De Havilland DHC-3 Otter

Yakutat Coastal Airlines

The single engine airplane departed Yakutat on an on-demand flight to Dry Bay, a remote airstrip located about 30 miles southeast of the Southeast Alaska community of Yakutat. On final approach, the aircraft crashed in a wooded area located short of runway. All four occupants were injured, three critically.

Blue Water Aviation - Manitoba Air Charter Services

At approximately 0745 Central Daylight Time on 26 October 2019, the Blue Water Aviation float-equipped deHavillandDHC-3 Otteraircraft (registration C-GBTU, serial number 209) departed Bissett Water Aerodrome, Manitoba, with the pilot, 2 passengers, and approximately 800 pounds of freight on board. The destination was Little Grand Rapids, Manitoba, on the eastern shore of Family Lake. At approximately 0845, while on approach to Family Lake, the aircraft’s right wing separated from the fuselage. The aircraft then entered a nose-down attitudeand struck the water surface of the lake. The pilot and the 2 passengers were fatally injured. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces. The emergency locator transmitter activated momentarily.

Taquan Air

On May 13, 2019, about 1221 Alaska daylight time, a float-equipped de Havilland DHC-2 (Beaver) airplane, N952DB, and a float-equipped de Havilland DHC-3 (Otter) airplane, N959PA, collided in midair about 8 miles northeast of Ketchikan, Alaska. The DHC-2 pilot and four passengers sustained fatal injuries. The DHC-3 pilot sustained minor injuries, nine passengers sustained serious injuries, and one passenger sustained fatal injuries. The DHC-2 was destroyed, and the DHC-3 sustained substantial damage. The DHC-2 was registered to and operated by Mountain Air Service LLC, Ketchikan, Alaska, under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 as an on-demand sightseeing flight. The DHC-3 was registered to Pantechnicon Aviation LTD, Minden, Nevada, and operated by Venture Travel, LLC, dba Taquan Air, Ketchikan, Alaska, under the provisions of Part 135 as an on-demand sightseeing flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area at the time of the accident. According to information provided by the operators, both airplanes had been conducting sightseeing flights to the Misty Fjords National Monument area. They were both converging on a scenic waterfall in the Mahoney Lakes area on Revillagigedo Island before returning to the Ketchikan Harbor Seaplane Base (5KE), Ketchikan, Alaska, when the accident occurred. According to recorded avionics data recovered from the DHC-3, it departed from an inlet (Rudyerd Bay) in the Misty Fjords National Monument area about 1203 and followed the inlet westward toward Point Eva and Manzanita Island. At 1209, at an altitude between 1,900 and 2,200 ft, the DHC-3 crossed the Behm Canal then turned to the southwest about 1212 in the vicinity of Lake Grace. Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) tracking data for both airplanes, which were provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), began at 1213:08 for the DHC-3, and at 1213:55 for the DHC-2. At 1217:15, the DHC-3 was about level at 4,000 ft mean sea level (msl) over Carroll Inlet on a track of 225°. The DHC-2 was 4.2 nautical miles (nm) south of the DHC-3, climbing through 2,800 ft, on a track of 255°. The DHC-3 pilot stated that, about this time, he checked his traffic display and “there were two groups of blue triangles, but not on my line. They were to the left of where I was going.” He stated that he did not observe the DHC-2 on his traffic display before the collision. The ADS-B data indicated that, about 1219, the DHC-3 started a descent from 4,000 ft, and the DHC-2 was climbing from 3,175 ft. During the next 1 minute 21 seconds, the DHC-3 continued to descend on a track between 224° and 237°, and the DHC-2 leveled out at 3,350 ft on a track of about 255°. Between 1220:21 and 1221:14, the DHC-3 made a shallow left turn to a track of 210°, then a shallow right turn back to a track of 226°. The airplanes collided at 1221:14 at an altitude of 3,350 ft, 7.4 nm northeast of 5KE. The ADS-B data for both airplanes end about the time of the collision. The DHC-2 was fractured into multiple pieces and impacted the water and terrain northeast of Mahoney Lake. Recorded avionics data for the DHC-3 indicate that at 1221:14, the DHC-3 experienced a brief upset in vertical load factor and soon after entered a right bank, reaching an attitude about 50° right wing down at 1221:19 and 27° nose down at 1221:22. The DHC-3 began descending and completed a 180° turn before impacting George Inlet at 1222:15 along a northeast track.

Taquan Air

The airline transport pilot was conducting a commercial visual flight rules (VFR) flight transporting 10 passengers from a remote fishing lodge. According to the pilot, while in level cruise flight about 1,100 ft mean sea level (msl) and as the flight progressed into a mountain pass, visibility decreased rapidly. In an attempt to turn around and return to VFR conditions, the pilot initiated a climbing right turn. Before completing the 180° right turn, he saw what he believed to be a body of water and became momentarily disoriented, so he leveled the wings. Shortly thereafter, he realized that the airplane was approaching an area of snow-covered mountainous terrain, so he applied full power and initiated a steep climb; the airspeed decayed, and the airplane collided with an area of rocky, rising terrain, which resulted in substantial damage to the wings and fuselage. The pilot reported no mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation, and the examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The weather forecast at the accident time included scattered clouds at 2,500 ft msl, overcast clouds at 5,000 ft msl with cloud tops to 14,000 ft and clouds layered above that to flight level 250, and isolated broken clouds at 2,500 ft with light rain. AIRMET advisory SIERRA for "mountains obscured in clouds/precipitation" was valid at the time of the accident. Conditions were expected to deteriorate. Passenger interviews revealed that through the course of the flight, the airplane was operating in marginal visual meteorological conditions and occasional instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) with areas of precipitation, reduced visibility, obscuration, and, at times, little to no forward visibility. Thus, based on weather reports and forecasts, and the pilot's and passengers' statements, it is likely that the flight encountered IMC as it approached mountainous terrain and that the pilot then lost situational awareness. The airplane was equipped with a terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS); however, the alerts were inhibited at the time of the accident. Although the TAWS was required to be installed per Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations, there is no requirement for it to be used. All company pilots interviewed stated that the TAWS inhibit switch remained in the inhibit position unless a controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) escape maneuver was being accomplished. However, the check airman who last administered the accident pilot's competency check stated that the TAWS inhibit switch was never moved, even during a CFIT escape maneuver. The unwritten company policy to leave the TAWS in the inhibit mode and the failure of the pilot to move the TAWS out of the inhibit mode when weather conditions began to deteriorate were inconsistent with the goal of providing the highest level of safety. However, if the pilot had been using TAWS, due to the fact that he was operating at a lower altitude and thus would have likely received numerous nuisance alerts, the investigation could not determine the extent to which TAWS would have impacted the pilot's actions. At the time of the accident, the director of operations (DO) for the company resided in another city and served as DO for another air carrier as well. He traveled to the company's main base of operation about once per month but was available via telephone. According to the chief pilot, he had assumed a large percentage of the DO's duties. The president of the company said that the chief pilot had taken over "officer of the deck" and "we're just basically using him [the DO] for his recordkeeping." The FAA was aware that the company's DO was also DO for another commuter operation. FAA Flight Standards District Office management and principal operations inspectors allowed him to continue to hold those positions, although it was contrary to the guidance provided in FAA Order 8900.1. The company's General Operations Manual (GOM) only listed the DO, the chief pilot, and the president by name as having the authority to exercise operational control. However, numerous company personnel stated that operational control could be and was routinely delegated to senior pilots. The GOM stated that the DO "routinely" delegated the duty of operational control to flight coordinators, but the flight coordinator on duty at the time of the accident stated that she did not have operational control. In addition, the investigation revealed numerous inadequate and missing operational control procedures and processes in company manuals and operations specifications. Based on the FAA's inappropriate approval of the DO, the insufficient company onsite management, the inadequate operational control procedures, and the exercise of operational control by unapproved persons likely resulted in a lack of oversight of flight operations, inattentive and distracted management personnel, and a loss of operational control within the air carrier. However, the investigation could not determine the extent to which any changes to operational control, company management, and FAA oversight would have influenced the pilot's decision to continue the VFR flight into IMC.

