Cessna 550 Citation Bravo

Historical safety data and incident record for the Cessna 550 Citation Bravo aircraft.

Safety Rating

9.9/10

Total Incidents

5

Total Fatalities

4

Incident History

April 13, 2026 2 Fatalities

private

c 115 km NE of Cochabamba -

A Cessna 550 Citation, CP-3243, is missing and presumed to have crashed in Bolivia with two pilots on board. The aircraft took off at 08:19 local time (12:19 UTC) from La Paz (LPB). Last contact with air traffic control was around 08:50. It entered a circular pattern starting at 08:55 that was repeated about 20 times at 39,000 feet until 10:55, when it entered a high rate of descent until radar contact was lost at 19,375 feet, two minutes later. The aircraft was located in a wooded area by helicopters. Both occupants are confirmed to have been killed. Local media reported that the aircraft was owned by Oscar Mario Justiniano, a businessman from Santa Cruz and currently Minister of Productive Development.

Yulgilbar Pastoral Company

Lismore New South Wales

On the morning of 25 September 2015, the captain and copilot of a Cessna 550 aircraft (Citation Bravo), registered VH-FGK, prepared to conduct a private flight from Lismore Airport to Baryulgil, about 40 NM south-west of Lismore, New South Wales. The aircraft had been parked at the northern end of the airport overnight, with engine covers and control locks on. After arriving at the airport, the flight crew conducted a pre-flight inspection, with no abnormalities identified. They then commenced the normal pre-start checks, which included the disengagement of the flight control locks. The crew elected to use runway 15 for take-off, and used the Cessna simplified take-off performance criteria (see Take-off performance simplified criteria) to determine the thrust settings and take-off reference speeds. The resultant reference speeds were 105 kt for the decision speed (V1) and 108 kt for the rotation speed (VR). At about 1300 Eastern Standard Time, the flight crew started the engines and performed the associated checks, with all indications normal. The crew reported that they completed the after start checks, and the captain then taxied the aircraft to the holding point for runway 15, less than 200 m from where the aircraft was parked. While stopped at the holding point, the crew completed the taxi and pre-take-off checks, the copilot broadcast the standard calls on the common traffic advisory frequency, and the captain communicated with air traffic control (ATC). The captain taxied the aircraft onto the runway, and turned left onto the runway centreline to commence the take-off run from the intersection. While rolling along the runway, the captain advanced the thrust levers to the approximate take-off setting. The captain then called ‘set thrust’, and the copilot set the thrust levers to the more precise position needed to achieve the planned engine thrust for the take-off. As the aircraft accelerated, the copilot called ‘80 knots’ and crosschecked the two airspeed indicators were in agreement and reading 80 kt. The copilot called ‘V1’ and the captain moved their hands from the thrust levers to the control column in accordance with the operator’s normal procedure. A few seconds later, the copilot called ‘rotate’ and the captain initiated a normal rotate action on the control column. The crew reported that the aircraft did not rotate and that they did not feel any indication that the aircraft would lift off. The copilot looked outside and did not detect any change in the aircraft’s attitude as would normally occur at that stage. The captain stated to the copilot that the aircraft would not rotate, and pulled back harder on the control column. The copilot looked across and saw the captain had pulled the control column firmly into their stomach. Although the aircraft’s speed was then about 112 kt, and above VR, the crew did not detect any movement of the attitude director indicator or the nose wheel lifting off the ground, so the captain rejected the take-off; applied full brakes, and set the thrust levers to idle and then into reverse thrust. The aircraft continued to the end of the sealed runway and onto the grass in the runway end safety area (RESA), coming to rest slightly left of the extended centreline, about 100 m beyond the end of the runway. The aircraft sustained substantial damage and the flight crew, who were the only occupants of the aircraft, were uninjured. The nose landing gear separated from the aircraft during the overrun, and there was significant structural damage to the fuselage and wings. The right wheel tyre had deflated due to an apparent wheel lockup and flat spot, which had progressed to a point that a large hole had been worn in the tyre.

Jet24

Vienna-Schwechat Vienna

Following an uneventful flight from Salzburg, the crew was cleared to descent to Vienna-Schwechat Airport. On approach to runway 34, the crew completed the checklist and lowered the landing gear when he realized the the left main gear remained stuck in its wheel well and that the green light failed to come on on the cockpit panel. The crew agreed to continue. After touchdown on runway 34, the aircraft deviated to the left, veered off runway and came to rest in a grassy area located near taxiway D and taxiway B5 and B6. All five occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Prince Aviation

Brac Dalmatia

Following an uneventful flight from Tirana, the crew started the approach to Brac Airport in good weather conditions. After landing on runway 04, the crew started the braking procedure but the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, went through a fence, lost its undercarriage and came to rest in a rocky area, bursting into flames. All five occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was partially destroyed by a post crash fire.

