Anchorage - Hoholitna River

The float equipped airplane was attempting to cross a mountain pass, following two other company airplanes. The first two pilots, and passengers, described five to seven miles visibility, 700 feet ceilings, clouds hanging on the mountainsides, and misty rain. The route of flight required several turns in the pass. The pilot had not flown through the pass in marginal Visual Flight Rules (VFR) weather before this flight. After the first two airplanes went through the pass, they lost radio contact with the accident pilot, and did not see or hear from him again. The wreckage was later located at the head of an intersecting canyon, two miles before the correct pass. The airplane had been modified with a Short Take Off and Landing (STOL) kit. Canadian certification flight tests had determined that this modification eliminated aerodynamic warning of impending stalls, and therefore required an audible stall warning. Company pilots indicated it was common for the stall warning system to activate at an airspeed 10-15 miles per hour above the actual stall. At the time of the accident, the airplane did not have the ventral fin installed, and a takeoff flaps setting was selected. The audible stall warning circuit breaker was found in the pulled (disabled) position.

Flight / Schedule

Anchorage - Hoholitna River

Registration

N1433Z

MSN

0595

Year of Manufacture

1953

Date

September 9, 1998 at 10:45 AM

Type

CRASH

Flight Type

Charter/Taxi (Non Scheduled Revenue Flight)

Flight Phase

Flight

Crash Site

Mountains

Crash Location

Telequana Pass Alaska

Region

North America • United States of America

Crash Cause

Human factor

Narrative Report

On September 9, 1998 at 10:45 AM, Anchorage - Hoholitna River experienced a crash involving De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver, operated by Rust's Flying Service - Rustair, with the event recorded near Telequana Pass Alaska.

The flight was categorized as charter/taxi (non scheduled revenue flight) and the reported phase was flight at a mountains crash site.

5 people were known to be on board, 5 fatalities were recorded, 0 survivors were identified or estimated. This corresponds to an estimated fatality rate of 100.0%.

Crew on board: 1, crew fatalities: 1, passengers on board: 4, passenger fatalities: 4, other fatalities: 0.

The listed crash cause is human factor. The float equipped airplane was attempting to cross a mountain pass, following two other company airplanes. The first two pilots, and passengers, described five to seven miles visibility, 700 feet ceilings, clouds hanging on the mountainsides, and misty rain. The route of flight required several turns in the pass. The pilot had not flown through the pass in marginal Visual Flight Rules (VFR) weather before this flight. After the first two airplanes went through the pass, they lost radio contact with the accident pilot, and did not see or hear from him again. The wreckage was later located at the head of an intersecting canyon, two miles before the correct pass. The airplane had been modified with a Short Take Off and Landing (STOL) kit. Canadian certification flight tests had determined that this modification eliminated aerodynamic warning of impending stalls, and therefore required an audible stall warning. Company pilots indicated it was common for the stall warning system to activate at an airspeed 10-15 miles per hour above the actual stall. At the time of the accident, the airplane did not have the ventral fin installed, and a takeoff flaps setting was selected. The audible stall warning circuit breaker was found in the pulled (disabled) position.

Aircraft reference details include registration N1433Z, MSN 0595, year of manufacture 1953.

Fatalities

Total

5

Crew

1

Passengers

4

Other

0

Crash Summary

The float equipped airplane was attempting to cross a mountain pass, following two other company airplanes. The first two pilots, and passengers, described five to seven miles visibility, 700 feet ceilings, clouds hanging on the mountainsides, and misty rain. The route of flight required several turns in the pass. The pilot had not flown through the pass in marginal Visual Flight Rules (VFR) weather before this flight. After the first two airplanes went through the pass, they lost radio contact with the accident pilot, and did not see or hear from him again. The wreckage was later located at the head of an intersecting canyon, two miles before the correct pass. The airplane had been modified with a Short Take Off and Landing (STOL) kit. Canadian certification flight tests had determined that this modification eliminated aerodynamic warning of impending stalls, and therefore required an audible stall warning. Company pilots indicated it was common for the stall warning system to activate at an airspeed 10-15 miles per hour above the actual stall. At the time of the accident, the airplane did not have the ventral fin installed, and a takeoff flaps setting was selected. The audible stall warning circuit breaker was found in the pulled (disabled) position.

Cause: Human factor

Occupants & Outcome

Crew On Board

1

Passengers On Board

4

Estimated Survivors

0

Fatality Rate

100.0%

Known people on board: 5

Operational Details

Schedule / Flight

Anchorage - Hoholitna River

Flight Type

Charter/Taxi (Non Scheduled Revenue Flight)

Flight Phase

Flight

Crash Site

Mountains

Region / Country

North America • United States of America

Aircraft Details

Registration

N1433Z

MSN

0595

Year of Manufacture

1953