Aero Union

Lockheed P-3 Orion

Prior to the accident flight, the air tanker airplane had flown 9 times on the day of the accident, for a total flight time of 5 hours and 46 minutes. The purpose of the flights was to provide recurrent training for pilots scheduled to conduct fire-fighting operations for the United States Department of Agriculture Forest Service (USFS) during the upcoming fire season. Pilots aboard the airplane during the earlier flights reported no mechanical problems with the airplane. As was the mission for other flights that day, the accident flight, the tenth flight, was a training flight to conduct practice drops of water over an area of rugged mountainous terrain located north of the airport. Aboard the flight were the captain, the copilot, and the company's Chief Pilot, who was providing flight instruction. The Chief Pilot had been on board all the flights that day. Radar data indicated that the flight departed the airport and proceeded about 10.5 nautical miles to the north where it began maneuvering in a manner consistent with the conduct of practice water drops. The data showed the airplane entering and then following a right-hand racetrack pattern oriented northeast-southwest, during which it appeared that practice drops were being made on the southwest leg. During the last minute of the flight, the airplane was on the northeast leg of the racetrack pattern, flying up a valley that was oriented northeast-southwest with uphill being to the northeast. The airplane's flight path was initially near the middle of the valley. During the last 36 seconds of the flight, the airplane's flight path began to deviate towards the rising terrain on the eastern side of the valley. The last two radar hits show the airplane at an altitude of less than 100 feet above ground level. The airplane had completed approximately 1.75 circuits of the racetrack when the data ended with the airplane at 2,900 feet msl, heading northeast. The initial impact point was located about 2,150 feet northwest of the last radar data point at an elevation of about 2,450 feet msl, indicating the airplane entered a left descending turn and completed about 90 degrees of turn between the last radar hit and the impact. No distress calls were received from the airplane. According to local authorities, witnesses observed a "fire ball" at the time of the accident. Examination of the wreckage site revealed that the airplane impacted on about a 304 degree magnetic heading in a 40 degree left bank with the left wingtip striking the ground first. The airplane was severely fragmented and a severe post crash fire burned most of the structure and surrounding vegetation. Remnants of the entire airplane were accounted for at the wreckage site. There was no evidence of pre-existing structural failures or impact with foreign objects in any of the wreckage. All four of the engines and propellers were found at the wreckage site. The engines did not have any indications of an uncontainment, case rupture, or pre-impact in-flight fire. All four engines had damage to the compressor and/or turbine rotors that was consistent with engine operation. The cockpit engine instrumentation gages indicate that all four engines were running at about 2,200 shaft horsepower at impact. Review of the airplane's maintenance records did not reveal any chronic issues with the airplane nor any system/component anomalies that would have contributed to the accident. The airplane was equipped with neither a cockpit voice recorder (CVR) nor a flight data recorder (FDR) and Federal Aviation Regulations did not require the airplane to be so equipped. The reason for the in-flight collision with terrain could not be determined.

Douglas C-54 Skymaster

A Douglas C-54G & Beech 58P were on a fire suppression mission with the USDA Forest Service. The C-54 (Tanker 19) was being used as an aerial tanker, while the Beech 58 (Lead 56) was on a lead operation. Lead 56 departed the fire area about 5 minutes before Tanker 19. Both airplanes proceeded to an uncontrolled airport at Ramona, CA, for landing on runway 27 with a 360° overhead approach. Tanker 19 was on the initial approach about 1 mile east of the airport, when the two planes collided. Investigation revealed that Lead 56 struck the vertical stabilizer of Tanker 19, while descending. The empennages of both airplanes separated, and both crashed in uncontrolled descents. Before the accident, a Grumman S2 pilot was following Tanker 19. While in a shallow descent to the airport, he saw Tanker 19 slightly below the horizon and heard Tanker 19 make two calls (at 8 and 2 miles on initial approach). He also heard a transmission from Lead 56 moments before the collision, but did not see Lead 56, nor was he watching Tanker 19 when the collision occurred. Investigators were unable to determine Lead 56's activities after departing the fire area. Transmissions were heard from Lead 56 on the forest service tactical (operations) frequency when the plane was within 10 miles of the airport. Moments before the collision, Lead 56 was heard on the airport's common traffic advisory frequency (ctaf). Forest service procedures required that all pilots transmit their position on the ctaf within 10 miles of the airport. The forest service had not made arrangements with the airport manager to perform overhead approaches, nor were parameters published for initial approach altitude or airspeed.

