Lvov - Odessa - Thessaloniki
Flight / Schedule
Lvov - Odessa - Thessaloniki
Aircraft
Yakovlev Yak-42Registration
UR-42334
MSN
26 06 164
Year of Manufacture
1986
Operator
Aerosweet AirlinesDate
December 17, 1997 at 09:12 PM
Type
CRASHFlight Type
Scheduled Revenue Flight
Flight Phase
Flight
Crash Site
Mountains
Crash Location
Katerini Central Macedonia / <U+039A>e<U+03BD>t<U+03C1><U+03B9><U+03BA><U+03AE> <U+039C>a<U+03BA>ed<U+03BF><U+03BD><U+03AF>a
Region
Europe • Greece
Crash Cause
Human factor
Narrative Report
On December 17, 1997 at 09:12 PM, Lvov - Odessa - Thessaloniki experienced a crash involving Yakovlev Yak-42, operated by Aerosweet Airlines, with the event recorded near Katerini Central Macedonia / <U+039A>e<U+03BD>t<U+03C1><U+03B9><U+03BA><U+03AE> <U+039C>a<U+03BA>ed<U+03BF><U+03BD><U+03AF>a.
The flight was categorized as scheduled revenue flight and the reported phase was flight at a mountains crash site.
70 people were known to be on board, 70 fatalities were recorded, 0 survivors were identified or estimated. This corresponds to an estimated fatality rate of 100.0%.
Crew on board: 8, crew fatalities: 8, passengers on board: 62, passenger fatalities: 62, other fatalities: 0.
The listed crash cause is human factor. AeroSvit Airlines Flight 241 was a scheduled service from Kiev, Ukraine to Thessaloniki, Greece with an en route stop at Odessa, Ukraine. The first leg of the flight was operated by a Boeing 737. Because of engine problems, an aircraft change had to be made at Odessa. The last leg of the flight was carried out using a Yakovlev 42 (UR-42334), which was being chartered from Lvovskie Avialinii. The flight crew had no previous experience in flying to Thessaloniki. The flight was dispatched from Odessa with the No 1 VHF/NAV receiver inoperative, which was contrary to the minimum equipment list (MEL), and took off at 17:23 hours UTC. The weather conditions at Thessaloniki Airport were above required approach and landing minima, however, darkness and an overcast cloud layer obscured awareness of mountainous terrain in the area. The flight was instructed by the approach controller to conduct the LAMBI1F standard arrival procedure and was cleared to execute a VOR-DME-ILS approach to runway 16. The aircraft did not follow the "19 DME arc" as required by the approach procedure, but proceeded directly to the THS NDB. It overshot the localizer course at least twice and the flight crew were unable to establish a stabilized approach. According to the CVR cockpit conversations, the flight crew was confused and uncertain with respect to the navigation aids and the information that was presented. During the approach there were no standard callouts made by the flight crew related to the glide slope, outer marker or minima. At 18:54 UTC the Thessaloniki Tower controller reported that they had passed the airport. The flight crew was unaware that they overflew the runway until they were informed by the controller. The flight crew then initiated a go-around but did not follow the published missed approach procedure, nor did they follow the instructions given by the ATC. Although instructed by ATC to proceed to, and enter the south holding pattern, the flight continued on a flight path to the west. The flight crew remained confused, disorganized, and disoriented during the missed approach and the subsequent clearances issued by ATC. They had lost situational and terrain awareness, and they were uncertain with respect to the radio navigation aids and the information that was presented. They also requested "route vectors" and "heading" twice although Thessaloniki Airport was a non-radar facility. The flight crew occasionally was confused in reading and reporting the correct distances on their DME equipment (miles to kilometers and vice versa) as their instruments displayed distances in kilometers. The flight crew in their effort to solve the navigational problem, often switched their focus from VOR/DME information to ADF, and vice versa. This, in conjunction with the VHF/NAV receiver malfunction, contributed greatly to the confusion in the cockpit and to the loss of orientation. At 19:12 UTC the GPWS sounded for 4 seconds. At the same time the approach controller radioed: "AEW number one, continue VOR-DME/ILS approach minima, continue and report approaching the outer marker". The crew replied: "Outer marker will be report`. After a while the approach controller asked: "AEW-241, do you have the field in sight?". At that time the GPWS sounded again. Shortly afterwards the aircraft impacted the side of Mount Pente Pigadia at 3300 feet. The wreckage was found at 10:30 hours, December 20. At the same date a Greek Air Force Lockheed Hercules, which was being used in the search, crashed, killing all 5 on board. On October 6, 2000 a trial began with two air traffic controllers being accused of many counts of manslaughter and of violating the transportation regulations. They were sentenced to five years imprisonment. In December 2002 a Thessaloniki appeals court reduced the sentences of two air traffic controllers to four years and four months each.