Rainbow King Lodge

On September 15, 2015, about 0606 Alaska daylight time, a single-engine, turbine-powered, float-equipped de Havilland DHC-3T (Otter) airplane, N928RK, impacted tundra-covered terrain just after takeoff from East Wind Lake, about 1 mile east of the Iliamna Airport, Iliamna, Alaska. Of the 10 people on board, three passengers died at the scene, the airline transport pilot and four passengers sustained serious injuries, and two passengers sustained minor injuries. The airplane sustained substantial damage. The airplane was registered to and operated by Rainbow King Lodge, Inc., Lemoore, California, as a visual flight rules other work use flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. Dark night, visual meteorological conditions existed at the departure point at the time of the accident, and no flight plan was filed for the flight. At the time of the accident, the airplane was en route to a remote fishing site on the Swishak River, about 75 miles northwest of Kodiak, Alaska.

Promech Air

The airplane collided with mountainous, tree-covered terrain about 24 miles east-northeast of Ketchikan, Alaska. The commercial pilot and eight passengers sustained fatal injuries, and the airplane was destroyed. The airplane was owned by Pantechnicon Aviation, of Minden, Nevada, and operated by Promech Air, Inc., of Ketchikan. The flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 as an on-demand sightseeing flight; a company visual flight rules flight plan (by which the company performed its own flight-following) was in effect. Marginal visual flight rules conditions were reported in the area at the time of the accident. The flight departed about 1207 from Rudyerd Bay about 44 miles east-northeast of Ketchikan and was en route to the operator’s base at the Ketchikan Harbor Seaplane Base, Ketchikan. The accident airplane was the third of four Promech-operated float-equipped airplanes that departed at approximate 5-minute intervals from a floating dock in Rudyerd Bay. The accident flight and the two Promech flights that departed before it were carrying cruise-ship passengers who had a 1230 “all aboard” time for their cruise ship that was scheduled to depart at 1300. (The fourth flight had no passengers but was repositioning to Ketchikan for a tour scheduled at 1230; the accident pilot also had his next tour scheduled for 1230.) The sightseeing tour flight, which the cruise ship passengers had purchased from the cruise line as a shore excursion, overflew remote inland fjords; coastal waterways; and mountainous, tree-covered terrain in the Misty Fjords National Monument Wilderness. Promech pilots could choose between two standard tour routes between Rudyerd Bay and Ketchikan, referred to as the “short route” (which is about 52 nautical miles [nm], takes about 25 minutes to complete, and is primarily over land) and the “long route” (which is about 63 nm, takes about 30 minutes to complete, and is primarily over seawater channels). Although the long route was less scenic, it was generally preferred in poor weather conditions because it was primarily over water, which enabled the pilots to fly at lower altitudes (beneath cloud layers) and perform an emergency or precautionary landing, if needed. Route choice was at each pilot’s discretion based on the pilot’s assessment of the weather. The accident pilot and two other Promech pilots (one of whom was repositioning an empty airplane) chose the short route for the return leg, while the pilot of the second Promech flight to depart chose the long route. Information obtained from weather observation sources, weather cameras, and photographs and videos recovered from the portable electronic devices (PEDs) of passengers on board the accident flight and other tour flights in the area provided evidence that the accident flight encountered deteriorating weather conditions. Further, at the time of the accident, the terrain at the accident site was likely obscured by overcast clouds with visibility restricted in rain and mist. Although the accident pilot had climbed the airplane to an altitude that would have provided safe terrain clearance had he followed the typical short route (which required the flight to pass two nearly identical mountains before turning west), the pilot instead deviated from that route and turned the airplane west early (after it passed only the first of the two mountains). The pilot’s route deviation placed the airplane on a collision course with a 1,900-ft mountain, which it struck at an elevation of about 1,600 ft mean sea level. In the final 2 seconds of the flight, the airplane pitched up rapidly before colliding with terrain. The timing of this aggressive pitch-up maneuver strongly supports the scenario that the pilot continued the flight into near-zero visibility conditions, and, as soon as he realized that the flight was on a collision course with the terrain, he pulled aggressively on the elevator flight controls in an ineffective attempt to avoid the terrain. Although Promech’s General Operations Manual specified that both the pilot and the flight scheduler must jointly agree that a flight can be conducted safely before it is launched, no such explicit concurrence occurred between the accident pilot and the flight scheduler (or any member of company management) before the accident flight. As a result, the decision to initiate the accident tour rested solely with the accident pilot, who had less than 2 months’ experience flying air tours in Southeast Alaska and had demonstrated difficulty calibrating his own risk tolerance for conducting tour flights in weather that was marginal or below Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) minimums. Further, evidence from the accident tour flight and the pilot’s previous tour flights support that the pilot’s decisions regarding his tour flights were influenced by schedule pressure; his attempt to emulate the behavior of other, more experienced pilots whose flights he was following; and Promech’s organizational culture, which tacitly endorsed flying in hazardous weather conditions, as evidenced (in part) by the company president/chief executive officer’s own tour flight below FAA minimums on the day of the accident.

Transwest Air

The float-equipped Transwest Air Limited Partnership DHC-3 turbine Otter (registration C-FSGD, serial number 316) departed Scott Lake, Northwest Territories, at approximately 1850 Central Standard Time on a 33-nautical mile, day, visual flight rules flight to Ivanhoe Lake, Northwest Territories. The aircraft did not arrive at its destination, and was reported overdue at approximately 2100. The Joint Rescue Coordination Centre Trenton was notified by the company. There was no emergency locator transmitter signal. A search and rescue C-130 Hercules aircraft was dispatched; the aircraft wreckage was located on 23 August 2013, in an unnamed lake, 10 nautical miles north of the last reported position. The pilot, who was the sole occupant of the aircraft, sustained fatal injuries.

