United Express

Embraer ERJ-145

Following an uneventful flight from Newark on flight UA4933 (CommutAir flight CS4933), the crew started the descent to runway 01 at Presque Isle Airport, Maine. At 1109LT, at an altitude of 2,000 feet, in a limited visibility due to snow falls and freezing rain, the captain decided to initiate a go-around. About 20 minutes later, the crew started a second approach to runway 01. After touchdown, the aircraft went out of control and veered off runway to the right. While contacting snow, both main landing gears collapsed. The left main gear was torn off and collided with the left engine before the airplane came to a stop. A crew member and three passengers were injured. At the time of the accident, the visibility was limited to a half a mile in snow falls and freezing rain. Also, it was reported that both the freezing rain sensor and the Runway Visual Range (RVR) system values were not available at the time of the accident.

Embraer ERJ-145

At 1406, United Express Flight 3363 (LOF3363), operated by Trans States Airlines LLC (TSA), departed Chicago O’Hare International Airport, Chicago, United States. Before commencing the descent into Ottawa/Macdonald-Cartier International Airport (CYOW), Ontario, the flight crew obtained the automatic terminal information service (ATIS) information Yankee for CYOW issued at 1411. Based on the reported wind speed and direction, the flight crew calculated the approach speed (VAPP) to be 133 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS). Runway 25 was identified in ATIS information Yankee as the active runway. However, as a result of a previous overrun on Runway 07/25 in August 2010, TSA prohibited its flight crews from landing or taking off on Runway 07/25 when the surface is reported as damp or wet. Because rain showers were forecast for CYOW and Runway 32 was the longest runway, the flight crew decided at 1506 to carry out an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to Runway 32. At 1524, the CYOW terminal air traffic controller (ATC) advised the flight crew that it was starting to rain heavily at CYOW. About 2 minutes later, the aircraft intercepted the glideslope for the ILS to Runway 32. Final descent was initiated, the landing gear was extended, and the flaps were selected to 22°. Upon contacting the CYOW tower controller, the flight crew was advised that moderate rain had just started at the airport and the wind was reported as 310° magnetic (M) at 10 knots. The aircraft crossed the GREELY (YYR) final approach fix at 4.3 nautical miles (nm), slightly above the glideslope at 174 KIAS. About 1528, the aircraft passed through 1000 feet above ground level (agl) at 155 knots. Moments later, the flaps were selected to 45°. The airspeed at the time was approximately 145 KIAS. The tower controller advised the flight crew that the wind had changed to 320°M at 13 knots gusting to 20 knots. To compensate for the increased wind speed, the flight crew increased the VAPP to 140 KIAS. About 1 minute later, at 1529, the aircraft crossed the threshold of Runway 32 at about 45 feet agl, at an airspeed of 139 KIAS. As the aircraft crossed the runway threshold, the intensity of the rain increased, so the flight crew selected the windshield wipers to high. When the aircraft was about 20 feet agl, engine power was reduced and a flare was commenced. Just before touchdown, the aircraft encountered a downpour sufficient to obscure the crew’s view of the runway. Perceiving a sudden increase in descent rate, at approximately 5 feet agl, the captain applied maximum thrust on both engines. The master caution light illuminated, and a voice warning stated that the flaps were not in a take-off configuration. Maximum thrust was maintained for 7 seconds. The aircraft touched down smoothly 2700 feet beyond the threshold at 119 KIAS; the airspeed was increasing, and the aircraft became airborne again. The aircraft touched down a second time at 3037 feet beyond the threshold, with the airspeed increasing through 125 KIAS. Airspeed on touchdown peaked at 128 KIAS as the nosewheel was lowered to the ground, and then the thrust levers were retarded to flight idle. The outboard spoilers almost immediately deployed, and about 8 seconds later, the inboard spoilers deployed. The aircraft was about 20 feet right of the runway centreline when it touched down for the second time. Once the nosewheel was on the ground, the captain applied maximum brakes. The flight crew almost immediately noted that the aircraft began skidding. The captain then requested the first officer to apply maximum brakes as well. The aircraft continued to skid, and no significant brake pressure was recorded until about 14 seconds after the outboard spoilers deployed, when brake pressure suddenly increased to its maximum. During this time, the captain attempted to steer the aircraft back to the runway centreline. As the aircraft skidded down the runway, it began to yaw to the left. Full right rudder was applied, but was ineffective in correcting the left yaw. Sufficient water was present on the runway surface to cause the aircraft tires to send a spray of water, commonly known as a rooster tail, to a height of over 22 feet, trailing over 300 feet behind the aircraft. At some point during the landing roll, the captain partially applied the emergency/parking brake (EPB), and when no braking action was felt, the EPB was engaged further. With no perceivable deceleration being felt, the EPB was stowed. The aircraft continued to skid down the runway until about 7500 feet from the threshold, at which point it started skidding sideways along the runway. At 1530, the nosewheel exited the paved surface, 8120 feet from the threshold, at approximately 53 knots, on a heading of 271°M. The aircraft came to rest on a heading of 211°M, just off the left side of the paved surface. After coming to a stop, the flight crew carried out the emergency shutdown procedure as per the company Quick Reference Handbook (QRH), and consulted with the flight attendant on the status of everyone in the passenger cabin. The flight crew determined that there was no immediate threat and decided to hold the passengers on board. When the aircraft exited the runway surface, the tower activated the crash alarm. The CYOW airport rescue and firefighting (ARFF) services responded, and were on scene approximately 3 minutes after the activation of the crash alarm. Once ARFF personnel had conducted a thorough exterior check of the aircraft, they informed the flight crew that there was a fuel leak. The captain then called for an immediate evacuation of the aircraft. The passengers evacuated through the main cabin door, and moved to the runway as directed by the flight crew and ARFF personnel. The evacuation was initiated approximately 12 minutes after the aircraft came to a final stop. After the evacuation was complete, the firefighters sprayed foam around the aircraft where the fuel had leaked.

