Hawker 800XP

Aereo Lineas del Centro SA

A Hawker 800XP, XA-JMR, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Bath Township, Michigan. The captain, co-pilot, and passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a local area post-maintenance flight. The airplane arrived at Duncan Aviation’s maintenance facility at Battle Creek Executive Airport at Kellogg Field (BTL), Battle Creek, Michigan for routine maintenance in March 2025. According to Duncan Aviation maintenance personnel, multiple routine inspections were completed on the airplane over seven months. One inspection included the removal of the wing leading edges and TKS ice protection panels for a visual inspection for cracks and signs of corrosion. Per the manufacturer, after the leading edge inspection, a post-maintenance stall test flight is required before the airplane can be returned to service. According to preliminary ADS-B data, the airplane departed BTL at 17:08 and entered a left climbing turn and proceeded to an area about 9 miles northeast of BTL. The flight crew asked ATC for a block altitude from FL140 to FL160, and ATC approved the request. The airplane leveled off at FL150. At 17:27 the airplane began a rapid descent from FL140, during which time there was an indiscernible transmission from the accident airplane, ATC responded “XA-JMR Cleveland.” The flight crew responded, “we are in a...” followed by a transmission in Spanish which translated to “in a stall, recovering, sorry.” There were no further transmissions from the flight crew. The airplane came to rest in a wooded area about 49 miles northeast of BTL at an elevation of 850 ft mean sea level and oriented on a magnetic heading of 150°. The airplane impacted terrain in a relatively flat attitude. A postimpact fire consumed a large portion of the main wreckage with the exception of a portion of the right wing, both winglets, and the empennage section. All major structures were accounted for at the accident site. According to Duncan Aviation personnel, the flight crew was the primary crew for the accident airplane, and they reported that they flew the airplane about 150 hours per year. Duncan Aviation personnel also reported that just prior to the completion of the maintenance procedures, the captain was provided with a list of experienced test pilots, for hire, to perform the postmaintenance stall test flight. However, after being unable to coordinate the stall test flight with a test pilot, the flight crew elected to perform the post maintenance stall test themselves. According to their personal flight logbooks, the captain and co-pilot exclusively flew the accident airplane, and they completed their most recent training at a commercial simulator training facility in May 2025, about 5 months before the accident. The Pilot’s Operating Manual (POM) contained instructions on operating limitations, system descriptions, flight planning, flight handling, and techniques for the stall test flight. The POM provided the required conditions for the stall test which included altitude above 10,000 ft above ground level, 10,000 ft above clouds and below 18,000 ft mean sea level. In addition, this stall test could only be conducted during day visual meteorological conditions with a good visual horizon, with the autopilot disengaged, an operative stall identification system, the external surfaces free of ice, the ventral tank empty and weather radar on standby. The stall test section of the POM also noted stall characteristics and stated “There is no natural stall warning or aerodynamic buffet prior to the stall. It is acceptable for stick pusher operation to be coincident with the natural stall, provided that any rolling tendency can be restrained to within 20° bank angle by normal use of ailerons.” A “Caution” advisory stated: A FREQUENT REASON FOR UNACCEPTABLE STALL CHARACTERISTICS IS A TENDENCY TO ROLL THE STALL. IT IS ACCEPTABLE FOR A MODERATE ROLL TO OCCUR, PROVIDED THAT NORMAL USE OF AILERONS CAN LIMIT THE ROLL ANGLE TO NO MORE THAN 20%. AILERON SNATCH MAY OCCUR AT OR PRIOR TO STALL AND IS NOT ACCEPTABLE. THE AILERON SNATCH MAY BE STRONG ENOUGH TO AFFECT RECOVERY USING AILERON INPUT, IN WHICH CASE THE ELEVATOR CONTROL MUST BE MOVED FORWARD TO DECREASE THE ANGLE OF ATTACK AND ALLOW THE RETURN OF NORMAL AILERON CONTROL. IN SUCH AN EVENT THE PILOT MUST BE PREPARED TO RECOVER FROM AN UNUSUAL ATTITUDE. PILOTS CONDUCTING STALL CHECKS SHOULD HAVE PRIOR EXPERIENCE IN PERFORMING STALLS IN THE HAWKER AND MUST BE PREPARED FOR UNACCEPTABLE STALL BEHAVIOR AT ANY POINT LEADING UP TO AND THROUGHOUT THE MANEUVER. The NTSB has investigated at least three other accidents/incidents involving the performance of required stall tests after maintenance in business jets.