Rediske Air

Before picking up the nine passengers, the pilot loaded the accident airplane at the operator's base in Nikiski with cargo (food and supplies for the lodge). The operator of the lodge where the passengers were headed estimated the cargo weighed about 300 pounds (lbs) and that the passengers' baggage weighed about 80 lbs. Estimates of the passengers' weights were provided to the lodge operator in preparation for the trip, which totaled 1,350 lbs. The load manifest listed each of these weight estimates for a total weight of 1,730 lbs and did not contain any balance data. The cargo was not weighed, and the pilot did not document any weight and balance calculations nor was he required to do so. The airplane operator did not keep fueling records for each flight. A witness who was present during the fueling operations at the operator's base reported that he saw the pilot top off the front tank then begin fueling the center tank. The first leg of the trip from the operator's base to pick up the passengers was completed uneventfully. According to witnesses at Soldotna Airport, after loading the passengers and their baggage, the pilot taxied for departure. There were no witnesses to the accident. The airplane impacted the ground about 2,320 feet from the threshold of the departure runway and about 154 feet right of the runway centerline. An extensive postcrash fire consumed most of the airplane's cockpit and cabin area, including an unknown quantity of the baggage and cargo. Impact signatures were consistent with a nose- and right-wing-low attitude at impact. The entire airplane was accounted for at the wreckage site. Disassembly and examination of the engine and propeller revealed that both were operating during impact. Examination of the structure and flight control systems found no preimpact malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot was properly certificated and qualified in accordance with applicable federal regulations. Toxicological testing of specimens from the pilot was negative for any carbon monoxide, alcohol, or drugs. The airplane was not equipped, and was not required to be equipped, with any type of crashresistant recorder. A video recovered from a passenger's smartphone showed the accident sequence looking out of the row 4 left seat window; the left wing and flaps are in view for most of the sequence and the flap position does not change. The investigation found that the flaps were set to the full-down (or landing) position during takeoff, contrary to recommended procedures in the airplane flight manual (AFM). The recovered video was used to estimate the airplane speed, altitude, and orientation for the portion of the flight where ground references were visible, about 22.5 seconds after the start of the takeoff roll. For the first 12 seconds, the airplane accelerated linearly from the beginning of the takeoff roll through liftoff. The pitch angle decreased slightly in the first 8 seconds as the tail lifted, remained essentially constant for about 4 seconds, and began to slightly increase as the airplane lifted off. Beginning about 14 seconds after the start of the takeoff roll, the speed began decreasing and the pitch angle began increasing. The pitch angle increased at a constant rate (about 2.8 degrees/second), reaching a maximum value of about 30 degrees, and the ground speed decreased from its maximum of about 68 mph to about 44 mph at the end of the analyzed time. The ground references disappeared from the video frame as the airplane experienced a sharp right roll before impacting the ground several seconds later. The low speed, rapid right roll, and pitch down of the airplane is consistent with an aerodynamic stall. The constant pitch rate before the stall is consistent with an aft center of gravity (CG) condition of sufficient magnitude that the elevator pitch down authority was insufficient to overcome the pitching moment generated by the aft CG. Additionally, the flaps setting at the full-down (or landing) position, contrary to procedures contained in the AFM, would have exacerbated the nose-up pitching moment due to the increased downwash on the tail and aft shift of the center of pressure; the additional aerodynamic drag from the fully extended flaps would have altered the airplane's acceleration. Using the data available, the airplane was within weight and balance limitations for the first leg of the trip. However, the cargo loaded was about 2.4 times the weight indicated on the load manifest. Further, the total weight of cargo and baggage in the cargo area, as estimated during the investigation, exceeded the installed cargo net's load limit of 750 lbs by more than 50 lbs. Although the loaded cargo actual weight was higher than indicated on the load manifest, the flight from Nikiski to Soldotna was completed without any concerns noted by the pilot, indicating that even with the higher cargo load, the airplane was within the normal CG range for that leg of the flight. Thus, based on the investigation's best estimate and a calculation of the airplane's weight and balance using the recovered passenger weights, weights and location of the luggage recovered on scene, weight of the cargo recovered on scene, and weights accounting for the liquid cargo destroyed in the postimpact fire, once the passengers were loaded, the airplane weight would have exceeded the maximum gross weight of 8,000 lbs by about 21 lbs and the CG would have been at least 5.5 inches aft of the 152.2-inch limit (a more definitive calculation could not be performed because the exact location of the cargo was not known). Additionally, the kinematics study of the accident airplane's weight and motion during initial climb and up to the point of stall found that with the pilot applying full pitch-down control input, the CG required to produce the motion observed in the video was likely just past 161 inches. Thus, the only way for the airplane motion to match the motion observed in the video was for the CG to be considerably aft of the 152.2-inch limit, which provides additional support to the results from the weight and balance study. Based on the video study, the weight and balance study constructed from available weight and balance information, and the kinematics study, the airplane exceeded the aft CG limit at takeoff, which resulted in an uncontrollable nose-up pitch leading to an aerodynamic stall. The CG was so far aft of the limit that the airplane likely would have stalled even with the flaps in the correct position. Neither 14 CFR Part 135 nor the operator's operations specifications (OpSpec) require that the aircraft weight and balance be physically documented for any flights. However, according to Section A096 of the OpSpec, when determining aircraft weight and balance, the operator should use either the actual measured weights for all passengers, baggage, and cargo or the solicited weights for passengers plus 10 lbs and actual measured weights for baggage and cargo. The operator did not comply with federal regulations that require adherence to the weighing requirements or the takeoff weight limitations in the AFM. Additionally, although the inaccurate estimate of 300 lbs for the cargo resulted in a calculated CG that was within limits for both legs of the flight, the actual weight of the cargo was significantly higher. Once loaded in Soldotna, the combination of the passengers, their baggage, and the actual cargo weight and its location resulted in the CG for the accident flight being significantly aft of the limit. With the CG so far aft, even with full nose-down input from the pilot, the nose continued to pitch up until the airplane stalled. For each flight in multiengine operations, 14 CFR 135.63(c) requires the preparation of a load manifest that includes, among other items the number of passengers, total weight of the loaded aircraft, the maximum allowable takeoff weight, and the CG location of the loaded aircraft; one copy of the load manifest should be carried in the airplane and the operator is required to keep the records for at least 30 days. Single-engine operations are excluded from this requirement. The NTSB attempted to address this exclusion with the issuance of Safety Recommendations A-89-135 and A-99-61, which asked the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to amend the record-keeping requirements of 14 [CFR] 135.63(c) to apply to single-engine as well as multiengine aircraft. The FAA did not take the recommended action in either instance, and the NTSB classified Safety Recommendations A-89-135 and A-99-61 "Closed—Unacceptable Action" in 1990 and 2014, respectively.

