60G helicopter from the Air National Guard's 210th Air Rescue Squadron, Anchorage, Alaska, reached the steep, snow and ice-covered site, they confirmed that both pilots sustained fatal injuries.

Beechcraft 1900C

The crew departed on a commercial cargo flight during dark night, visual meteorological conditions on an instrument flight rules flight plan. The departure end of the runway is adjacent to an ocean bay, and wind gusts up to 26 knots were reported. Local residents north of the airport reported stronger wind, estimated between 50 and 60 knots. A fuel truck operator, who was familiar with the crew’s normal routine, reported that, before the airplane taxied to the runway, it remained on the ramp for 6 or 8 minutes with both engines operating, which he described as very unusual. There were no reports of radio communications with the flight crew after the airplane departed. The airplane crashed about 1 mile offshore, and the fragmented wreckage sank in ocean water. Because of the fragmented nature of the wreckage and ocean current, the complete wreckage was not recovered. The cockpit area forward of the wings was extensively fragmented, thus the validity of any postaccident cockpit and instrument findings was unreliable. Likewise, structural damage to the airframe precluded determining flight control continuity. Both propellers had witness marks consistent with operating under engine power and within their normal operating range. A postaccident examination of the engines and recovered components did not disclose any evidence of a mechanical malfunction. Due to the lack of mechanical deficiencies of the engines and propellers, and the extensive airframe fragmentation consistent with a high-speed water impact, it is likely that the crew had an in-flight loss of control of an unknown origin before impact.

Embraer EMB-120 Brasília

The captain and first officer were conducting a localizer DME back course approach to runway 36 in a twin-engine turboprop airplane during a night cargo flight under IFR conditions. The minimum visibility for the approach was one mile, and the minimum descent altitude (MDA) was 460 feet msl (338 feet agl). Prior to leaving their cruise altitude, the first officer listened to the ATIS information which included an altimeter setting of 29.30 inHg. No other altimeter information was received until the crew reported they were inbound on the approach. At that time, tower personnel told the crew that the visibility was one mile in light snow, the wind was from 040 degrees at 22 knots, and the altimeter setting was 29.22 inHg. The crew did not reset the airplane altimeters from 29.30 to 29.22. At the final approach fix (5 miles from the runway), the captain began a descent to the MDA. Thirty-six seconds before impact, the first officer cautioned the captain about the airplane's high airspeed. Due to strong crosswinds, the captain disconnected the autopilot 22 seconds before impact. He said he pushed the altitude hold feature on the flight director at the MDA. Eighteen seconds before impact, the airplane leveled off about 471 feet indicated altitude, but then descended again 9 seconds later. The descent continued until the airplane collided with the ground, 3.5 miles from the runway. The crew said that neither the airport, or the snow-covered terrain, was observed before impact. The crew reported that the landing lights were off. The airplane was not equipped with a ground proximity warning system.

Beechcraft 1900C

The airline transport pilot was cleared for the localizer approach. The airplane impacted the ground 3.2 nautical miles from the runway threshold. The minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the approach was 560 feet msl, which is 263 feet above touchdown. Night, instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The surrounding terrain was flat, snow-covered, and featureless. The reported weather was 200 feet overcast, 1 1/2 miles visibility in snow, and winds of 12 knots, gusting to 32 knots. The pilot reported he was established on the final approach course, descending to the MDA, and then woke up in the snow. He said he did not remember any problems with the airplane. No pre accident mechanical anomalies were discovered with the airplane during the investigation. The airport has high intensity runway lights, sequenced flashing lead-in lights, and visual approach slope indicator lights. All airport lights and navigation aids were functioning. The airplane was not equipped with an autopilot. Captains have the option of requesting a copilot, but, the captain's pay is reduced by a portion equal to one-half the copilot's pay. The pilot had returned from the previous nights trip at 0725. He had three rest periods, four hours, two hours, and five hours 15 minutes, since his previous nights flight. Each rest period was interrupted by contact with the company. The company indicated that it is the pilot's responsibility to tell the company if duty times are being exceeded. 14 CFR 135.267 states, in part: '(d) Each assignment ... must provide for at least 10 consecutive hours of rest during the 24 hours that precedes the planned completion of the assignment.'