Aircraft reference details include registration UR-42334, MSN 26 06 164, year of manufacture 1986.
Fatalities
Total
70
Crew
8
Passengers
62
Other
0
Crash Summary
AeroSvit Airlines Flight 241 was a scheduled service from Kiev, Ukraine to Thessaloniki, Greece with an en route stop at Odessa, Ukraine. The first leg of the flight was operated by a Boeing 737. Because of engine problems, an aircraft change had to be made at Odessa. The last leg of the flight was carried out using a Yakovlev 42 (UR-42334), which was being chartered from Lvovskie Avialinii. The flight crew had no previous experience in flying to Thessaloniki. The flight was dispatched from Odessa with the No 1 VHF/NAV receiver inoperative, which was contrary to the minimum equipment list (MEL), and took off at 17:23 hours UTC. The weather conditions at Thessaloniki Airport were above required approach and landing minima, however, darkness and an overcast cloud layer obscured awareness of mountainous terrain in the area. The flight was instructed by the approach controller to conduct the LAMBI1F standard arrival procedure and was cleared to execute a VOR-DME-ILS approach to runway 16. The aircraft did not follow the "19 DME arc" as required by the approach procedure, but proceeded directly to the THS NDB. It overshot the localizer course at least twice and the flight crew were unable to establish a stabilized approach. According to the CVR cockpit conversations, the flight crew was confused and uncertain with respect to the navigation aids and the information that was presented. During the approach there were no standard callouts made by the flight crew related to the glide slope, outer marker or minima. At 18:54 UTC the Thessaloniki Tower controller reported that they had passed the airport. The flight crew was unaware that they overflew the runway until they were informed by the controller. The flight crew then initiated a go-around but did not follow the published missed approach procedure, nor did they follow the instructions given by the ATC. Although instructed by ATC to proceed to, and enter the south holding pattern, the flight continued on a flight path to the west. The flight crew remained confused, disorganized, and disoriented during the missed approach and the subsequent clearances issued by ATC. They had lost situational and terrain awareness, and they were uncertain with respect to the radio navigation aids and the information that was presented. They also requested "route vectors" and "heading" twice although Thessaloniki Airport was a non-radar facility. The flight crew occasionally was confused in reading and reporting the correct distances on their DME equipment (miles to kilometers and vice versa) as their instruments displayed distances in kilometers. The flight crew in their effort to solve the navigational problem, often switched their focus from VOR/DME information to ADF, and vice versa. This, in conjunction with the VHF/NAV receiver malfunction, contributed greatly to the confusion in the cockpit and to the loss of orientation. At 19:12 UTC the GPWS sounded for 4 seconds. At the same time the approach controller radioed: "AEW number one, continue VOR-DME/ILS approach minima, continue and report approaching the outer marker". The crew replied: "Outer marker will be report`. After a while the approach controller asked: "AEW-241, do you have the field in sight?". At that time the GPWS sounded again. Shortly afterwards the aircraft impacted the side of Mount Pente Pigadia at 3300 feet. The wreckage was found at 10:30 hours, December 20. At the same date a Greek Air Force Lockheed Hercules, which was being used in the search, crashed, killing all 5 on board. On October 6, 2000 a trial began with two air traffic controllers being accused of many counts of manslaughter and of violating the transportation regulations. They were sentenced to five years imprisonment. In December 2002 a Thessaloniki appeals court reduced the sentences of two air traffic controllers to four years and four months each.
Cause: Human factor
Occupants & Outcome
Crew On Board
8
Passengers On Board
62
Estimated Survivors
0
Fatality Rate
100.0%
Known people on board: 70
Operational Details
Schedule / Flight
Lvov - Odessa - Thessaloniki
Operator
Aerosweet AirlinesFlight Type
Scheduled Revenue Flight
Flight Phase
Flight
Crash Site
Mountains
Region / Country
Europe • Greece