Servant Air

According to a passenger who was seated in the front, right seat, as the flight progressed toward the destination, the pilot decided to make an unscheduled landing at a lake that was surrounded by rising terrain. The passenger said that after making an easterly approach to the lake, before touching down, the pilot initiated a go-around. The passenger said they flew low over the surface of the lake toward a “V” shaped notch formed by a creek with hills on either side at the east end of the lake. He said that while flying through the notch, he thought the left wing of the airplane had hit the hillside. He said the pilot reacted by pulling back hard on the control yoke and rolling the airplane to the right. The airplane entered a steep climb, it began to shake, and stall warning horn sounded. The airplane then rolled left into a steep descent and impacted the ground in a nose-down attitude. The airplane’s left wing had impacted a tree on the creek bank prior to the crash. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Toxicological tests detected the pilot’s recent use of over-the-counter medications used for relief of cold and flu symptoms. Two of these medications are sedating. The use of these sedating medications on the day of the accident or the underlying illness may have affected the pilot’s performance. Given the lack of mechanical deficiencies with the airplane, and the passenger's account of the accident, it is likely the pilot failed to maintain adequate clearance with a tree while performing a low altitude maneuver following a go-around.

Black Sheep Aviation %26 Cattle Company

The aircraft was being utilized in support of mineral exploration activities, to transport building materials, fuel, and winter camp supplies from Mayo, Yukon, to winter airstrips located at Withers Lake and Rackla River, Yukon. Withers Lake is located 113 statute miles (sm) east of Mayo, and Rackla Airstrip is located 94 sm northeast of Mayo (Appendix B). On the accident flight, the aircraft was transporting a load of twelve 6-inch by 6-inch wood timbers, each 16 feet long, and 2 barrels of jet fuel. The pilot had arrived at the Mayo Airport at about 0630 1 on the morning of the accident. The pilot’s first trip of the day was to Withers Lake, departing Mayo at 0834. The pilot completed 2 trips to Withers Lake and 1 trip to Rackla prior to the accident flight. The accident flight departed Mayo at 1448 under visual flight rules (VFR) on a company itinerary. At 1507 the Canadian Mission Control Centre (CMCC) received a 406-MHz emergency locater transmitter (ELT) alert. Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre Victoria (JRCC Victoria) was notified at 1522. Aircraft operating in the area were alerted, and a commercial helicopter was dispatched from Ross River, Yukon, approximately 1 hour later to search for the aircraft. The helicopter crew located the aircraft wreckage at 1833 at about 4300 feet above sea level (asl), on a remote, snow-covered hillside 38 nautical miles (nm) northeast of Mayo.

GCI Communication

On August 9, 2010, about 1442 Alaska daylight time, a single-engine, turbine-powered, amphibious float-equipped de Havilland DHC-3T airplane, N455A, impacted mountainous, tree-covered terrain about 10 nautical miles (nm) northeast of Aleknagik, Alaska. The airline transport pilot and four passengers received fatal injuries, and four passengers received serious injuries. The airplane sustained substantial damage, including deformation and breaching of the fuselage. The flight was operated by GCI Communication Corp. (GCI), of Anchorage, Alaska, under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. About the time of the accident, meteorological conditions that met the criteria for marginal visual flight rules (MVFR) were reported at Dillingham Airport (DLG), Dillingham, Alaska, about 18 nm south of the accident site. No flight plan was filed. The flight departed about 1427 from a GCI-owned private lodge on the shore of Lake Nerka and was en route to a remote sport fishing camp about 52 nm southeast on the Nushagak River. According to GCI lodge personnel, the purpose of the flight was to transport the lodge guests to the fishing camp for an afternoon of fishing. The GCI lodge manager stated that the accident pilot had flown previously that morning in the accident airplane to DLG, where he dropped off another GCI pilot and then returned to the lodge. Sky Connect tracking system data for the accident airplane showed that, on that previous trip, the accident pilot departed the lodge for DLG about 0902 and returned about 1120. A review of DLG flight service station (FSS) recordings revealed that, about 1105, during the return flight from DLG to the lodge, the accident pilot filed a pilot report (PIREP) in which he reported ceilings at 500 feet, visibility of 2 to 3 miles in light rain, and “extremely irritating…continuous light chop” turbulence that he described as “kind of that shove-around type stuff rather than just bumps.” According to GCI lodge personnel, when the pilot returned to the lodge, he stated that the weather was not conducive for a flight to the fishing camp because of the turbulence and low ceilings. Passengers from the accident flight and GCI personnel indicated during postaccident interviews that, by the time that they had lunch about 1300, the weather had improved, and the group discussed with the pilot the option of going to the fishing camp. One passenger characterized the conversation as casual and stated that no pressure was placed on the pilot to make the flight or to depart by a certain time. The GCI lodge manager and some passengers stated that they thought that the pilot checked the weather on the computer during lunch, and the guest party co-host (one of GCI’s senior vice presidents) stated that the pilot informed him about 1400 that he was comfortable taking the group to the fishing camp if the group wanted to go. The GCI lodge manager stated that, before the airplane departed, he sent an e-mail to the fishing camp to indicate that the guests were coming, and personnel there informed him that the pilot had already contacted them. The lodge manager stated that he went down to the dock to help push the airplane off and that, when the flight departed, he could see all of Jackknife Mountain across the lake. (The mountain’s highest peak, which is about 3 nm from the dock, is depicted as 2,326 feet above mean sea level [msl] on an aviation sectional chart, and the elevation of Lake Nerka is depicted as about 40 feet msl on a topographical map.) He stated that the weather included broken ceilings about 2,000 feet above ground level (agl) with some blue patches in the sky and good visibility. The flight route from the lodge to the fishing camp traversed Class G airspace; 14 CFR 91.155 specifies that, for daytime flights below 1,200 feet agl, the flight must be flown clear of clouds and in conditions that allow at least 1 mile flight visibility. During a postaccident interview, the passenger who was in the right cockpit seat stated that, when the airplane departed, the visibility was “fine.” He stated that the pilot went a different direction during takeoff (compared to the passenger’s experiences during previous flights to the fishing camp) and that the pilot said it was to avoid “wind and weather.” The passenger described the weather as cloudy above with light turbulence. He stated that the airplane stayed below the clouds and that he noticed water “running across” the outside of the windshield before he fell asleep about 10 minutes into the flight. Another passenger, who was seated in the second seat behind the pilot on the left side of the airplane, stated that some fog was present beneath the airplane but that he did not think that the airplane flew into any clouds. He estimated that he fell asleep about 3 to 4 minutes after departure. The passenger who was in the first seat behind the pilot on the left side of the airplane stated in an initial interview that he could not see well out his side window and that he had no indication of the weather; however, in a subsequent interview, he stated that, once the airplane was airborne, he could not see the ground and could see only “white-out” conditions outside the airplane. He stated in the subsequent interview that he did not know if the airplane had climbed into clouds initially or if it had entered clouds at some point along the way. The passenger who was in the third seat behind the pilot on the left side of the airplane stated that the pilot kept the airplane below the cloud ceiling and flew along the tree line, followed streams, and maneuvered to avoid terrain. The passenger stated that the airplane banked into a left turn (he said that the bank angle was not unusual) and then immediately impacted terrain. Neither he nor the other passenger who was awake at the time of impact recalled noticing any unusual maneuvering, unusual bank or pitch angles, or change in engine noises that would indicate any problem before the airplane impacted terrain. The wreckage was found at an elevation of about 950 feet msl in steep, wooded terrain in the Muklung Hills, about 16 nm southeast of the GCI lodge. Figure 1 shows the accident site (view looking north-northwest).

