Fort Pierce - Murfreesboro
Flight / Schedule
Fort Pierce - Murfreesboro
Aircraft
Mitsubishi MU-2 MarquiseRegistration
N316PR
MSN
761
Year of Manufacture
1980
Operator
Flying CloudDate
June 25, 2006 at 12:24 PM
Type
CRASHFlight Type
Ferry
Flight Phase
Takeoff (climb)
Crash Site
Airport (less than 10 km from airport)
Crash Location
Fort Pierce Florida
Region
North America • United States of America
Coordinates
27.4467°, -80.3256°
Crash Cause
Human factor
Narrative Report
On June 25, 2006 at 12:24 PM, Fort Pierce - Murfreesboro experienced a crash involving Mitsubishi MU-2 Marquise, operated by Flying Cloud, with the event recorded near Fort Pierce Florida.
The flight was categorized as ferry and the reported phase was takeoff (climb) at a airport (less than 10 km from airport) crash site.
1 people were known to be on board, 1 fatalities were recorded, 0 survivors were identified or estimated. This corresponds to an estimated fatality rate of 100.0%.
Crew on board: 1, crew fatalities: 1, passengers on board: 0, passenger fatalities: 0, other fatalities: 0.
The listed crash cause is human factor. Witnesses stated that they observed the twin-engine airplane roll into a steep right bank and enter a spin at a low altitude (less than 700 feet) during the initial climb. The airplane then descended and impacted terrain about 1.5 miles from the end of the departure runway. Some witnesses reported hearing an unusual engine noise just before the airplane began to roll and spin. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed. Examination of the right engine revealed that the ring gear support of the engine/propeller gearbox had fractured in flight due to high cycle fatigue originating from the corner radii of the high-speed pinion cutout. The reason for the fatigue could not be determined. The ring gear support disengaged from the ring gear due to this failure, resulting in a disconnection in power being transferred from the engine power section to the propeller. In addition to the ability for a pilot to manually feather the propellers, and an automatic feathering feature, the engine (Honeywell TPE-331) design also includes a “Negative Torque Sensing” (NTS) system that would automatically respond to a typical failed engine condition involving a propeller that is driving the coupled engine. Feathering the propeller reduces drag and asymmetric yawing due to the failed engine. All Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certification evaluations for one-engine inoperative handling qualities for the airplane type were conducted with the NTS system operational. According to the airplane manufacturer, the NTS system was designed to automatically reduce the drag on the affected engine to provide a margin of safety until the pilot is able to shut down the engine with the condition lever. However, if a drive train disconnect occurs at the ring gear support, the NTS system is inoperable, and the propeller can come out of feather on its own, if the disconnect is followed by a pilot action to retard the power lever on the affected engine. In this scenario, once the fuel flow setting is reduced below the point required to run the power section at 100% (takeoff) rpm, the propeller governor would sense an “underspeed” condition and would attempt to increase engine rpm by unloading the propeller, subsequently driving the propeller out of feather toward the low pitch stop. This flat pitch condition would cause an increase in aerodynamic drag on one side of the airplane, and unanticipated airplane control difficulty could result due to the asymmetry.
Aircraft reference details include registration N316PR, MSN 761, year of manufacture 1980.
Geospatial coordinates for this crash are approximately 27.4467°, -80.3256°.
Fatalities
Total
1
Crew
1
Passengers
0
Other
0
Crash Summary
Witnesses stated that they observed the twin-engine airplane roll into a steep right bank and enter a spin at a low altitude (less than 700 feet) during the initial climb. The airplane then descended and impacted terrain about 1.5 miles from the end of the departure runway. Some witnesses reported hearing an unusual engine noise just before the airplane began to roll and spin. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed. Examination of the right engine revealed that the ring gear support of the engine/propeller gearbox had fractured in flight due to high cycle fatigue originating from the corner radii of the high-speed pinion cutout. The reason for the fatigue could not be determined. The ring gear support disengaged from the ring gear due to this failure, resulting in a disconnection in power being transferred from the engine power section to the propeller. In addition to the ability for a pilot to manually feather the propellers, and an automatic feathering feature, the engine (Honeywell TPE-331) design also includes a “Negative Torque Sensing” (NTS) system that would automatically respond to a typical failed engine condition involving a propeller that is driving the coupled engine. Feathering the propeller reduces drag and asymmetric yawing due to the failed engine. All Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certification evaluations for one-engine inoperative handling qualities for the airplane type were conducted with the NTS system operational. According to the airplane manufacturer, the NTS system was designed to automatically reduce the drag on the affected engine to provide a margin of safety until the pilot is able to shut down the engine with the condition lever. However, if a drive train disconnect occurs at the ring gear support, the NTS system is inoperable, and the propeller can come out of feather on its own, if the disconnect is followed by a pilot action to retard the power lever on the affected engine. In this scenario, once the fuel flow setting is reduced below the point required to run the power section at 100% (takeoff) rpm, the propeller governor would sense an “underspeed” condition and would attempt to increase engine rpm by unloading the propeller, subsequently driving the propeller out of feather toward the low pitch stop. This flat pitch condition would cause an increase in aerodynamic drag on one side of the airplane, and unanticipated airplane control difficulty could result due to the asymmetry.
Cause: Human factor
Occupants & Outcome
Crew On Board
1
Passengers On Board
0
Estimated Survivors
0
Fatality Rate
100.0%
Known people on board: 1
Operational Details
Schedule / Flight
Fort Pierce - Murfreesboro
Operator
Flying CloudFlight Type
Ferry
Flight Phase
Takeoff (climb)
Crash Site
Airport (less than 10 km from airport)
Region / Country
North America • United States of America