Lockheed P-3 Orion

Air tanker N924AU had been dispatched from its base in Santa Barbara, CA to Missoula, MT to support fire suppression efforts involving a number of large fires in the Northern Region. The flight departed in VFR conditions at 16:05 PDT. While still in the area controlled by the Oakland FAA Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC), the crew requested and received an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) clearance. They were assigned an altitude of 23,000 feet. The Orion proceeded uneventfully and was handed off to the Approach Controller at Missoula (MSO). MSO Approach did not have, at that time, terminal radar equipment that covered their entire area of responsibility. At first contact with MSO Approach, the Orion was 26 miles southeast of the Missoula International Airport and descending to 12,000 feet. In the course of several exchanges between the Orion and the MSO Approach Controller, it was disclosed and confirmed that the Orion’s flight crew did not have the approach plate (or chart) depicting the published approach procedure for the VOR-DME Bravo (B) approach, which was the approach in use for aircraft arriving from the south. Clearance was nevertheless offered and accepted and the controller provided the information as the Orion crew began to execute the VOR-DME B approach. At this time, the cloud bases at the MSO Airport were at about 7,900 feet and other aircraft making instrument approaches there were descending through 8,000 feet, cancelling their IFR flight plans and making visual approaches to the airport for landing. Since the Orion’s crew was able to monitor these radio communications/transmissions on the same frequency, they were probably counting on doing the same. At this time, there were very strong winds and moderate to severe turbulence reported at altitudes above 8,000 feet that increased with altitude in the MSO area. In addition to turbulence, the Orion crew contended with effects of flying at high altitudes, using oxygen in an unheated and un-pressurized aircraft for more than two hours. At some point in the initial phase of the approach, some confusion as to what heading to fly apparently occurred and the airtanker turned back toward the south, away from MSO. By this time the controller had authorized descent to 8,600 feet on an approximate heading of 200 degrees magnetic. MSO Approach received notification by Salt Lake City ARTCC (Center) that this airtanker was west of the course consistent with the approach procedure and subsequent notification that the airtanker had disappeared off Center’s radar screen. Repeated attempts to contact the Orion crew failed and MSO Approach notified the County Sheriff’s office, the Forest Service, and other agencies that the aircraft was missing and presumed down. Search and rescue attempts were not able to detect an Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) signal. The mishap site was located the following day. Source: https://www.fs.usda.gov/managing-land/fire by Candy S. Rock Fitzpatrick.

Douglas C-54 Skymaster

The crew was completing a local training flight at Chico Airport. After touchdown, the nose gear collapsed. The airplane slid on its nose for few dozen yards before coming to rest. Both pilots escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Douglas C-54 Skymaster

After takeoff from Kenai Airport, while climbing to an altitude of 2,000 feet, the engine n°1 caught fire and exploded. The crew declared an emergency and elected to return to Kenai when a part of the left wing detached. Out of control, the airplane crashed in a pasture and was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. All three occupants were killed.

Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress

The crew was engaged in a fire fighting mission in the region of Tucson, Arizona. While flying at low height, the crew noticed a loss of power on all four engines and attempted an emergency landing. The aircraft crash landed in an uninhabited area and came to rest. Both pilots were uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Douglas A-26 Invader

The pilot, sole on board, was performing a fire fighting mission in the region of Springerville, Arizona. Approaching the drop zone, he lost control of the airplane that crashed in flames. The pilot was killed.

Douglas A-26 Invader

The pilot, sole on board, was completing a fire fighting mission in the region of show Low. While cruising at low height, the right engine lost power. The pilot shot down the engine and feathered the propeller and started to drop its retardant load when the left engine caught fire. He attempted an emergency landing when the airplane struck trees and crashed. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot was seriously injured.