February 14, 2010 2 Fatalities

Time Air

Reinhardtsdorf-Schöna Saxony

During the early evening, at 1946 hrs, after a flight time of one hour and 50 minutes the airplane came back to Prague, Czech Republic, after a flight to France. For the Pilot in Command (PIC) it was the first flight of the day. The co-pilot left the airplane after the landing and was replaced by the copilot of the subsequent accident flight. The co-pilot had already flown two flights that day - around midday - with a total flight time of one hour and 40 minutes. There were no passengers on board. The aircraft departed Prague at 2008 hrs for a ferry flight to Karlskrona, Sweden. The flight was conducted in accordance with Instrument Flight Rules (IFR). The course of events is described based on the analysis of the recordings of the Flight Data Recorder (FDR), the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR), radar and radio communications. The appendix shows two different FDR recording diagrams. Diagram 1 shows the entire flight (time in UTC) and diagram 2 shows the flight from 1918:30 UTC on. Take-off took place on runway 31. The co-pilot was Pilot Flying (PF). The flight was conducted manually, neither of the two autopilots was engaged. From 2012 hrs on, after a right hand turn, the flight proceeded toward the north. The airplane was in climb attitude. At 2014:16 hrs, still in climb, the PIC said "I didn't fly night time for long time". The co-pilot asked: "Have you already experienced a roll during night?" She answered laughing: "Yes, really." He: "Better we won't." She laughing: "Do you enjoy that thing?" Co-pilot: "You are the first one with whom I talked about it, don't tell it [...]." PIC: "Whom shall I not tell?" [...] She again: "I also do it always, but I persuade [...] to do that." Co-pilot: "[...] Bravo does it better." At 2015:00 hrs, during this short conversation, the crew received the instruction from ATC Prague to climb to FL260 and to level off above reporting point DEKOV. The conversation in the cockpit continued. Co-pilot: "Bravo does the roll faster with the ailerons but the spoilers are slower." At 2015:33 hrs ATC repeated the instruction. At 2015:40 hrs the PIC acknowledged the instruction. Between 2017:10 hrs and 2017:20 hrs the airplane rolled about its longitudinal axis; initially to the left up to a bank angle of 30°, and right afterwards to the right up to a bank angle of 20°, then back again to the horizontal. At 2017:20 hrs the PIC responded to it with the words: "Let's go, we are already high enough, you nettle me - come on [...]." At 2017:22rs ATC Prague instructed the crew to contact ATC Munich; at 2017:35 hrs the PIC confirmed the instruction. At 2017:42 hrs she said: "Later but." The co-pilot replied: "Let's do it at higher altitude." At 2018:29 hrs, the PIC contacted ATC Munich. At 2018:36 hrs the crew received the instruction from ATC Munich to climb to FL330. This was confirmed at 2018:44 hrs. Between 2018:51 hrs and 2019:00 hrs the following conversation took place: - 2018:51 hrs PIC: "Sufficient, is it sufficient?" - 2018:53 hrs Co-pilot: "For what?" - 2018:54 hrs PIC: "Sufficient." - 2018:56 hrs PIC: "The altitude." - 2018:58 hrs Co-pilot: "For what?" - 2018:58 hrs PIC: "For that," - 2019:00 hrs Co-pilot: "It is sufficient." At 2019:00 hrs the airplane levelled off in FL270, at 2019:05 hrs the airplane nose moved upward until a pitch angle of about 14° was reached. At 2019:09 hrs the aircraft began to roll about its longitudinal axis to the right. Within 4 seconds the airplane reached the inverted flight attitude and in another 4 seconds it rolled another 90°. Simultaneously the heading changed right toward the east, then toward the south and finally toward the west. During the roll the pitch angle decreased to almost -85° which is almost a vertical nose dive. The computed airspeed increased significantly. The airplane crashed near Reinhardtsdorf-Schöna, Saxon Switzerland, about 500 m north of the border to the Czech Republic.

Safety Profile

Reliability

Reliable

This rating is based on historical incident data and may not reflect current operational safety.