Pacific Island Air

While approaching Vomo Island, near Viti Levu Island, Fiji, the single engine aircraft crashed into the sea few dozen metres offshore. All six occupants were slightly injured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Black Sheep Aviation %26 Cattle Company

The Black Sheep Aviation and Cattle Company de Havilland DHC-3T Turbo Otter (registration C-GZCW, serial number 447) had been loaded with a cargo of lumber at Mayo, Yukon. The aircraft was taxied to the threshold of Runway 06 and the pilot began the take-off roll at 1755 Pacific daylight time. At lift-off, the aircraft entered an extreme nose-up attitude and began to rotate to the right. Shortly thereafter, the aircraft struck the airport ramp. The pilot, who was the sole occupant of the aircraft, was fatally injured. A small post-impact fire was extinguished by first responders.

Wings Airline Services

Shortly after takeoff from Flamingo Bay, the single engine aircraft crashed in the sea few dozen metres offshore. The pilot was injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

Nordair Québec 2000

The Otter registered C-FKLC was on the frozen Lagopede Lake, ready for takeoff, when another Otter operated by Air Saguenay and registered C-FODT landed on the same lake. Upon touchdown, the pilot lost control of the aircraft that collided with the Otter waiting for departure. While the Otter registered C-FODT was slightly damaged, the Otter registered C-FKLC was damaged beyond repair after its right wing was torn off. The pilot, sole on board, was uninjured.

Air Tindi

The Air Tindi Ltd. de Havilland DHC-3T (Turbo) Otter (registration C-FXUY, serial number 142) water taxied from the Air Tindi dock at Yellowknife, Northwest Territories, for a charter flight to Blachford Lake. The aircraft was loaded with two crew members, seven passengers, and 840 pounds of cargo. Before the flight, the pilot conducted a preflight passenger briefing, which included information about the location of life preservers and emergency exits. During the take-off run, at about 1912 mountain daylight time, the aircraft performed normally. It became airborne at about 55 mph, which is lower than the normal take-off speed of 60 mph. The pilot applied forward control column to counter the pitch-up tendency, but there was no response. He then trimmed the nose forward, but the aircraft continued to pitch up until it stalled at about 50 feet above the water and the left wing dropped. The aircraft struck the water in the East Bay in a nose-down, 45/ left bank attitude. On impact, the left wing and left float detached from the aircraft, and the aircraft came to rest on its left side. The crew was able to evacuate the passengers before the aircraft submerged, and local boaters assisted in the rescue. There were no serious injuries to the crew or passengers. The aircraft suffered substantial damage.

Mavrik Aire

The airline transport certificated pilot was conducting a VFR cross-country business flight, transporting cargo and personnel to a remote airport. The accident airplane was one of two airplanes transporting supplies for a hunting/fishing company, traveling a multi-segment route. The pilot was accompanied by a pilot-rated passenger occupying the right front seat, and a second passenger seated behind the pilot. The pilot obtained a weather briefing from the FAA, which included AIRMETs for mountain obscuration, and IFR conditions due to low ceilings and visibility in smoke, light rain and mist. The pilot said that when he took off on the accident flight, the visibility was 1 to 3 miles in smoke, haze, and fog, but was VFR. He recalled hazy conditions in which he could see rolling hills and river cuts. The pilot-rated passenger was initially flying the airplane. Upon entering lowering visibility, the pilot said he reassumed control of the airplane, and attempted a 180 degree turn to clear the low visibility area, but collided with trees and crashed. The rear seat passenger reported that the accident airplane was flying about 500 to 1,000 feet above the ground because of smoke and fog. He estimated the visibility at takeoff was about 1 mile. About 30 minutes after departure, the airplane was flying over mountainous terrain, and appeared to be following a canyon. The passenger said that the visibility decreased due to fog. He said that the airplane's throw-over control yoke was initially positioned in front of the right seat, pilot-rated passenger, when suddenly a mountain ridge appeared in front of the airplane. The pilot repositioned the control yoke in front of the left seat, banked the airplane to the left, and added engine power. Within a few seconds, the passenger indicated that he felt the airplane collide with several trees and then descend to the ground. The airplane came to rest upright with extensive fuselage damage, about 1,400 feet msl. One wing was torn off the airframe. A postcrash fire consumed the wreckage. A terminal forecast for the airport of departure included few clouds at 500 feet, and visibilities as low as 3 miles in smoke and mist. The destination airport for the accident flight segment had few clouds at 100 feet, and visibilities as low as 2 1/2 miles.

Huron Air

At approximately 0900 eastern standard time (EST), the pilot arrived at the airstrip and prepared the ski-equipped de Havilland DHC–3 (Otter) aircraft (registration C–GOFF, serial number 65) for the morning flight. This Otter was equipped with a turbine engine. Two passengers, with enough supplies for an extended period of time, including a snowmobile and camping gear, were to be flown to a remote location. The pilot loaded the aircraft and waited for the weather to improve. At approximately 1200 EST, the pilot and passengers boarded the aircraft and took off in an easterly direction. The aircraft got airborne near the departure end of the airstrip, and, shortly after take-off, the right wing struck a number of small bushes and the top of a birch tree. The aircraft descended and struck the frozen lake surface, approximately 70 feet below the airfield elevation in a steep, nose-down, right-wing-low attitude. When it came to rest, the aircraft was inverted and partially submerged, with only the aft section of the fuselage remaining above the ice. All of the occupants were wearing lap belts. The pilot and front seat passenger received fatal injuries. The rear seat passenger survived the impact and evacuated the aircraft with some difficulty due to leg injuries. The following morning, about 22 hours after the accident, a local air operator searching for the missing aircraft located and rescued the surviving passenger.

Grasshopper Aviation

The commercial certificated pilot reported that just after takeoff in a wheel/ski equipped airplane, he heard a very loud bang, followed by a loud rattling noise. As he turned towards the departure airstrip, he had difficulty using the airplane's rudder pedals. Using a combination of aileron input and the remaining amount of rudder control, he was able to maneuver the airplane for a landing on the airstrip. He said that as the airplane passed over the approach end of the airstrip, it drifted to the right, and he initiated a go-around. The airplane subsequently collided with a stand of trees bordering the airstrip, and sustained structural damage to the wings, fuselage, and empennage. In a written statement to the NTSB, the pilot stated that he suspected that the right elevator's outboard and center hinges or hinge pins failed, allowing the right elevator to swing rearward and jam the airplane's rudder. An FAA airworthiness inspector traveled to the accident scene to examine the airplane. He reported that the right elevator was discovered about 150 feet behind the airplane, within the wreckage debris path through a stand of trees. He said that the right elevator sustained a significant amount of damage along the leading edge, which would normally be protected by the horizontal stabilizer. The FAA inspector examined the airplane's horizontal stabilizer in the area where the right and left elevators connect, and noted signs of new paint on the rivets that held the torque tube support assembly, indicating recent reinstallation or replacement of the torque tube support assembly. He indicated that the torque tube support assembly was installed at a slight angle to the right, which allowed the right elevator to eventually slip off of the center and outboard hinge pins. The inspector said that witness marks on the center and outboard hinge pins showed signs of excessive wear towards the outboard portion of each pin. The inspector noted that a review of the airplane's maintenance records failed to disclose any entries of repair/replacement of the elevator torque tube support assembly.

