British United Airways - BUA

BAc 111

On 14 January 1969 the crew flew from Gatwick to Rotterdam and return, following which they departed on a scheduled international flight Gatwick-Genoa-Gatwick. For this flight Captain A occupied the left-hand seat as pilot-in-charge, Captain B the right hand seat as co-pilot and Captain C the centre supernumerary seat as pilot-in-command, ultimately responsible for the correct operation of the aircraft. Before leaving Gatwick Captain A briefed Captain B concerning the co-pilot duties assigned to him. Although Captain C, as pilot-in-command, did not himself formally brief Captains A and B there was no doubt that they were aware of their respective tasks. On the flight from Gatwick to Genoa the aircraft was forced, due to unfavourable weather conditions at Genoa, to divert to Milan-Linate Airport where it landed at 1430 hours. Before commencing the return flight to Gatwick the crew had to await the arrival of the passengers from Genoa. This took place at 1930 hours. During the five-hour waiting period on the ground, the aircraft APU was kept in operation to ensure cabin heating and air conditioning. While Captain C tried unsuccessfully to sleep in the aircraft, Captains A and B inspected the aircraft and found ice on the wings and tail unit. The aircraft was subsequently de-iced. Before boarding the aircraft, Captains A and B made another external inspection of the aircraft and established that there was no ice on any part of it. The result of this inspection was duly reported to Captain C. Captains A and B carried out the pre-flight checks in accordance with the company checklist and verified that the take-off weight and aircraft loading were within the permitted limits. The crew occupied the same positions as during the previous flight, Captain A being in the left-hand seat, Captain B in the right-hand seat and Captain C in the jump- seat. In view of the weather, temperature and runway conditions, the crew decided to use the 18O flap setting, Spey 2 thrust (full thrust), engine anti-icing and the APU for cabin air conditioning. V1 and Vr were established at 117 kt and V2 at 127 kt. At 2018 hours, after clearance from Linate ATC, the engines were started and engine anti-icing selected "ON". There was a considerable layer of snow along the sides of the taxiways and runway, but they themselves were clear and usable. In view of the isolated patches of slush or water on the runway, Captain A considered it essential for the engine igniter switches to be selected "ON" during the entire take-off. At 2028 hours the aircraft was cleared to enter runway 18 and, after receiving the latest information concerning visibility and wind, it was cleared for take-off at 2031 hours. Before the brakes were released, a check was made of engine P7 pressures and of the other engine instruments which were found to be normal. At about 80 kt Captain A took over the aircraft's control column. The airspeed indicators showed regular acceleration and Captain A stated that just before 100 kt the engine instruments were also registering normally. V1 and Vr were called and the aircraft was rotated into the initial climbing attitude; immediately after or during this manoeuvre, a dull noise was distinctly heard by all the crew members. This noise was variously described by them as: "not like a rifle shot, not like the slamming of a door or something falling in the aircraft but more like someone kicking the fuselage with very heavy boots, an expansive noise covering a very definite time span with a dull non-metallic thud". The bang was immediately associated by the crew with the engines. After looking at the TGT gauges, and observing that No. 1 engine was indicating a temperature 20°c higher than that of No. 2 engine, Captain C said: "I think it's number one" or wards to that effect, and after a brief pause "throttle it". On receipt of Captain C's comment Captain A closed the power level of No. 1 engine. During or just after the explosion, he had completed the rotation manoeuvre and the aircraft was climbing at 12O of pitch with reference to the flight director. As a precaution, after closing No. 1 power lever he reduced the angle of climb to 6O. At the same time the co-pilot (Captain B) who had reached for the check list and was looking for the page relating to an engine emergency, became aware of a sharp reduction in the aircraft's acceleration; he noticed that the undercarriage was still down and he retracted it immediately. According to the crew the aircraft reached a maximum height of 250 ft, after which a progressive loss of momentum became evident. A maximum speed of 1401145 kt was achieved immediately after rotation, but it fell to 127 kt after No. 1 engine had been throttled back, These figures were consistent with those subsequently derived from the flight recorder. The crew said that the stick-shaker operated three times between 125 and 115 kt. The co-pilot had a vague recollection that the stick-push and the warning klaxon operated during the critical phase before impact. The pilot-in-charge remembered vaguely that someone said "raise the flaps", but no crew member remembers doing so or making the re traction. On looking out of the aircraft the crew saw the ground and the obstructions close at hand and realized that contact of the aircraft with the ground was inevitable and imminent. Captain A controlled the aircraft extremely well during the touchdown; the aircraft slid along the snow-covered surface, passing over small obstructions, and came to a halt 470 m from the point of first contact with the ground (see Fig. 1-11. The co-pilot operated both engine fire-extinguishers and Captain C ordered the pilots to leave the aircraft immediately via the side windows. During the ground slide an orange glow was seen to light up the glass panels of the windows for a short time. There was no fire. After closing No. 1 power lever, Captain A remembered having ordered the shutdown drill for this engine but he could not say for certain whether this wae dme. It was established, however, that Captain B closed both the HP cocks at the first sensation of ground contact.