Saab 340

During the approach, the flightcrew was unable to get the right main landing gear extended and locked. After several attempts, while conferring with the checklist and company personnel, the flightcrew performed an emergency landing with the unsafe landing gear indication. During the landing, the right main landing gear slowly collapsed, and the airplane came to rest off the right side of the runway. Examination of the right main landing gear revealed that the retract actuator fitting was secured with two fasteners, a smaller bolt, and a larger bolt. The nut and cotter key were not recovered with the smaller bolt, and 8 of the 12 threads on the smaller bolt were stripped consistent with an overstress pulling of the nut away from the bolt. The larger bolt was bent and separated near the head, consistent with a tension and overstress separation as a result of the smaller bolt failure. The overstress failures were consistent with the right main landing gear not being locked in the extended position when aircraft weight was applied; however, examination of the right main landing gear down lock system could not determine any pre-impact mechanical malfunctions. Further, the right main landing gear retract actuator was tomography scanned, and no anomalies were noted. The unit was then functionally tested at the manufacturer's facility, under the supervision of an FAA inspector. The unit tested successfully, with no anomalies noted.

Bae Jetstream 41

The twin-engine turboprop airplane touched down about 1,900 feet beyond the approach end of the 6,000-foot runway. During the rollout, the pilot reduced power by pulling the power levers aft, to the flight idle stop. He then depressed the latch levers, and pulled the power levers further aft, beyond the flight idle stop, through the beta range, into the reverse range. During the power reduction, the pilot noticed, and responded to a red beta light indication. Guidance from both the manufacturer and the operator prohibited the use of reverse thrust on the ground with a red beta light illuminated. The pilot pushed the power levers forward of the reverse range, and inadvertently continued through the beta range, where aerodynamic braking was optimum. The power levers continued beyond the flight idle gate into flight idle, a positive thrust setting. The airplane continued to the departure end of the runway in a skid, and departed the runway and taxiway in a skidding turn. The airplane dropped over a 60-foot embankment, and came to rest at the bottom. The computed landing distance for the airplane over a 50-foot obstacle was 3,900 feet, with braking and ground idle (beta) only; no reverse thrust applied. Ground-taxi testing after the accident revealed that the airplane could reach ground speeds upwards of 85 knots with the power levers at idle, and the condition levers in the flight position. Simulator testing, based on FDR data, consistently resulted in runway overruns. Examination of the airplane and component testing revealed no mechanical anomalies. Review of the beta light indicating system revealed that illumination of the red beta light on the ground was not an emergency situation, but only indicated a switch malfunction. In addition, a loss of the reverse capability would have had little effect on computed stopping distance, and none at all in the United States, where performance credit for reverse thrust was not permitted.