Deraps Aviation

A de Havilland DHC-3 Otter owned by Deraps Aviation Inc., registration C-FLGA, serial number 279, took off from Lake de l'Avion, Quebec, near Natashquan Airport at approximately 1050 eastern daylight time on a flight to a hunting camp 57 miles to the north along the Aguanish River. The pilot and three passengers were on board. Upon arriving at the destination at approximately 1135, the aircraft flew over part of the neighbouring forest before crashing upside down on rugged ground. The passengers were fatally injured on impact. The pilot survived and was evacuated to Sept-Îles by Canadian Forces Search and Rescue services at approximately 0400 on 29 September 2002.

Air Saguenay

The single engine aircraft departed Lake Cojibo with two passengers, one pilot and a full load of freight, destined for a fishing camp. Weather conditions were good but the OAT was high. After takeoff, the aircraft encountered difficulties to maintain a proper rate of climb due to the high temperature and the weight it was carrying. The pilot entered a valley and while trying to gain height to clear rising terrain, the aircraft struck the top of a mountain and crashed, bursting into flames. All three occupants were injured and the aircraft was destroyed by fire.

Tamalik Air

The single engine aircraft departed Otter Creek near Goose Bay on a charter flight to a fishing lodge with three passengers and one pilot on board. The pilot reported he was in climb mode when the aircraft pitched forward and then nosed up before entering an uncontrollable nose-down descent, although it did not exhibit characteristics normally associated with an aerodynamic stall. It impacted the water hard, resulting in structural failure of the float supports and extensive damage to the fuselage. 'Lab Air 911', a Twin Otter medevac flight bound for Nain witnessed the incident and raised the alarm. All four occupants were rescued by boat while the aircraft sank in 55 feet of water. Source: http://www.dhc-3archive.com/DHC-3_398.html

Bishop Aviation

The pilot and 21 jumpers were aboard the airplane for the local skydiving flight. The airplane took off to the north on the wet grass runway. Jumpers reported that during the initial takeoff climb, the aircraft assumed a "very steep angle of attack," and described the pilot "winding the wheel on the lower right side of the chair clockwise, frantically," and "busy with a wheel between the seats." The airplane impacted trees and terrain approximately 250 yards east of the runway. The pilot reported that the "airplane flew through a dust devil" and did not have enough altitude for a complete recovery. The pilot stated the winds were northerly at 6 to 8 knots with "extreme" turbulence. The nearest weather observation facility reported clear skies with calm wind. Takeoff weight and center of gravity (CG) were calculated at 9,118.05 lbs and 161.92 inches. The AFM listed the maximum gross weight at 8,000 pounds and the aft CG limit at 152.2 inches. Further, an AFM WARNING stated: C. G. POSITION OF THE LOADED AIRCRAFT MUST BE CHECKED AND VERIFIED PRIOR TO TAKE-OFF, AND APPROPRIATE TRIM SETTINGS SHOULD BE USED; OTHERWISE ABNORMAL STICK FORCES AND POSITIONS MAY RESULT. The elevator trim wheel is located on the righthand side of the pilot's seat. Post-accident examination of the airplane revealed that there were 16 seatbelts in the cabin section and 2 seatbelts in the cockpit. Additionally, a placard installed in the cockpit stated, in part, THIS AIRPLANE IS LIMITED TO THE OPERATION OF NINE PASSENGERS OR LESS. Regarding the discrepancy between the placarded 9 passenger limit and the 21 jumpers aboard, the pilot stated that parachute jumpers are not considered to be passengers and therefore, he did not have to comply with the placarded limit.

Jackson Air Service

A DHC-3 and a Cessna 185 (both float equipped aircraft) had been chartered to move equipment from an outpost camp which was being threatened by forest fires in the Tadoule Lake (Lac Brochet, MB) area. Takeoff was conducted in a westerly direction into light winds estimated to be 5 to 8 knots. Besides the pilot there were two passengers (the camp owner and his son), two 45 gallon drums of #2 gas, a propane cylinder, battery chargers plus other sundry items. It was reported that once the aircraft was airborne, a windshift occurred which may have resulted in rollover and a downdraft situation. The aircraft began to descend, despite the application of full engine power, and settled into the trees with little forward speed and the wings in a near level attitude. The aircraft was then consumed by fire, the pilot and his two passengers were able to escape with minor scrapes and bruises. The pilot of the Cessna 185 witnessed the accident while airborne and he then returned and landed and rendered assistance to the three occupants. The local temperature was 27 degrees C, and the aircraft was near its maximum gross weight. It was reported that the aircraft had a headwind in proximity to the forest fire on takeoff, and that it flew into the area of a tailwind during initial climb.

Blue Water Aviation - Manitoba Air Charter Services

The Blue Water Aviation Services seaplane departed from Long Haul Lake, Manitoba, with a pilot and an aviation maintenance engineer on board. Shortly after take-off, at 1320 central daylight savings time, the aircraft's engine abruptly lost power. The pilot's attempts to restart the engine were unsuccessful, and the aircraft descended into a stand of trees and struck the ground. The engineer suffered fatal injuries, and the pilot was seriously injured. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces.

Points North Air

The wheel-ski equipped de Havilland DHC-3 Otter, C-FASV, serial number 23, was engaged in flying road construction crews from base camps to work sites in northern Saskatchewan. A five-man crew was moved from a base camp to a small lake, about 22 nautical miles (nm) from Points North Landing, Saskatchewan, the company's main base. The drop-off was made in the morning with a pick-up planned for late afternoon. The pilot then flew back to Points North Landing and filled the aircraft's fuel tanks from the company's main fuel supply. When the pilot returned for the pick-up, the ambient temperature was about seven degrees Celsius, and there were between five and six inches of slush on the ice surface. The pilot loaded the passengers and attempted a take-off. The aircraft accelerated slowly in the slush, and the pilot rejected the take-off. He selected a different take-off run, moved a passenger to a forward seat, and attempted a second take-off. The pilot continued beyond his previously selected rejection distance. The engine revolutions per minute (rpm) then reportedly decreased by about 150 rpm. The aircraft did not become airborne, and it ran into the low shoreline and crashed, skidding to a stop about 300 feet from the shore. An intense fire broke out immediately. The passengers and pilot evacuated the aircraft. Only one passenger suffered minor burns during the evacuation. Flames engulfed the main fuselage and engine, destroying the aircraft.

Harbour Air Seaplanes

The float-equipped, turbine-engine, DHC-3 Otter departed from Tasu, British Columbia, at about 1940 Pacific daylight saving time (PDT), with the pilot and two passengers on board, on a charter, visual flight rules (VFR) flight to Alliford Bay, 26 nautical miles to the north. When the aircraft did not arrive at destination, the operator initiated a search. The aircraft wreckage was located the following day, 18 nautical miles (nm) south of Alliford Bay, in rugged terrain at an elevation of 1,700 feet above sea level (asl). The aircraft was destroyed, and there were no survivors.