Douglas C-47 Skytrain (DC-3)

Flight 1030X was an extra scheduled international flight from Paris (Orly), France, to Jersey, Channel Islands. It took off from Orly at 1626 hours GMT. At 1706 hours, when about 100 miles from Jersey, the pilot made his first radio contact with Jersey zone concerning the Jersey weather. At 1742 hours he informed Jersey zone that he was descending to 1 500 ft and estimated Jersey at 1755 hours. He was then given the 1720 hours Jersey weather report, which included visibility 80 m, RVR 200 m and 818 cloud at the surface, after which the aircraft was cleared to Jersey Approach Control. In response to the approach controller's question as to his intentions concerning diversion, the pilot replied: "We'll come down the ILS and then overshoot and go to Dinard." The controller then cleared the aircraft to 1 000 ft and passed the QFE as 1 007 mb. The aircraft arrived at the Jersey beacon at 1753 hours and began an approach to runway 27, during which the guidance provided from the ILS was supplemented by distance information provided by the controller from the indications of the Decca 424 radar. The approach, the subsequent overshoot and the climb to 1 000 ft appear to have been without incident, following which the pilot informed the controller of his intention to make another approach and requested radar guidance back to the ILS outer marker. After directing the aircraft into position for a second approach to runway 27, the controller advised the pilot to take up his own headings on the ILS and informed him at 1803 hours that the aircraft was 5 miles from touchdown. Just after being given a distance of 4 miles, the pilot reported passing the outer marker and also that he was established, thus indicating that guidance was being received from the ILS and being used for the approach. Subsequent distance information was given by the controller at 1.5 mile, which was not acknowledged by the pilot, and again at 1 mile (at 1806:13 hours). Both these transmissions were clipped and are recorded as "... and a half miles now" and "... mile from touchdown". The latter transmission provoked an immediate "how many?" from the pilot, to which the controller replied by giving "three quarters of a mile now and left of the centre line." The pilot acknowledged this at 1806:24* hours with "TB" (the final two letters of the aircraft's registration). This was the last communication received from the aircraft. According to the air hostess, (the sole survivor), the flight was uneventful up to the time of the accident. She did not have any feeling of descending at any time. There was a bump which she attributed to the starboard undercarriage wheels having hit something; this was followed by a momentary roll to the right and a much greater roll back to the left. Subsequently, it was established that the aircraft had hit with its starboard wing the outermost approach light pole, which was 3 000 ft from the runway threshold, at a height 58 ft above runway level. After climbing slightly,'it rolled to an inverted attitude, at which time the starboard wing folded rearwards and separated as the aircraft dived to the ground, still inverted. It crashed at about 1806:27 hours. The stewardess survived while all 26 other occupants were killed.

Vickers Viscount

The aircraft was on a scheduled service (charter flight) from Berlin to Frankfurt-Main. Aboard were a pilot-in-command, a copilot, 2 stewardesses, 11 passengers and one child. The flight proceeded normally until the final approach at its destination. During a missed ILS approach in poor visibility the aircraft struck the ground alongside runway 25 and was badly damaged while rolling to a stop. Two of the sixteen occupants were injured. The accident occurred at 1848LT.