Beechcraft 1900C

The Beechcraft 1900C, N87GL, was in its landing roll on runway 13, and the Beechcraft A90, N1127D, was in its takeoff roll on runway 04. The collision occurred at the intersection of the two runways. The flight crew of the Beechcraft 1900C had made appropriate efforts to coordinate the approach and landing through radio communications and visual monitoring; however they mistook a Cherokee pilot's transmission (that he was holding for departure on runway 04) as a response from the Beechcraft A90 to their request for the Beechcraft A90's intentions, and therefore mistakenly believed that the Beechcraft A90 was not planning to take off until after the Beechcraft 1900C had cleared the runway. The failure of the Beechcraft A90 pilot to announce over the common traffic advisory frequency his intention to take off created a potential for collision between the two airplanes.

Bae Jetstream 41

The airplane stalled and crashed 1.2 nautical miles east of runway 28L during an ILS approach. The captain initiated the approach at high speed & crossed the FAF at a high speed without first having the airplane properly configured for a stabilized approach. The airspeed was not monitored nor maintained by the flightcrew. The airline had no specified callouts for airspeed deviations during instrument approaches. The captain failed to apply full power & configure the airplane in a timely manner. Both pilots had low flight time and experience in in the airplane and in any EFIS-equipped airplane. Additionally, the captain had low time and experience as a captain. Inadequate consideration was given to the possible consequences of pairing a newly upgraded captain, on a new airplane, with a first officer who had no airline experience in air carrier operations, nor do current FAA regulations address this issue.

BAe Jetstream 31

The company chief pilot/check pilot was giving a check flight to a company first officer (f/o). An FAA inspector was aboard to observe the check pilot's ability to give proficiency check flights. Soon after liftoff on the 2nd takeoff, the check pilot simulated an engine failure. The f/o, who was wearing a vision limiting device, allowed the airplane to drift to the left, but the FAA inspector noted that the f/o successfully regained directional control. The inspector then looked away from the cockpit, and when he looked back, the airplane was descending. Moments later, it collided with the ground. The FAA inspector reported that the check pilot was looking to the left, outside of the aircraft, and did not have his hand near the power quadrant. Review of the CVR tape revealed that, from the time the f/o was given the simulated left engine failure until impact, the check pilot did not say anything to the f/o. No maintenance discrepancy or material deficiency was noted during the investigation. The f/o had 3925 hours in this make/model of aircraft.

BAe Jetstream 31

During arrival for an ILS runway 21R approach, the aircraft encountered icing conditions for about 9-1/2 minutes. As the aircraft was vectored for the approach, the Seattle ARTCC controller used an expanded radar range and did not provide precise positioning of the aircraft to the final approach course. The flight crew attempted to continue on a steep, unstabilized approach for a landing. Recorded radar data showed that the aircraft was well to the right of the ILS course line and well above the glide slope as it passed the outer marker/final approach fix (faf). It did not intercept the localizer course until it was about 1.5 mile inside the faf. Also, it was still well above the ILS glide slope were recorded altitude data was lost when the aircraft was abt 2.5 miles from the airport. The tower had closed, but the controller saw the aircraft in a higher than normal rate of descent in a wings level attitude. Before reaching the runway, the aircraft nosed over and crashed in a steep descent. There was evidence that ice had accumulated on the airframe, including the horizontal stabilizers, which may have resulted in a tail plane stall. All six occupants were killed.