Wildcountry Airways

The float-equipped DHC-3 (Otter), carrying the pilot and six passengers, departed the company's water base at Cochenour, Ontario, on a charter flight to Sandy Beach Lodge, located on Trout Lake approximately 25 miles to the east. The pilot levelled the aircraft and configured it for cruise flight at approximately 2,500 feet above sea level (asl). Shortly after level-off, the pilot heard a popping sound and noted a slight loss of engine power, and wisps of whitish-grey smoke entered the cabin. The aircraft instruments indicated normal engine operation, and the fire warning system did not activate. The pilot suspected that the engine had suffered a cylinder failure and turned to return to Cochenour. A passenger seated in the right front crew seat reported flames near the floor at the front, right corner of the cockpit. The pilot radioed the Thunder Bay Flight Service Station to advise of the emergency, had the passenger vacate the crew seat, and attempted to suppress the fire with a hand-held extinguisher. Thick, black smoke billowed into the cabin, restricting visibility and causing respiratory distress for all of the occupants. The pilot opened the left crew door in order to see ahead and landed the aircraft, still on fire, on McNeely Bay, the first available landing site. The aircraft landed hard but remained upright on the floats. The occupants left by the main door, with their life jackets, and were picked up almost immediately by nearby boats. The aircraft was consumed by fire within minutes after landing. The pilot suffered second degree burns to his face and right forearm, and the passenger in the right crew seat suffered burns to his right leg. The remaining five passengers escaped serious injury.

Buffalo Narrows Airways

The single-engine, float-equipped DHC-3 Otter departed Ketchikan, Alaska, at 0905 Pacific daylight time (PDT) on 09 May 1996 with a pilot and co-pilot on board. They were on a visual flight rules (VFR) ferry flight to Dawson Creek, British Columbia, en route to Buffalo Narrows, Saskatchewan. After a refuelling stop and weather briefing at Prince Rupert, British Columbia, the aircraft departed eastbound along the published Telkwa Pass VFR route. When the aircraft did not arrive at Dawson Creek, it was reported overdue. The next day, an extensive search for the missing Otter was commenced and wreckage was located by search and rescue aircraft at 1930 PDT, 30 miles east of Terrace, in the Telkwa Pass. The aircraft had struck mountainous terrain and was destroyed. Both occupants were fatally injured.

Western Straits Air

The single-engine turbine Otter on amphibious floats departed Triumph Bay, British Columbia, at 1634 Pacific daylight saving time (PDT) with one pilot and nine passengers on board for a visual flight rules (VFR) flight to Campbell River. At 19:01:59 the pilot called Campbell River Flight Service Station (FSS) and reported that he was seven nautical miles (nm) northwest of the airport, inbound for Campbell River. Radar data from Comox indicate that, when this call was made, the aircraft was actually 11 nm northwest of Campbell River, just south of the Narrows (see map, Appendix A). At 19:02:40, the pilot was given the 1900 PDT Campbell River weather observation, which was as follows: ceiling 300 feet overcast and visibility two miles in light rain and fog. The pilot requested a special VFR (SVFR) clearance to enter the Campbell River control zone. Clearance for SVFR was delayed by Comox air traffic control (ATC) until an instrument flight rules (IFR) aircraft on approach to Campbell River had landed. At 19:03:54, the IFR aircraft reported breaking clouds at 900 feet above sea level (asl), which would be approximately 550 feet above ground level, on the ILS approach to runway 11 at Campbell River (airport elevation is 346 feet). This information was acknowledged by the turbine Otter pilot. The IFR aircraft landed at 1904, and the turbine Otter was issued an SVFR clearance at 19:04:45. Radar data indicate that, at that time, the aircraft was about one mile northwest of Tyee Spit, a frequently used, alternate landing site (water) for company aircraft when weather conditions preclude landing at Campbell River airport. Radar data indicate that, at 1906, after passing by Tyee Spit, the aircraft turned southbound and flew directly toward the airport. At about 2 1/2 miles from the airport, at 19:07:40, the aircraft turned right to a heading of approximately 310/ magnetic and flew in that general direction for about two minutes. The aircraft was on a track that was approximately parallel to the extended runway centre line, tracking outbound from the airport with the localizer and the Campbell River (YBL) non-directional beacon (NDB) to the left. The aircraft passed abeam the YBL NDB, which serves as the final approach fix (FAF) for the ILS approach to runway 11, and continued outbound. At 19:09:40, at about three miles outside the beacon, the aircraft turned left to a southerly heading toward the localizer and the YBL NDB. At 19:10:08, the pilot radioed that he was seven miles northwest; this was the last transmission received from the aircraft. At 19:10:25, radar contact was lost. The aircraft crashed into the northwest side of a 1,047-foot mountain at about the 860-foot level, in straight-and-level flight on a heading of 183/ magnetic. The pilot and seven of the passengers received fatal injuries. The two remaining passengers received serious injuries. The accident occurred at 1910 PDT during the hours of official daylight, at latitude 50/01'N, longitude 125/22'W. Official sunset in Campbell River was at 1908, and night was at 1940 PDT.

Walsten Air Service

The single engine aircraft departed Stewart Lake, some 60 miles west of Dryden, on a charter flight to Salvesen Lake, carrying five anglers to a fishing camp. Upon landing on Salvesen Lake, the aircraft flipped over and became submerged. All six occupants were killed. It was reported that the landing was completed with a relative strong tailwind.

Wings of Alaska

Five aircraft departed a lodge, one behind the other. Fog and drizzle were encountered, and the pilot of the first aircraft radioed to the pilots of the other aircraft to cross the river to the east shoreline. A passenger in the fourth aircraft (N13GA) stated that when the aircraft was over the middle of the river, she could not see either shore due to fog. The pilot of N13GA (a floatplane) stated that he encountered deteriorating weather and started a descent, intending to make a precautionary landing. He began to level, expecting conditions to improve. Subsequently, the floatplane hit the surface of 'glassy water' and crashed. Seven passengers were killed and four other occupants were seriously injured. The aircraft was destroyed.

Ketchikan Air Service

The single engine airplane was returning to its base in Ketchikan following maintenance in Thorne Bay. Shortly after takeoff, while climbing, the engine lost power, forcing the pilot to attempt an emergency landing. While landing on water, a control wire snapped, causing the airplane to nose down in the water, coming to rest upside down. All three occupants were rescued by coastguard 20 minutes later and the aircraft sank.

Ketchum Air Service

The on-demand fishing/hunting charter air carrier pilot experienced a total loss of power and landed in a small lake. During the ground run following the emergency landing a oil-fed fire destroyed the aircraft. Investigators found inadequate flight following documentation, and fuel records or maintenance records for accident acft or operation. Passenger witnesses reported low fuel gauges prior to takeoff. Fuel pump examination indicated fuel starvation.