Talon Air

On December 20, 2020, about 2035 eastern standard time, a Beechcraft Hawker 800XP, N412JA, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident at Republic Airport (FRG), Farmingdale, New York. The captain sustained minor injuries and the first officer was seriously injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 business flight. The flight was operating on an instrument flight rules flight plan from Miami-Opa Locka Executive Airport (OPF), Opa Locka, Florida, to FRG. The captain was the pilot monitoring, and the first officer was the pilot flying. Both pilots stated that the flight to FRG was normal. As they approached FRG, air traffic control (ATC) vectored them onto the ILS RWY 14 approach. The weather included a ceiling of 200 ft overcast and 3/4-mile visibility, which was the weather minimum for the approach. The pilots briefed the approach, and the airplane was fully configured to land by the time they reached the final approach fix (FAF). Both pilots said that after passing the FAF, the FRG tower-controller reported that the visibility had deteriorated to 1/4-mile. The captain asked the first officer if he was “comfortable” continuing with the approach, and he said he was. The first officer said he was using the autopilot on the approach, the airplane was stabilized “on glideslope and on speed,” and he felt they could safely descend to minimums. The first officer reported that the captain made the standard altitude callouts, and when they reached 200 ft, the captain announced “minimums, lights.” The first officer then looked outside, saw the “lead-in” lights, announced “continuing,” and returned to flying the airplane via instruments. As the airplane descended to 100 ft, the captain said the runway was to the left. The first officer said he looked out and saw runway end identifier lights, the red terminating lights, and only the end of the runway. The weather was worse than he expected, and it was as if a “black cloud” was sitting at the end of the runway. The first officer said the conditions were not “good enough for him” and hit the takeoff/go-around (TOGA) switch. He did not verbally announce that he was going-around, but the captain said, “Go-Around.” The first officer responded by saying “Go Around” twice, called for flaps 15°, and added full power. The first officer said the airplane never established a positive rate of climb and impacted the ground. The captain said that as the airplane descended to 100 ft, it began drifting to the right. He told the first officer that he needed to make a correction; however, the correction was not sufficient to get the airplane realigned with the runway centerline and he called for a go-around. The captain said the airplane pitched up in response to the TOGA switch, and he heard both engines spool up as he retracted the flaps, but the airplane did not climb. The airplane then impacted the ground, veered right, and spun before coming to a stop. According to a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector, the airplane departed the runway environment about 2,000 ft down the runway, then traveled approximately 1,500 ft before coming to rest. The nose wheel and both main landing gear departed the aircraft and were found on the runway. There was no postimpact fire.

Gemini Air Group

On March 14, 2020, about 1600 mountain standard time, a Raytheon Aircraft Company Hawker 800XP, N100AG, was substantially damaged after veering off the runway and impacting a sign at the Scottsdale Airport, Scottsdale, Arizona. The pilot and co-pilot were not injured. The airplane was being operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. The pilot stated that the flight departed from Roger, Arkansas about 1315 with the planned destination of Scottsdale. After an uneventful flight, the pilot made a stabilized approach to runway 21. Upon landing, the airplane touched down on the runway centerline in light and variable winds. The pilot recalled that the touchdown felt normal. During the landing roll, the airplane began to veer to the right and the pilot added left rudder in an effort to correct. Despite his attempts of full left rudder deflection, the airplane continued to veer off the runway. The airplane continued off the runway surface and encountered large rocks located between the runway and taxiway. The airplane collided with runway lights and a sign puncturing the left wing and resulted in substantial damage; the engines both sustained foreign object damage from the rocks. The pilot opined that the loss of control was a result of the nosewheel steering wheel not being aligned correctly.