Loon Air

The single engine aircraft was engaged in a post maintenance test flight, carrying one engineer and two pilots. Shortly after takeoff from Villeneuve Airport, while in initial climb, the aircraft started to pitch up and down then lost height and crashed. The passenger was seriously injured while both pilots were killed, among them Billy Bourque, owner of Loon Air.

Ketchikan Air Service

The single engine airplane has to be ferried back to its base following repairs after it suffered an incident last February 1992. It crashed upon takeoff in unknown circumstances. There were no casualties but the aircraft was written off.

Air Saguenay

The pilot departed the Air Saguenay base at Squaw Lake, Schefferville in northern Quebec around 07:00 local on a VFR flight to Desbergères Lake, about 210 miles to the northwest. The float-equipped C-FBSF was carrying six passengers and equipment for hunting caribou. Weather conditions deteriorated 30 minutes into the flight. The pilot entered a narrow valley some 50 miles northwest of Schefferville, then realised he could not clear the mountain peaks because of the lower ceiling in that area. When he tried to turn around to the left he flew into a fog bank. On emerging from the fog he saw the aircraft was going to strike the mountain. He raised the nose to minimize the force of the impact and tried to set the Otter down on the mountain side. The floats slid about 150 feet along the rocky surface, then broke off. The engine struck the ground and was torn off. The engine then rolled under the aircraft and came to rest on the right side of the fuselage. The Otter came to rest on the mountainside at an altitude of 2,650 feet. All passengers had been sitting on the right side of the aircraft and the baggage and equipment was stowed on the left side. The pilot and passengers were able to evacuate the Otter and there were no injuries. As they did so the Otter caught fire and burned for 45 minutes, consuming the fuselage. The wings fell to the ground after the wing supports melted. The fire died out after all flammable material was consumed. When radio contact with the Otter was lost, search aircraft were launched and located the crash site. The occupants were spotted at 11:30 and a rescue helicopter arrived at the site at 14:00 and all were rescued. There was however no rescue for the Otter which had been completely destroyed. Source: http://www.dhc-3archive.com/DHC-3_9.html

Woods Air Service - Woods Air Fuel

The airplane was in cruise flight when the pilot noticed a slight fire smell. The engine began to lose power slowly and would not respond to engine control inputs. The pilot landed on a gravel bar and had to extinguish the fire in the engine accessory case with the fire extinguisher and dirt. The airplane has not been recovered and the engine has not been examined.

Cargair

While cruising in poor weather conditions, the single engine aircraft was too low, struck tree tops and crashed in a wooded area, bursting into flames. The wreckage was found about 40 km north of Saint-Michel-des-Saints. All three passengers were injured while the pilot was killed.

Harbour Air Seaplanes

The pilot was supposed to proceed under VFR mode to the west but as weather conditions deteriorated with low clouds, he decided to continue to the south. While flying between two mountains, the single engine aircraft encountered atmospheric turbulences and the pilot elected to return when the aircraft lost height and struck trees. Upon impact, both wings were torn off and the aircraft crashed in a wooded area. All 11 occupants were injured, four of them seriously.

Wright Air Service

The pilot reported a substantial loss of power while in cruise flight. He was unable to maintain altitude and the aircraft crashed into trees. An examination of the recently overhauled engine revealed a fractured exhaust rocker arm that caused the loss of power.

Aerokon Aviation

The Otter was on a diamond drill move from the Pelly Crossing Airport in the Yukon to a site 45 miles to the east. On board was 2,300 pounds of drill equipment, the pilot and one passenger. The aircraft’s weight with this load and fuel was just under the maximum authorized weight of 8,000 pounds. The Pelly Crossing Airport had a three thousand foot east/west gravel runway, at an elevation of 1,870 feet in mountainous terrain. The pilot departed runway 07 using a reduced power setting and upon becoming airborne he pumped the flaps to the full-up position. The aircraft began to settle towards the trees off the end of the strip. The pilot applied full power and as the aircraft began to settle into the trees closed the throttle. The Otter descended into the trees, burst into flames and was destroyed by a post-impact fire. The pilot was able to egress the aircraft and helped the passenger out. Both received serious burns and other injuries.

Private American

The aircraft was on its way from Phoenix to Gustavus, AK, to be delivered to its new operator Glacier Bay Airways. On the leg from Port Hardy to Prince Rupert, while cruising at an altitude of 4,000 feet, the engine exploded and oil spread on the windscreen. The crew ditched the aircraft in the Grenville Channel and was quickly rescued. The aircraft sank and was not recovered.

Temsco Helicopters

After departing the floatplane base on a company VFR flight plan, the scheduled commuter flight proceeded northwest along a saltwater strait at a low altitude above water. Two miles northwest of the airport the aircraft entered a snow squall and the pilot attempted a steep turn to reverse course. During the turn the aircraft impacted and sank in 167 feet deep water. Search and rescue efforts were suspended after 4 days.

PropAir

The Otter, with five occupants on board, was on a charter from its base at Chibougamau to Camp Placer, 206 miles to the north-east. At destination, a sand runway 2,200 feet in length and 100 feet in width had been built on an esker. On either side, there was a 100 foot gradient with a thirty degree slope. The wind speed was twenty knots. According to the operating manual, the wind exceeded the seven knot cross-wind limitation for the aircraft under such conditions. When the tail wheel touched down, the Otter turned nose to the wind, left the runway and came to rest at the bottom of the esker, in a sorry state. The Otter was destroyed in the accident. Source: Karl E. Hayes

Jamie Muñoz

Witnesses stated that the aircraft used most of the runway to takeoff, reached an approximately altitude of 60 feet, then pulled up to clear an embankment. However, the aircraft struck a tall palm tree and crashed between 2 roads, near an intersection, where the roads merged. The cargo was removed from the acft and weighed. Computations showed that the maximum allowable gross weight of the acft was exceeded by approximately 1,928 lbs. No preimpact part failure or malfunction was evident. The passenger was injured and the pilot was killed.

Pickle Lake Air Services

Few minutes after takeoff from Pickle Lake, while in cruising altitude, the pilot hear a loud bang. The engine lost power then caught fire and failed. Unable to reach the nearest airport, the pilot attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft crashed in a swampy scrub, bursting into flames. Both occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was destroyed.

Goose Bay Air Services

A wheel/ski-equipped DHC-3 Otter aircraft was on the return leg of a charter flight to Snegamook Lake to retrieve a hunting party of four, along with their hunting gear and bounty of several hundred ptarmigan. It departed Snegamook Lake at 09:15. After takeoff, the engine began to run rough but improved somewhat when the power was reduced for cruising. As the aircraft was approaching Nipishish Lake, the pilot reported to company dispatch that the engine was again running rough, but he was able to maintain altitude, and he would follow the Crooked River toward Goose Bay in case a precautionary landing became necessary. Three minutes later, C-FAGM called dispatch again, advising them that he was intending to land on a large area on the Crooked River. He also indicated that there was an odour of smoke in the aircraft. The aircraft was in a nose-down, left- bank attitude, with the flaps fully extended and the skis retracted when it struck the frozen surface of the river. The Otter bounced clear of the surface, turned left came to rest in an upright position.