Swat Technology

On 11th June, 2015, at about 18:25 h, an HS-125-800XP aircraft with nationality and registration marks N497AG, operated by SWAT Technology Limited departed Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport, Abuja (DNAA) for Port Harcourt International Airport (DNPO) as a charter flight on an Instrument Flight Rule (IFR) flight plan. There were five persons on board inclusive of three flight crew and two passengers. The Captain was the Pilot Flying while the Co-pilot was the Pilot Monitoring. At 18:48 h, N497AG established contact with Lagos and Port Harcourt Air Traffic Control (ATC) units cruising at Flight Level (FL) 280. At 18:55 h, the aircraft was released by Lagos to continue with Port Harcourt. Port Harcourt cleared N497AG for descent to FL210. At 19:13 h, the crew reported field in sight at 6 nautical miles to touch down to the Tower Controller (TC). TC then cleared the aircraft to land with caution “runway surface wet”. The crew experienced light rain at about 1.3 nautical miles to touch down with runway lights ON for the ILS approach. At about 1,000 ft after the extension of landing gears, the PM remarked ‘Okay...I got a little rain on the windshield’ and the PF responded, ‘We don’t have wipers sir... (Laugh) Na wa o (Na wa o – local parlance, - pidgin, for expression of surprise). From the CVR, at Decision Height, the PM called out ‘minimums’ while the PF called back ‘landing’ as his intention. The PM reported that the runway edge lights were visible on the left side. On the right side, it was missing to a large extent and only appeared for about a quarter of the way from the runway 03 end. The PM observed that the aircraft was slightly to the left of the “centreline” and pointed out “right, right, more right.” The PM further stated that at 50 ft, the PF retarded power and turned to the left. At 40 ft, the PM cautioned the PF to ‘keep light in sight don’t go to the left’. At 20 ft, the PM again said, ‘keep on the right’. PF replied, ‘Are you sure that’s not the centre line?’. At 19:16 h, the aircraft touched down with left main wheel in the grass and the right main wheel on the runway but was steered back onto the runway. The PF stated, “...but just on touchdown the right-hand lights were out, and in a bid to line up with the lights we veered off the runway to the left”. The nose wheel landing gear collapsed, and the aircraft stopped on the runway. The engines were shut down and all persons on board disembarked without any injury. From the CVR recordings, the PF told the PM that he mistook the brightly illuminated left runway edge lights for the runway centreline and apologized for the error of judgement for which the PM responded ‘I told you’. The aircraft was towed out of the runway and parked at GAT Apron at 21:50 h. The accident occurred at night in light rain.

NetJets

The Hawker and the glider collided in flight at an altitude of about 16,000 feet above mean sea level about 42 nautical miles south-southeast of the Reno/Tahoe International Airport (RNO), Reno, Nevada, which was the Hawker's destination. The collision occurred in visual meteorological conditions in an area that is frequently traversed by air carrier and other turbojet airplanes inbound to RNO and that is also popular for glider operations because of the thermal and mountain wave gliding opportunities there. Before the collision, the Hawker had been descending toward RNO on a stable northwest heading for several miles, and the glider was in a 30-degree, left-banked, spiraling climb. According to statements from the Hawker's captain and the glider pilot, they each saw the other aircraft only about 1 second or less before the collision and were unable to maneuver to avoid the collision in time. Damage sustained by the Hawker disabled one engine and other systems; however, the flight crew was able to land the airplane. The damaged glider was uncontrollable, and the glider pilot bailed out and parachuted to the ground. Because of the lack of radar data for the glider's flight, it was not possible to determine at which points each aircraft may have been within the other's available field of view. Although Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) require all pilots to maintain vigilance to see and avoid other aircraft (this includes pilots of flights operated under instrument flight rules, when visibility permits), a number of factors that can diminish the effectiveness of the see-and-avoid principle were evident in this accident. For example, the high closure rate of the Hawker as it approached the glider would have given the glider pilot only limited time to see and avoid the jet. Likewise, the closure rate would have limited the time that the Hawker crew had to detect the glider, and the slim design of the glider would have made it difficult for the Hawker crew to see it. Although the demands of cockpit tasks, such as preparing for an approach, have been shown to adversely affect scan vigilance, both the Hawker captain, who was the flying pilot, and the first officer reported that they were looking out the window before the collision. However, the captain saw the glider only a moment before it filled the windshield, and the first officer never saw it at all.